DEBORAH WESLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1979-11-06
No. 78-1772
Before HENDRY and NESBITT, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
375 So. 2d 1093 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1979) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Deborah Wesley was convicted of battery and assault upon a law enforcement officer in circuit court. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the information charged only misdemeanors, placing the charges outside the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction, which extends only to felonies and misdemeanors arising from the same circumstances as a charged felony.


Holding

The circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the information charged only misdemeanors, and circuit court jurisdiction extends only to felonies and misdemeanors arising from the same circumstances as a felony also charged. The jurisdictional defect constitutes fundamental error that can be raised at any time, including on appeal. Therefore, the convictions are void.


Headnotes

[1] A challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a court is a fundamental error that may be raised at any time, including on appeal.

[2] Circuit courts in Florida generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses unless they arise out of the same circumstances as a felony charge.

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Key Quotes

“It is important to observe that each count alleges that the appellant unlawfully rather than knowingly committed the battery. Consequently, the accusatory pleading as written constitutes a misdemeanor pursuant to Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977) rather than a felony as provided by Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977).”

Establishes that the language of the charges determined whether they were misdemeanors or felonies, and that the information charged only misdemeanors.

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Facts & Procedural History

Wesley was charged by information with two counts of battery upon law enforcement officers (PTL. George Cabanas and another officer) while they were p…

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Opinion of the Court
NESBITT, Judge.

[*1094] NESBITT, Judge.

Appellant, Deborah Wesley, was charged by information in the Circuit Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit with two counts of assault upon a law enforcement officer. The material allegation of the information herein charges that:

Deborah Wesley . . . did then and there unlawfully commit battery upon PTL. GEORGE CABANAS, of the Key West Police Department, while said officer was in the lawful performance of his duties, to-wit: making the arrest of said DEBORAH WESLEY, by hitting said PTL. GEORGE CABANAS in the face, in violation of F.S. 784.03 and 784.07.

The remaining count names a different officer upon whom the battery had allegedly been committed but is otherwise essentially the same.

It is important to observe that each count alleges that the appellant unlawfully rather than knowingly committed the battery. Consequently, the accusatory pleading as written constitutes a misdemeanor pursuant to Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977) rather than a felony as provided by Section 784.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977). No objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was raised by a motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190.

After submission of the case, the jury returned the verdict of guilty as to Count I, a battery, and to Count II, an assault upon a law enforcement officer. The trial court withheld adjudication of conviction on the battery count and placed the defendant on probation for a period of two years with the special condition that she serve sixty days in the county jail. With respect to the assault conviction, the court adjudicated the defendant guilty and sentenced her to sixty days in the county jail to be served concurrently with the term of imprisonment on the battery conviction. No motion for arrest of judgment was made to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in accordance with Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.610.

Pursuant to Article V, Section 5(b), Florida Constitution, the Legislature has prescribed the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts over criminal offenses by the adoption of Section 26.012(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1977), which in pertinent part provides as follows: “[o]f all felonies and of all misdemeanors arising out of the same circumstances as a felony which is also charged.”

The threshold question is whether the appellant may challenge the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court initially on appeal. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error and can be raised at any time. Solomon v. State, 341 So. 2d 537 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). In the present case, each count of the information initially charges the appellant with a misdemeanor over which the Circuit Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the conviction of an assault upon a law enforcement officer did not arise out of an offense over which the Circuit Court had jurisdiction and is therefore void. Englund v. State, 368 So. 2d 86 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Radford v. State, 360 So. 2d 1303 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); and Waters v. State, 354 So. 2d 1277 (Fla.2d DCA 1978).

Accordingly, the judgments and sentences are hereby vacated and the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Allen v. State, 463 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …th allegations of the information, in and of themselves, do not demonstrate jurisdiction, then the cause should be dismissed with leave to file in the proper forum or, alternatively, transferred to that forum. Brehm v. State, supra; Wesley v. State, 375 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Englund v. State, 368 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). If, on the other hand, the allegations properly allege a jurisdictional basis, any determination during or after trial that the charges are not supported by the evidence does no…
  • Woods v. State, 879 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
    …Harrell v. State, 721 So. 2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing C.W. v. State, 637 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Booker v. State, 497 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Page v. State, 376 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wesley v. State, 375 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Waters v. State, 354 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Solomon v. State, 341 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)). In J.D. v. State, 849 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the court stated that "a lack of jurisdiction constitute…
  • Harris v. State, 854 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
    …jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See, e.g., Harrell v. State, 721 So. 2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Novatan v. State, 610 So. 2d 726, 728 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), approved on other grounds, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1994); Wesley v. State, 375 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). For two reasons, however, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. . First, the defendant’s main objective is to set aside his adjudication of guilt on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The plea colloquy ma…

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