STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT A. PRESTON, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of a suppression order in a capital murder case, holding that routine pretrial orders in capital cases should be reviewed by district courts rather than the Supreme Court, even though such orders would be reviewable on final appeal if a death sentence is imposed.
The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction over interlocutory orders in capital cases only under article V, section 3(b)(4) (writs of prohibition), not under section 3(b)(3). Routine pretrial orders like suppression rulings in capital cases should be reviewed by district courts, not the Supreme Court, even though such orders would be reviewable on direct appeal if a death sentence is ultimately imposed.
[1] The Florida Supreme Court may review interlocutory orders in capital cases under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, but will decline to exercise such…
[2] Routine interlocutory orders in capital cases, such as evidence suppression, are not directly appealable to the Florida Supreme Court unless they are raised as error in a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Interlocutory appeals under section 3(b)(3) are confined to orders "passing on a matter" which on final judgment would be appealable here.”
Establishes the narrow scope of Supreme Court jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert Preston was charged with first-degree murder, a capital offense. The circuit court entered a pretrial order suppressing certain evidence obtain…
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ENGLAND, Chief Justice.
The present interlocutory appeal is before the Court on transfer from the fourth district court of appeal. Before that court Preston successfully argued that jurisdiction properly lies in this Court under article V, sections 3(b)(3) and (1) of the Florida Constitution, since he is charged with a first-degree murder for which, on final judgment, the death penalty might be imposed. Treating the appeal as a petition for certiorari under section 3(b)(3), we transfer this cause back to the district court pursuant to article V, section 2(a) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(b).
Article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, authorizes the Court to review, in its discretion, “any interlocutory order passing upon a matter which upon final judgment would be directly appealable to the supreme court.” The matter here for review is a pretrial order of the circuit court suppressing certain evidence obtained during a search of Preston’s room.1
Preston argues that the Court’s jurisdiction over this appeal is supported by our exercise of jurisdiction in Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1977), and Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1978), both of which involved judicial decisions in the course of a capital case other than a final decision imposing a sentence of death.
Reino brought to the Court a trial court’s order which held that the statute of limitations on capital crimes did not bar Reino’s prosecution, and Bundy brought to the Court an order of the trial judge denying his disqualification to preside in a capital case. Unlike the present appeal, both of those cases came to the Court on petitions for writ of prohibition under article V, section 3(bX4) of the Constitution, which authorizes the Court to “issue writs of prohibition ... in causes within the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review.” Capital cases, of course, where the death penalty may be imposed, arguably will be “causes” within this Court’s jurisdiction to review. Nonetheless, our jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory matters in those cases was, as Justice Sundberg noted for the Court in Reino, “novel and not without doubt.” 2
Interlocutory appeals under section 3(b)(3) are confined to orders “passing on a matter” which on final judgment would be appealable here. Routine interlocutory orders in the course of a capital case, such as the suppression order in this case, could be, of course, appealable here if a conviction is had and a sentence of death imposed. Under those circumstances the interlocutory order would be reviewable here if argued as error as a part of the appeal. But the issues in these types of motions are not unique to capital cases or to the death sentence itself. There is no compelling reason that they cannot be reviewed in the district courts like all other interlocutory matters in the course of a criminal proceeding.
For this reason, we decline to exercise our jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders, in capital cases, under section 3(b)(3). We direct the transfer of this matter back to the fourth district court of appeal.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUND-BERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. . There is no independent basis for jurisdiction here under article V, section 3(b)(1), as the court’s order did not initially and directly pass on the validity of a state statute, a federal statute or a treaty, and did not construe a provision of the state or federal constitution.
. 352 So. 2d at 855.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1984)…press. The state filed an interlocutory appeal in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which transferred that case to this Court. We declined jurisdiction and remanded the cause to the Fifth District Court of Appeal for a decision. State v. Preston, 376 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1979). In State v. Preston, 387 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), the district court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence. The court specifically held that Preston’s mother had the authority to give consent to the search. Id.…1 / 2
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Harvard v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999)…bstantial issues of fact, this is not a new concept. We have declined jurisdiction over writ petitions and other analogous proceedings in the past for similar reasons.3 We have done so even in ongoing capital cases. For example, in State v. Preston, 376 So. 2d 3, 4-5 (Fla.1979), a capital case where the death penalty had not yet been imposed, we declined jurisdiction and transferred an interlocutory appeal, which we treated as a petition for writ of certiorari, because the issues raised were not unique to d…1 / 2
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State v. Fourth Dist. Court OF Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1997)…ty cases. This includes cases in which this Court has vacated a death sentence and remanded for further penalty proceedings. However, our jurisdiction does not include cases in which the death penalty is sought but not yet imposed, State v. Preston, 376 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1979), or cases in which we have vacated both the conviction and sentence of death and remanded for a new trial. We therefore recede from our decision in Williams and disapprove Chatman. We grant the petition for mandamus and direct that the…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Sanford Freed, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978)
- Rushing v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977)
- Renaldo Reino, Sr. v. The State of Fla. & the Honorable Gerald T. Wetherington, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977)