ROBERT EARL GREENE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Robert Earl Greene was convicted of second-degree murder of his nephew based primarily on his wife's testimony that she witnessed him inflict fatal blows. The Florida appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court committed reversible error by preventing cross-examination regarding the immunity agreement with the key prosecution witness and by allowing prejudicial evidence of the defendant's drug use.
The court held that both errors were reversible. First, it was reversible error to exclude evidence regarding the immunity agreement because such evidence was essential to allow the jury to assess the witness's bias, prejudice, and interest in the outcome when the case turned on conflicting testimony. Second, evidence of the defendant's drug addiction and marijuana use was irrelevant and served only to inflame and prejudice the jury, constituting reversible error.
[1] A trial court errs by sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's questioning of a witness regarding the terms and conditions of her immunity agreement, especia…
[2] Evidence of a defendant's drug addiction and unrelated criminal activity is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to inflame and prejudice the jury against the defendant.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In that state of the record, it was reversible error for the trial court to shut off defense counsel's effort to show whatever the agreement may have been between the State and Mrs. Greene in order to make available her testimony, so the jury may have known the full extent to which such immunity would properly relate to her interest in the outcome of the case and also to her bias and prejudice against the defendant.”
Establishes that preventing cross-examination about immunity was reversible error because the witness's testimony was central to the case and the jury needed to assess her bias and interest.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGreene and his wife were charged with second-degree murder of his nephew, who died from severe blows to the abdomen. The State granted immunity to Mrs…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Cross-Examination Scope cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Greene has perfected his appeal from the judgment and sentence imposed upon him following a jury verdict of guilty of second degree murder, such sentence being for a period of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
This case was prosecuted upon an information in which the State charged Greene and his wife, Mary, with second degree murder of his nephew. The child had been severely beaten and his death was caused by blows to his abdomen.
Prior to trial, the State, in exchange for her testimony, granted immunity to Mrs. Greene. When Mrs. Greene was testifying, she was asked by defense counsel concerning the terms and conditions of immunity. She disclaimed any knowledge as to how the immunity subject had been handled. When trial counsel attempted to question her concerning a letter written by her to her attorney concerning immunity, the State’s objection was sustained. In this regard, the court erred. The key evidence before the jury, upon which they found Greene to be guilty, was the testimony of Mrs. Greene; it was her testimony that she saw her husband inflict the blows upon the boy; it was his testimony that she was the one who, without any assistance from him, had inflicted all of the blows upon the boy. In that state of the record, it was reversible error for the trial court to shut off defense counsel’s effort to show whatever the agreement may have been between the State and Mrs. Greene in order to make available her testimony, so the jury may have known the full extent to which such immunity would properly relate to her interest in the outcome of the case and also to her bias and prejudice against the defendant. Frost v. State, 104 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); Coxwell v. State, 361 So. 2d 148 (Fla.1978); Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
This judgment and sentence is infected with further grievous error in that the State introduced evidence from several witnesses concerning the subject of the de fendant being a drug addict, smoking and selling marijuana, and that he suffered from a legal addiction to a prescribed drug, dilaudid, commonly known as morphine. His drug addiction and his use of marijuana had absolutely no connection with the case and could have served no purpose other than to inflame and prejudice the jury against the defendant in their consideration of whether they would accept the defendant’s version as to who inflicted the mortal wounds upon the child. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959); Beneby v. State, 354 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Buckhann v. State, 356 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
The judgment and sentence is reversed, with directions to grant the defendant a new trial.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jennings v. State, 478 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…ot illegal. Insofar as appellant is seeking to have the court revisit its sentencing discretion, relief should have been sought pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b), which provides for reduction or modification of a legal sentence. Cf., Bolt v. State, 376 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). However, Rule 3.800(b) expressly limits the time for such action to “within sixty days” after [*1110] imposition of sentence or disposition of a direct appeal. Appellant’s motion indicates that it was filed beyond this sixty day…
-
J. S. v. State, 382 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…ross-examination was therefore improperly restricted below. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Kufrin v. State, 378 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Holt v. State, 378 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Greene v. State, 376 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert, denied, 374 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1979). On this ground, I would reverse the adjudication and remand the cause for a new hearing.…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Coxwell v. State, 361 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1978)
- Beneby v. State, 354 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Buckhann v. State, 356 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Frost v. State, 104 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)