STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM RIKER, APPELLEE
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Florida's Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision that invalidated the child abuse statute as unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that the statutory language regarding deprivation of necessities and infliction of physical or mental injury provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and is constitutional.
The statute is constitutional and not impermissibly vague. The terms 'necessary clothing, shelter, or medical treatment' are adequately understood in the context of the statute's purposes, and the revised language punishing one who 'permits physical or mental injury to the child' is simpler and more straightforward than the predecessor statute's 'material endangerment' language previously upheld.
[1] Statutory language is adequate and constitutional when considered in the context of the statute's purposes.
[2] The phrase "necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment" is constitutionally sufficient to give notice of proscribed conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The sufficiency of this statutory language to give notice of the conduct proscribed should be considered in the context of the purposes of the statute, and when so considered, is adequate.”
Establishes the proper analytical framework for vagueness review—considering statutory language in light of the statute's purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Riker was charged with child abuse under Florida Statutes section 827.04(2). The county court dismissed the charge, holding the statute uncons…
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BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before the Court on appeal from a final decree of the County Court of Pasco County. The appellee was informed against for the crime of child abuse in violation of section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes (1977). The county court on motion of the defendant dismissed the information, expressly holding section 827.04(2) unconstitutional. The state appeals and this Court has jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides:
Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to the child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
The trial court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness. Specifically, the court said that the words “necessary clothing,” “necessary shelter,” “necessary medical treatment,” and “mental injury” are so vague as not to be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred. First we consider the statutory words “necessary . . . clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” The sufficiency of this statutory language to give notice of the conduct proscribed should be considered in the context of the purposes of the statute, and when so considered, is adequate. State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978); Campbell v. State, 240 So. 2d 298 (Fla.1970). The court also said that the words “mental injury” are vague. In State v. Joyce, we had for consideration the constitutionality of the predecessor to the statute before us now. Section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes (1975), provided:
Whoever, willfully, or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits the physical or mental health of the child to be materially endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemean-or of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.-084.
As indicated above, we held the words “necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment” to be adequate and constitutional. We also held that the statutory language referring to material endangerment of the mental or physical health of a child was sufficient to inform persons of common understanding of the proscribed conduct.
The language of the second independent clause in section 827.04(2), however, has been changed since the time of our decision in State v. Joyce. Ch. 77-429, § 1, Laws of Fla. Instead of referring to material endangerment of mental or physical health, the statute now seeks to punish one who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to the child. The language of this subsection as it reads now is simpler, more straightforward, and more readily understood by persons of common intelligence, than the “material endangerment” language upheld in State v. Joyce. We hold that it is not impermissibly vague.
The trial court erred in holding section 827.04(2) void for vagueness. The order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
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N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003)…hildren’s Hosp., Inc. v. Vigliotti, 385 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Indeed, failure to provide one’s child with adequate medical care certainly constitutes child abuse. See Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 970 (Fla.1999); State v. Riker, 376 So. 2d 862, 862 (Fla.1979). Additionally, absent some emergency or occurrence which requires “medical treatment ... necessary for the preservation of life,” M.N. v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Florida, Inc., 648 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the state and other…1 / 2
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Dufresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2002)…nded that the terms be defined by chapters 39, 984 and 985.” Id. Mental Injury In essence, the issue to be decided here is the applicability and effect of our decision in Fuchs to the vagueness challenge to section 827.03(l)(b). In State v. Riker, 376 So. 2d 862 (Fla.1979), this Court reviewed a trial court’s decision expressly holding the 1977 version of the child abuse statute, section 827.04(2), unconstitutional.2 On appeal, this Court held that the term “mental injury,” as well as other provisions in th…
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Wilson v. State, 744 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…rment of any bodily part.” See § 415.503(10), Fla. Stat. (1997). In addition, the term has been held not to be impermissi-bly vague. See State v. Bley, 652 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 660 So. 2d 712 (Fla.1995). See also State v. Riker, 376 So. 2d 862 (Fla.1979) (holding term "mental injury" not impermissibly vague).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Campbell v. State, 240 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1970)