TYRONE DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Tyrone Davis was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and sexual battery. The court reversed his conviction because the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a collateral crime on the issue of identity, as the similarities between the two crimes were insufficient to meet the legal standard.
Evidence of a collateral crime is admissible on the issue of identity only when there is more than mere general similarity between the crimes and there exists something unique or unusual about the perpetrators or their modus operandi. The similarities in this case—burglary, sexual battery of lone women, window entry, timing, and theft—were outweighed by significant dissimilarities in location, manner of sexual assault, assailant's attitude, and post-crime behavior, making the collateral evidence inadmissible.
[1] Evidence of collateral crimes is admissible to prove identity if the defendant can be positively connected to the collateral crime and there is more than a mere general s…
[2] Admissibility of collateral crime evidence on the issue of identity requires unique or unusual similarities in the perpetrator's modus operandi or characteristics, not ju…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There must be something unique or unusual about the perpetrators themselves or their modus operandi before evidence of a collateral crime will be admissible on the issue of identity.”
Establishes the strict standard required for admitting collateral crime evidence when identity is at issue
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis was charged with burglary of a dwelling and sexual battery. The prosecution introduced evidence of a collateral crime involving similar facts: b…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Identification Of Defendant cases and more on FLexlaw
HOBSON, Judge.
The appellant appeals his conviction for burglary of a dwelling and sexual battery. Although two points have been raised, only one, involving the admissibility of collateral crimes on the issue of identity, has merit and requires reversal.
Evidence of collateral crimes is relevant and therefore admissible for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959); Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Where the identity of the defendant is, as here, a material issue, evidence of a collateral crime to which the defendant can be positively connected is relevant, but it is not admissible unless there is more than a mere general similarity between the two crimes. Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The mere fact that a defendant is identified as having been involved in another crime does not render such collateral evidence admissible. Drayton v. State, 292 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). There must be something unique or unusual about the perpetrators themselves or their modus operandi before evidence of a collateral crime will be admissible on the issue of identity. Marion v. State, 287 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Beasley v. State, 305 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Sweet v. State, 313 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
While we agree with the learned trial judge that the facts of this case present a close question, we conclude that there were not enough similarities between the two crimes to justify admission of the collateral crime. Both crimes involved a burglary and sexual battery. A window was used to gain entry into the homes of young women living alone. The crimes were committed within three weeks of each other and took place at about the same time of night. Money was taken in both cases. There were significant dissimilarities, however. Not only did the crimes occur in different parts of the city, but the manner in which the sexual assaults were committed and the attitude of the assailant toward the victim varied substantially. Moreover, in addition to taking money, the assailant in the collateral crime ransacked the house for objects of value.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
GRIMES, C. J., and OTT, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Sias v. State, 416 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ral crime victim, that he committed the crime charged. See Beasley v. State, 305 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Accord, Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Marion v. State, 287 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Thus, in Davis v. State, 376 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the facts that the charged crime and the collateral crime involved burglary and sexual battery in which a window was used to enter the homes of young women who lived alone, occurred three weeks apart, and took place about the sam…
-
MacKlin v. State, 395 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…on trial. Assuming, but not deciding, that there was sufficient similarity between the collateral crime of February 12, 1977, and the crimes for which Macklin was on trial, but see Bradley v. State, 378 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Davis v. State, 376 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Henry v. State, 356 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), we consider Macklin's involvement in the criminal episode of February 12, 1977, to have become a feature not an incident of his trial in violation of the caveat in Williams v. St…
-
Joseph v. State, 447 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…re perpetrated, as compared to similarities so general as to be found in a vast number of like crimes, render the evidence of the collateral crimes irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, to establish the identity of the accused. See Davis v. State, 376 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); Franklin v. State, 229 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Accordingly, we re…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Ira G. Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Marion v. State, 287 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Beasley v. State, 305 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Cullen Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Masse v. State, 292 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Drayton v. State, 292 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Sweet v. State, 313 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)