ROSIE MAE REVERE, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ELLIS REVERE, DECEASED FOR THE BENEFIT OF SAID ESTATE AND ROSIE MAE REVERE, APPELLANT,
v.
SHELL CHEMICAL INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION LICENSED AND DOING BUSINESS IN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, ASGROW FLORIDA COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION AND JAMES B. JOINER, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A widow and estate representative appealed a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful death action against her husband's individual employer for pesticide exposure. The court affirmed, holding that Florida's workers' compensation statute bars third-party tort actions against an employee's own employer, regardless of the employer's negligence.
The court held that such an action is precluded by Section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes. The statutory bar applies to actions against an employee's own employer, distinguishing this case from actions against co-employees or true third parties. An individual employer cannot be sued as a co-employee.
[1] A third-party tortfeasor action against an employer is precluded when the employee's injury is compensable under workers' compensation.
[2] The concept of "third persons" against whom common-law actions may be brought for compensable injuries includes all persons other than the injured person's own employer.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the concept of "third persons," against whom common-law actions may be brought for compensable injuries, includes all persons other than the injured person's own employer”
Defines who qualifies as a third party defendant in workers' compensation cases; establishes that the employer is excluded from this category
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEllis J. Revere, an agricultural worker, died from unprotected exposure to pesticide while spraying from a truck operated by his employer, James B. Jo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Workers' Compensation Exclusivity cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is by the plaintiff below from a summary judgment in favor of James B. Joiner, one of the defendants in a wrongful death action.
The defendant Joiner was a truck farmer. As an individual, he was the employer of the plaintiff’s decedent Ellis J. Revere. Allegedly Revere’s death was caused by his unprotected exposure to a pesticide in the course of agricultural spraying thereof from a truck, operated by the employer Joiner, upon which the employee Revere was working; a result that was compensable under workmen’s compensation.
The summary judgment in favor of the defendant Joiner is affirmed on the ground that a third party tortfeasor action against said employer was precluded by Section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1977).
The right of an injured employee protected by workmen’s compensation to maintain an action against a co-employee whose negligence caused his injury [Franz v. McBee Company, 77 So. 2d 796 (Fla.1955)] is not applicable to an action against an employer. Here the individual employer Joiner was not a co-employee of the plaintiff’s decedent. In Cook v. Estate of Henry Lee Mills, 374 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), this court said:
“In the State of Florida, as elsewhere, the general rule holds true that ‘. the concept of “third persons,” against whom common-law actions may be brought for compensable injuries, includes all persons other than the injured person’s own employer; i. e.,; it includes co-employees, employers of employees working on the same project, and physicians whose malpractice aggravates the compensable injury.’ A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, Section 72.00 (Matthew Bender 1979).”
We hold to be misplaced, the reliance of the appellant on West v. Jessop, 339 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976), as basis to make the employer Joiner liable to suit as being a co-employee of the plaintiff decedent. In West it was held that an officer of an employer corporation can be regarded as a co-employee and subject to suit by a compensable injured employee of the corporation, when the corporate officer “has committed an affirmative act of negligence [causing the plaintiff’s injury] which goes beyond the scope of the nondelegable duty of the employer to provide his employees with a safe place to work.” However, in West it was made clear that such an action against the corporate employer would be precluded by the statute. Here the action against the individual employer Joiner was precluded by the statute. Mularkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Chase v. Tenbroeck, 399 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…McBee Company, 71 So. 2d 796 (Fla.1955). We disagree. Ten- [*61] ■broeck is the sole proprietor of the crane rental company. He does not possess the status of an employee even though he was working on the project. See Revere v. Shell Chemical, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1214 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. . For definitions of the terms contractor, subcontractor, and subsubcontractor, we turn to section 713.01, Florida Statutes (1975): (2) “Contractor” means…
Authorities Cited
- Frantz v. McBEE Co., 77 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1955)
- Mullarkey v. Fla. Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972)
- West v. Jessop, 339 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Miranda v. Evelio Miranda, 374 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)