CONCORD REALTY CORP'N AND IOWA MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
v.
ERNEST ROMANO AND FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Fla. | 1947-05-20
THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
159 Fla. 1 Florida Supreme Court (1947) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 30 So. 2d 495
Cited by 38 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Concord Realty and its insurance carrier appealed workers' compensation awards to an injured employee (Romano) who suffered a serious foot injury with systemic effects. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's award of temporary total disability compensation, holding that an injury producing incapacity throughout the body entitles the worker to such benefits regardless of the localized nature of the initial injury.


Holding

An injured employee is entitled to temporary total disability compensation where the injury produces such systemic effects that the injured person cannot engage in any kind of employment and is prevented from earning a livelihood, regardless of whether the initial injury is localized to a specific body part. The definition of disability under section 440.02(9) focuses on incapacity to earn wages, not the location or extent of the injury itself.


Key Quotes

“Where the injury produces such result, and the injured person is so incapacitated that he cannot engage in any kind of employment and is thereby prevented from earning a livelihood, he is entitled to temporary total disability compensation.”

Establishes the test for temporary total disability: total incapacity to engage in any employment, regardless of the localized nature of the injury.

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Facts & Procedural History

Romano suffered a serious accidental foot injury on March 20, 1945, arising out of his employment. The injury involved damage to a nerve that was neve…

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Opinion of the Court
KANNER, Associate Justice:

KANNER, Associate Justice:

This is a consolidated appeal from the Circuit Court by an employer and carrier from two orders of the Florida Industrial Commission, one from an order affirming the award *2on the merits, and the other on the ruling of the Commission that the Deputy Commissioner was without jurisdiction to modify his original award while the cause was then pending on appeal in the Circuit Court.

Appellee suffered a serious accidental injury to his foot, which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Deputy Commissioner found that appellee had been temporarily totálly disabled on the date of the accident, March 20, 1945, and ordered that he be paid on such basis. This was done until May 19, 1945, when the attending physician estimated that the maximum recovery had been reached and also estimated the permanent partial disability of the injured foot at 25% and, in consequence of which, appellants have refused to recognize the temporary total disability rate ordered to be paid.

Appellants contend that since such injury was only to the foot, which had reached maximum recovery without an operation, and this member was estimated at 25% to 33 1/3% permanently injured, which permanent disability probably would diminish if an operation were had, that this precluded a finding of temporary total disability.

The evidence discloses that though the injury was to the appellee’s foot, the effect of it extended to the whole body, due to an injured nerve which had never been repaired.

Where the injury produces such result, and the injured person is so incapacitated that he cannot engage in any kind of employment and is thereby prevented from earning a livelihood, he is entitled to temporary total disability compensation.

Under Workmen’s Compensation, Section 440.02, sub-section 9, F. S. 1941, the definition of “disability” is given as follows:

“ ‘Disability’ means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.”

On pages 828 and 829, 71 C. J. “temporary total disability is defined:

“Temporary total disability within the meaning of provisions allowing compensation therefor is the healing period, *3or time during which claimant is, by reason of his injury, unable to work, the period during which claimant is unable to work and is totally disabled and recovery is reasonably expected; and he is entitled to compensation for the period of the disability caused by the injury, whether resulting from a schedule injury or one not specifically provided for, where the statutory limit is not exceeded, but not for a period of incapacity thereafter caused by disease.”

Appellants complain about the refusal of the appllee to submit to a tendered operation. If such refusal is unreasonable, that is a matter that should be presented to the commission for determination, where the parties can be heard upon the issue. For if it is shown that the appellee unreasonably refuses a tendered operation, which, if successful, would remove the cause of his general disability and confine this disability to the functions of the foot, then a different situation is presented. As was stated by the Circuit Court when unholding the Commission’s award, it had assumed that appellants had tendered an operation, but this had nothing to do with the case, since there was no evidence or finding as to whether appellee had been unreasonable in failing to submit to an operation. The Circuit Court did not commit error when it sustained the award on the merits.

The ruling of the Commission on the Deputy Commissioner’s order modifying the original award was affirmed by the Circuit Court without prejudice to appellants. In this, there was no error.

The orders of the Circuit Court are hereby affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (13 total)

  • Regency INN v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …is “due to his physical capacity.” It is significant, however, that examination of the opinions in those three cases reveals that neither deals with the question of unavailability of jobs as a cause of wage loss. See, Concord Realty Corp. v. Romano, 159 Fla. 1, 30 So. 2d 495 (1947); Clark v. Western Knapp Engineering Co., 190 So. 2d 334 (Fla.1966); and City of Hialeah v. Warner, 128 So. 2d 611 (Fla.1961). . Parenthetically, we feel that it is fair to observe that the duration and amount of wage loss clai…
  • Corral v. McCRORY Corp., 228 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1969)
    …espects the Commission’s order is affirmed. It is so ordered. ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur. . Lobnitz v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 126 So. 2d 739 (Fla.1961). . Concord Realty Corporation v. Romano, 159 Fla. 1, 30 So. 2d 495 (1947). . Sand v. Eden Roe Hotel, 140 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1962), Alpert, Florida Workmen’s Compensation Law § 16:20 (1966).…
  • Sanz v. Eden ROC Hotel, 140 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1962)
    …and to require further proceedings consistent with these views. It is so ordered. THOMAS, Acting C. J., and THORNAL, O’CONNELL and HOBSON (Retired), JJ-, concur. . 99 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 304 (1958). . Concord Realty Corp. v. Romano, 159 Fla. 1, 30 So. 2d 495, 496 (1947). . “ * * * that there is no showing from this record that claimant’s alleged disability, that is, the pain, is or will be permanent.” . Trigg v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 581, 5 N.E.24 394, 108 A.L.R. 153 (1936); 1…

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