SPEEDLING, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
HAROLD "ANDY" KRIG, APPELLEE
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Speedling, Inc. appeals the denial of its motion to transfer venue from Pasco County to Hillsborough County in a breach of contract action. The court held that the cause of action accrued where the breach occurred—at Speedling's principal place of business in Hillsborough County where delivery was to be made—making venue improper in Pasco County.
Venue was improper in Pasco County. The cause of action accrued in Hillsborough County because that is where the breach occurred—where Speedling failed to deliver the plants at its principal place of business, which was the designated place of performance under the contract.
[1] For venue purposes, a cause of action on a contract accrues where the breach of that contract occurs.
[2] If a contract involves performance, the breach occurs where the defaulting party fails to perform an agreed-upon act.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A cause of action on a contract accrues for venue purposes where the breach of that contract occurs, and if a contract involves performance, the breach occurs where the defaulting party fails to perform an act that it has agreed to do.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for determining venue in contract breach cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarold Krig, a Pasco County resident, entered into contracts with Speedling, Inc., a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Hills…
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GRIMES, Chief Judge.
This appeal challenges an order denying the defendant’s motion to transfer venue in a contract action.
Harold Krig filed a complaint for breach of contract against Speedling, Inc. in the Circuit Court for Pasco County. The complaint alleged that in July 1978 Krig, a resident of Pasco County, and Speedling entered into a contract under which Spee-dling was to supply Krig with seedling plants for his farming operations. It further alleged that the parties executed the contract at Krig’s home. The contract, which was attached to the complaint, had the following notation: “method of payment — net ten days — all prices f.o.b. production area.” The complaint also alleged that difficulties arose in the production of the plants and that as a result Krig and Speedling entered into a new contract in September 1978 which also called for Spee-dling to supply plants to Mr. Krig. Spee-dling, however, refused to deliver the seedlings.
Speedling filed a motion to transfer venue to Hillsborough County and attached to that motion an affidavit of its president. In the affidavit, the president stated that Speedling was a Florida corporation having its principal and only place of business in Sun City in Hillsborough County. He also asserted that Speedling had always made delivery of its products to Mr. Krig at its place of business in Sun City. . The court denied the motion for transfer of venue, and Speedling instituted this timely appeal.
The applicable venue statute is Section 47.051, Florida Statutes (1977). It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.
It is undisputed that Speedling’s place of business was in Hillsborough County and that there was no property in litigation. Hence, if venue was proper in Pasco County, the cause of action would have had to have accrued there. However, as we view the record, the cause of action accrued in Hillsborough County.
A cause of action on a contract accrues for venue purposes where the breach of that contract occurs, and if a contract involves performance, the breach occurs where the defaulting party fails to perform an act that it has agreed to do. American International Food Corporation v. Lesko, 358 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Stanfield v. DeStefano, 300 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Williams v. Scholfield, 144 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).1 According to the affidavit submitted by Speedling’s president, Speedling always made delivery of its products at its place of business in Hillsborough County.2 Thus, the cause of action accrued there because that is where Speedling failed to perform by not delivering the plants which Mr. Krig had ordered.
In light of what we have said, it is clear that there was nothing upon which the court could base venue in Pasco County. For that reason, we reverse the order denying the motion to change venue and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHEB, J., and SHAFER, ROBERT T., Jr., Associate Judge, concur. . Krig cites Peters v. E. O. Painter Fertilizer Co., 73 Fla. 1001, 75 So. 749 (1917), and Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944), for the proposition that the cause of action accrues where the contract is made. Aside from the fact that an action for damages on a contract could hardly accrue until a breach occurs, each of these cases involved breaches of warranty in which the delivery of the tainted product had taken place in the county where venue was held to lie. See Williams v. Scholfield in which the court specifically rejected the interpretation of Peters now argued by Krig.
. This assertion is supported by the provision of the contract which called for prices to be paid f.o.b. production area.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Windsor v. Crescent A. Migliaccio, 399 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…Steel Products, Inc., v. Powell Brothers, Inc., 385 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), which would be Volusia County, where he resides. A cause of action for venue purposes accrues in the county where the contract is breached. Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So. 2d 57 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). If a plaintiff alleges breach of a covenant to pay money due or already earned under a contract, the cause of action accrues where performance of the act of payment was to occur. Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934);…
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Tropicana Prods., Inc. v. Hoke H. Shirley, 501 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…a contract accrues for [*1375] venue purposes where the breach of that contract occurs, and if a contract involves performance, the breach occurs where the defaulting party fails to perform an act that it has agreed to do.” Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So. 2d 57, 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In the instant case, Shirley sued Tropicana for damages resulting from Tropicana’s alleged breach of the contract by refusing to accept the 1985-86 fruit crop. The declaratory judgment count concerned Tropicana's alleged anti…
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Am. Vehicle Ins. Co. v. Olive Goheagan, 35 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…f that contract occurs, and if a contract involves performance, the breach occurs where the defaulting party fails to perform an act that it has agreed to do.’ ” Koslow v. Sanders, 4 So. 3d 37, 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So. 2d 57, 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). In Oliver v. Severance, 542 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), Severance obtained insurance through Oliver, who did business in Clay County. Severance was later injured and made a claim, which was denied. Id. Severance fi…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Oneida Langley Blanton v. THE Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872 (Fla. 1944)
- Peters v. E. O. Painter Fertilizer Co., 73 Fla. 1001 (Fla. 1917)
- State v. McCORMICK, 358 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Am. Int'l Food Corp. v. Lesko, 358 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Dep't OF Natural Res. v. Burton Holmes, 300 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Williams v. Scholfield, 144 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)