ULYSSES HOLT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ulysses Holt was convicted of armed robbery based largely on testimony from the sole direct witness, Gwendolyn Tisdale, who had been granted immunity. The court reversed his conviction because the trial judge improperly restricted cross-examination of Tisdale regarding the details and circumstances of her immunity grant, violating Holt's Sixth Amendment right to confront and test the credibility of witnesses.
The trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of the immunity witness. A defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination includes the right to expose a witness's motivation for testifying and any reasons other than merely telling the truth, and evidence of such motivation must be presented to the jury.
[1] The exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.
[2] A trial court errs by unduly restricting cross-examination concerning a key witness's potential bias or motive for testifying.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”
Establishes the legal principle that defendants have a constitutional right to explore a witness's motivation, particularly relevant when the witness received immunity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHolt was charged with armed robbery. The only direct evidence placing him at the crime scene came from Gwendolyn Tisdale, who was also charged in the …
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COBB, Judge.
The defendant, Ulysses Holt, was charged with armed robbery.
The key witness at trial against Holt was one Gwendolyn Tisdale, who also was charged with the robbery.
Prior to trial Tisdale had been granted immunity for her testimony.
She had refused to talk with defense counsel at scheduled depositions and, at one point, had fled from the jurisdiction.
At trial the only direct evidence placing Holt at the scene of the crime came from Tisdale.
Although the fact of the grant of immunity to her was elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination, the efforts of defense counsel to inquire as to the details surrounding that grant of immunity were foreclosed by a series of inexplicable objections and rulings thereon by the trial court.
Illustrative of the circumscription of cross-examination of this key witness is the following excerpt from the trial transcript: Q.
During this interview, did the police officers indicate to you that they would grant you immunity?
MR.
That is hearsay, Your Honor.
BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
At any point during this conversation, did you get the impression that you were being offered something in return for giving a statement?
MR.
That calls for a conclusion.
BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
Did you eventually make a statement that Ricky Holt and Willie Herman and Chuck Felton were' involved in this? A. Yes, I did. Q.
Why did you make that statement?
MR.
That is irrelevant.
MR. VALERINO: I feel that it is a relevant question as she has been denying any knowledge concerning this particular incident.
THE COURT: The Court sustained the objection.
Proceed with your next question.
BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
What did you tell them then? A. When? Q.
After you say you told them these people were involved? A. I told them who it was and what happened on the day of the robbery. Q.
After you made the statement to them, were you arrested? A. No, I wasn’t. Q.
What happened to you after you made the statement to them? A. I was allowed to go home. Q.
Allowed to go home? A. Yes. Q.
Prior to making the statement concerning Mr. Holt and Mr. Davis and Mr. Felton, did the police officers tell you you were going to go to jail, that they were going to get you put in prison for ten years or a period of time?
MR.
That is hearsay.
It is beyond the scope.
MR. VALERINO: Would the Court consider argument on that, Your Honor?
THE COURT: No. BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
At anytime, did you flee the jurisdiction of the State of Florida?
MR.
It is irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct.
MR. VALERINO: I feel it is relevant.
BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
Were you eventually made a co-defendant in this case? A. Yes, I was. Q.
And, when were you promised immunity if you testified here today? A. Tuesday. Q.
Do you recall being in Orange County back in 1976, August of 1976? A. Yes, sir, I do. Q.
Where had you come from?
MR.
It is beyond the scope and is irrelevant and immaterial.
MR. VALERINO: Would the Court consider argument on that, Your Honor?
THE COURT: No. BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
Do you recall appearing in Court in 1976, and refusing to testify?
MR.
It is irrelevant and immaterial and beyond the scope of Direct Examination.
BY MR. VALERINO: Q.
When did you decide to come to Florida?
When did you decide you wanted to testify in this particular case?
Did you notify anybody?
MR.
It goes beyond the scope.
MR. VALERINO: I have no further questions, Your Honor. The exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-376, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).
Any evidence which tends to establish that a witness is appearing for the State for any reason other than merely to tell the truth should not be kept from the jury.
Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and SHARP, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Rondy Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…v. State, 428 So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Harmon v. State, 394 So. 2d 121,125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The ability to expose an improper impetus for a witness’ testimony is an essential component of the right to a jury trial. See Holt v. State, 378 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (exposure of witness’ motivation in testifying is “proper function of constitutionally protected right of cross-examination”); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In exploring the types of wr…
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Wyon Dale Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…902-03 (1933) (concluding that had the issue been properly preserved, it would have been error for the trial court to limit cross-examination of a state witness as to his hopes for leniency when he testified previously for the State); Holt v. State, 378 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (stating, "[a]ny evidence which tends to establish that a witness is appearing for the State for any reason other than merely to tell the truth should not be kept from the jury,” including the details surrounding a grant…
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Hair v. State, 428 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…148 (Fla.1978); Porter; Nelson. Accordingly, when cross-examination alone is not sufficient to expose the possibility of improper motives in a witness, a defendant may present other impeachment testimony to demonstrate bias. Thus, in Holt v. State, 378 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), the court stated: The exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination .... Any evidence which tends to establish that a witness is appearing for…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974)
- Cowheard v. State, 365 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)