ROBERT P. SCOTT, APPELLANT,
v.
E. L. WALKER, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND MOBILE LAND AND TITLE COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Robert Scott appeals the denial of his motion to vacate a class-action judgment in a mobile home park dispute, arguing inadequate class representation and lack of notice to class members. The appellate court affirms, holding that procedural due process requires adequate representation by the class representative, not individual notice to all class members, and that Scott failed to demonstrate inadequate representation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Procedural due process requires that the class representative adequately represent the interests of the class, not that individual notice be provided to all identifiable class members. Scott failed to demonstrate in his motion or accompanying affidavits how Walker inadequately represented the class.
[1] Procedural due process in class action suits does not require notice to all class members, but rather adequate representation of the class interests by the representative…
[2] A party moving to vacate a class action judgment based on inadequate representation must demonstrate how the representative's actions were insufficient.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“procedural due process does not require notice to all class members in class action suits, but requires instead that the class representative adequately represent the interests of the class.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard: due process protection in class actions depends on adequate representation, not individual notice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceE. L. Walker filed a class-action suit in May 1976 on behalf of mobile home park lot owners, including Scott, challenging service fees charged by Mobi…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Robert P. Scott appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate final judgment in a class-action suit instituted in 1976 by E. L. Walker. Scott contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion because Walker inadequately represented the class and did not give the requisite notice to class members. We disagree, and affirm.
On May 20, 1976, Walker filed a class-action suit against Mobile Land and Title Company, owner of a mobile home park, seeking to invalidate the service fee paid by residents of the park to Mobile pursuant to the terms of the park’s Declaration of Conditions. The complaint also sought to enforce other provisions of the Declaration. Walker sued on behalf of himself and all other lot owners in the park, including Scott. Subsequently, Walker and Mobile entered into a stipulation for settlement, and on September 26, 1978, the trial court entered a final judgment based upon the stipulation.
On March 8, 1979, Scott moved on behalf of himself and other lot owners to vacate the judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Initially, he contended that Walker did not give notice to any lot owners of either the suit, the settlement or settlement negotiations, and that this violated procedural due process requirements as set out in Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (Fla.1976). We disagree with Scott’s construction of Frankel. It is true that Frankel states that procedural due process requires that individual notice be provided to those class members who are identifiable through reasonable effort. Id. at 469. This statement, however, is based directly on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). Eisen, however, is based on the mandatory notice requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Subsections (b)(3) and (c)(2), and not on procedural due process requirements. In fact, procedural due process does not require notice to all class members in class action suits, but requires instead that the class representative adequately represent the interests of the class. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940); see also Paulino v. Hardister, 306 So. 2d 125 (Fla.2d DCA 1974).
Finally, in his motion, Scott stated that Walker did not adequately represent the class. Neither in the motion nor in its accompanying affidavits, however, did Scott show how Walker inadequately represented the class. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Claffey v. Serafino, 338 So. 2d 270 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); see also Kar Kare Owners Group of Florida, Ltd. v. Chason, 356 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Scott’s motion to vacate the judgment.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Smith v. Weede, 433 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…v. Gelkop, 384 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) [order denying a motion to vacate a final judgment of marriage dissolution under rule 1.540 and a contempt order enforcing support provisions reviewable under rule 9.130(a)(4) and (5) ]; Scott v. Walker, 378 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) [order denying motion to vacate final judgment in class action suit treated as non-final for purposes of appeal]; Markham v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 373 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) [interlocutory appeal from order denying m…
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Marco Island Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Luc Christian Mazzini, 805 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…ument because, in the context of class actions, due process does not require that notice be given to all class members but instead requires that the class representative adequately represent the interests of the other class members. Scott v. Walker, 378 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also Paulino v. Hardister, 306 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Thus, by establishing that Mrs. Bhavnani is proceeding without legal counsel, the record on its face demonstrates that the due process rights of the remaining…
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Augustin P. Lagarde, Jr. v. Outdoor Resorts OF Am., Inc., 428 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…, the trial court entered an order denying relief which resulted in the previous appeal which we have now judicially noticed. The proper way to attack a final judgment in a class action is by a proceeding pursuant to rule 1.540(b). Scott v. Walker, 378 So. 2d 828 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Erhardt v. Erhardt, 362 So. 2d 70 (Fla.2d DCA 1978). The parties who sought that relief in the previous trial proceeding and its ensuing appeal are the same parties who brought the separate declaratory action below resulting in th…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (U.S. 1974)
- Hansberry v. LEE, 311 U.S. 32 (U.S. 1940)
- Frankel v. City OF Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1976)
- Claffey v. Serafino, 338 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- KAR Rare Owners Grp. OF Fla., Ltd. v. Chason, 356 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)