STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
LAWRENCE CARL WRIGHT, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a surviving co-perpetrator of a robbery can be guilty of felony murder in the second degree when a police officer shoots and kills another co-perpetrator during the commission of the robbery. The Court reversed the district court's decision that section 782.04(3) requires the victim to be an 'innocent' person.
A surviving co-perpetrator is guilty of felony murder in the second degree when a police officer kills another co-perpetrator during the crime. Section 782.04(3) contains no requirement that the victim be an 'innocent' person; the statute applies regardless of the victim's status as a perpetrator or accomplice.
[1] A surviving co-perpetrator of a felony may be guilty of felony murder when another co-perpetrator is killed by a police officer during the commission of the felony.
[2] The statute defining second-degree felony murder does not limit liability to situations where an innocent person is killed during the commission of a felony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The question involved is whether a surviving co-perpetrator of a robbery is guilty of felony murder in the second degree when a policeman shoots and kills another co-perpetrator during the perpetration of the robbery. We answer in the affirmative.”
Directly states the legal question and the Court's holding on the central issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWright and McRae committed a store robbery while Robertson waited in the getaway car. During the police interception, a gunfight ensued. Robertson was…
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ADKINS, Justice.
By petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of the district court of appeal, Wright v. State, 344 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), which allegedly conflicts with a decision of this Court, Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606 (Fla.1978) on the same point of law. Art. V, § 3(b)(3).
The question involved is whether a surviving co-perpetrator of a robbery is guilty of felony murder in the second degree when a policeman shoots and kills another co-perpetrator during the perpetration of the robbery. We answer in the affirmative.
The defendant, a person named McRae, and a person named Robertson were involved in the robbery of a store. Defendant and McRae committed the robbery while Robertson waited in the automobile. As they were attempting to leave after the robbery, the police intercepted the trio and a gun battle resulted. The defendant and Robertson were apprehended, but Robertson was fatally wounded by a bullet originating from the gun of one of the policemen.
Pursuant to plea negotiations defendant entered a plea of guilty to the robbery count and nolo contendere to the murder charge. Upon appeal the judgment of guilt for second degree murder was reversed and the judgment and sentence for robbery were affirmed. The district court of appeal held that section 782.04(3), Florida Statutes, defining those who shall be liable for second degree felony murder, does not contemplate a prosecution for that offense where an accomplice, co-conspirator or co-perpetrator of the underlying felony is subsequently killed by a police officer during the commission of the underlying felony.
In Mikenas v. State, supra, which was decided by this Court subsequent to the decision of the district court of appeal, this Court held to the contrary. In Mikenas the evidence disclosed that Barker, an auxiliary deputy sheriff, shot and killed Vito. Vito was a co-perpetrator. The defendant, in his appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree, argued that only “innocent” persons killed during the perpetration of a felony were intended by the legislature to be included in the phrase “a person is killed” contained in section 782.04(3) Florida Statutes (1975). We held there was nothing in the clear language of the statute which limited application to innocent persons killed by one perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony. That portion of the decision of the district court of appeal which reverses the judgment of guilt for second degree murder is quashed and the cause is remanded with instructions to affirm the judgment and sentence for second degree murder and reconsider the judgment and sentence for robbery. See State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (1979).
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
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Amos Lee King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1980)…nvoluntary sexual battery. We agree. Where the underlying felony was an element of the felony murder, a defendant cannot be sentenced for both the underlying felony and the felony murder. Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1979); State v. Wright, 379 So. 2d 96 (Fla.1979); State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla.1979). We find that appellant’s sentence for involuntary sexual battery must be vacated. The appellant also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to life imprisonment for the attempte…
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Amlotte v. State, 456 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1984)…t the death even if the killing was unintended. [*451] This doctrine has been extended to impute intent for deaths caused by the acts of co-felons, see, e.g., Mills v. State, 407 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and police, see, e.g., State v. Wright, 379 So. 2d 96 (Fla.1979), during the perpetration of certain felonies. Further extension of the felony murder doctrine so as to make intent irrelevant for purposes of the attempt crime is illogical and without basis in law. I recognize that our recent decision i…
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Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979)…llant with both crimes. However, where the underlying crime is an element of the greater offense, the defendant may [*MCCXLI] be convicted and sentenced only for the greater of the crimes. State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla.1979); State v. Wright, 379 So. 2d 96 (Fla.1979). See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). Robert Mahaun’s conviction for third-degree felony murder stands, but the conviction for chil…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1979)
- Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1978)
- Wright v. State, 344 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)