AMERICAN HERITAGE INSTITUTIONAL SECURITIES, INC., ROBERT L. NOBLE AND FORREST THOMPSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
FRANCIS T. PRICE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-01-30
No. 79-324
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.
379 So. 2d 420 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The appellants sought interlocutory review of a trial court order denying their motion to strike and motion for judgment on the pleadings in a class action case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order because determining whether a cause of action can proceed as a class action does not affirmatively determine liability under Florida's appellate rules.


Holding

The court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's order because determining whether a cause of action can be prosecuted as a class action does not affirmatively determine liability. The determination merely allows the case to proceed toward a potential but unestablished liability.


Headnotes

[1] An order determining whether a cause can be brought as a class action does not determine the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief, and thus i…

[2] Appellate Rule 9.130 replaced former Appellate Rule 4.2 and no longer provides for interlocutory appeals of matters formerly cognizable in equity.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The determination by a trial court that a cause can be appropriately brought as a class action, or that the allegations are sufficient to sustain a class suit, does not affirmatively determine liability. It allows the cause to proceed towards a potential liability as yet undetermined, and one which may never be established.”

Establishes the core holding that class certification orders do not determine liability and therefore are not reviewable as interlocutory appeals.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The appellees filed a two-count complaint that the appellants sought to strike or dismiss via motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court de…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SHARP, Judge.

SHARP, Judge.

The Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order denying the Appellant’s Motion to Strike and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal. The motions in the lower court were directed to whether the causes of action as stated in a two count complaint could be prosecuted as a class action. The Appellants urge that we have jurisdiction to review these non-final orders of the trial court under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure:

Review of non-final orders of lower tribunals is limited to those which . determine . . the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief.

We disagree. The determination by a trial court that a cause can be appropriately brought as a class action, or that the allegations are sufficient to sustain a class suit, does not affirmatively determine liability. It allows the cause to proceed towards a potential liability as yet undetermined, and one which may never be established.

Prior to the adoption of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective March 1, 1978, the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint in class actions was frequently the subject of appeal to the District Courts of Appeal of Florida. See Davidson v. Lely Estates, Inc., 330 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Rosenwasser v. Frager, 307 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975); Hendler v. Rogers House Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). These appeals were taken as “interlocutory” appeals under Rule 4.2, which provided: “Appeals may be prosecuted in accordance with this rule from interlocutory orders in civil actions which, from the subject matter or relief sought, are such as formerly were cognizable in equity . . . In equity, it has long been held that when a question is one of common or general interest to many persons, who constitute a class so numerous as to make it impractical to bring all of them before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.

Rule 9.130 has replaced former Appellate Rule 4.2. It no longer has the general category of matters formerly cognizable in equity. Under Rule 9.130 we do not have jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory orders raised in this appeal. Atreco-Florida, Inc. v. Berliner, 360 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla.1978). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the appeal is granted, and the appeal is hereby dismissed.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw