MARGARET W. INGRAM, PETITIONER,
v.
MAX H. INGRAM, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Appeal's decision that allowed a husband to claim a special equity in marital property based on financial contributions, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying such a claim and that the proper remedy, if needed, was through discretionary alimony rather than a property interest.
The trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying special equity; the district court erred in reversing without finding such abuse. However, the trial judge retained discretionary authority to award alimony to the husband if necessary to do equity between the parties. The case is remanded for the trial judge to reconsider the matter if appropriate.
[1] An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in dissolution proceedings absent a finding of abuse of discretion.
[2] A trial court has discretion to determine whether a party has established a claim for "special equity" in marital property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There was no finding by the district court that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the husband's claim of a "special equity."”
Establishes that the district court violated precedent by reversing without identifying abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWife entered marriage with title to a home purchased ten months prior with a $200 down payment. The parties lived in the home during an eight-year mar…
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OVERTON, Justice.
This case is before the Court on a petition for writ of certiorari from the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported as Ingram v. Ingram, 364 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The petitioner alleges conflict with Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976), on grounds that the district court substituted its judgment for that of the trial judge, despite the fact that there was no finding that the trial judge had abused his discretion. We find conflict with Shaw v. Shaw, as well as with our recent decision in Canakaris v. Canakaris, No. 54,124 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction,1 and quash the opinion of the district court.
This controversy arises from a dissolution proceeding in which the husband claimed a “special equity” in the marital home. The wife entered this marriage with title to the home which she had purchased, with a $200 down payment, approximately ten months prior to the marriage. The parties lived in the house during the eight-year marriage. During the course of the marriage both parties contributed to the house payments. The husband, who had two daughters from a previous marriage living in the marital home, contributed the majority of each mortgage payment. The husband also paid for various repairs and improvements to the home.
In its final judgment, the trial court refused to grant the husband a “special equity” in the home. The district court of appeal reversed and found that the husband’s financial contributions toward the mortgage constituted a “special equity,” and remanded the case for a determination of his share. There was no finding by the district court that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the husband’s claim of a “special equity.”
We have recently discussed the concept of “special equity” and the discretion of the trial judge in dissolution proceedings in our decisions in Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, No. 53,966 (Fla.1980), and Canakaris v. Canakaris, No. 54,124 (Fla.1980). The determination of the trial judge that there was no “special equity,” as we have defined it in Duncan and Canakaris, was proper. Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976). This does not mean that the trial judge was without the discretionary authority to make an alimony award to the husband if such an award was necessary to do equity between the parties.
We quash the opinion of the district court. In view of our decisions in Duncan and Canakaris, we direct that the district court remand to the trial judge for reconsideration if he deems it appropriate, given all the circumstances of the case.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, J., concurs in result only.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
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Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…(Fla.1980); Bullard v. Bullard, 385 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. dismissed, 307 So. 2d 186 (Fla.1975). . In the light of Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980), and Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1980), the wife now concedes that there is no basis for her claim of a “special [*579] equity” in any property either jointly owned or held in the husband’s name alone. See also Farrington v. Farrington, 390 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). . We…
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Roffe v. Moises Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…l court’s power to fashion, by this device, an equitable distribution of the parties’ property—in other words, to “make a property settlement agreement” for them—which we think has been granted by Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra, and Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla.1980); see Blum v. Blum, supra; Bird v. Bird, 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla.4th DCA 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 383 So. 2d 1143 (Fla.4th DCA 1980).1 The wife somewhat inconsistently also argues that the chancellor should have distributed the parties’ i…
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Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…his suggestion prospective only. Moreover it should be remembered that equitable distribution can involve an award of the wife’s property to the husband as well as vice versa. See Roffe v. Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1980). As to the standards to be used to effectuate equitable distribution, the court in Canakaris contented itself with quoting the last paragraph of Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (1979) which says: The court may consider any other factor…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Brown v. State, 364 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Ingram v. Ingram, 364 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)