DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD AND GALLAGHER BASSETT INSURANCE SERVICE, APPELLANTS,
v.
DORIS B. WALKER, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation case, the Florida District Court of Appeal partially affirmed and partially reversed an award of temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits to a school teacher who injured her back. The court found that the claimant's return to work demonstrated partial ability, negating temporary total disability during summer, but affirmed the award of permanent partial disability attributable to the work accident rather than apportioning it based on preexisting conditions.
The court reversed the award of temporary total disability for the summer period, finding that the claimant's return to work in May demonstrated partial ability to work. The court affirmed the permanent partial disability award as non-apportionable, holding that while an employer's knowledge of a prior disability is not relevant to compensation determinations, substantial evidence showed the prior condition was asymptomatic and never affected her work before the accident.
[1] A claimant's return to work demonstrates a partial ability to work, and the claimant must show subsequent total disability to receive further temporary total benefits.
[2] An employer is responsible for the full extent of a claimant's disability when a prior condition was asymptomatic and did not manifest independently of the injury at issu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellee's return to work in May, 1977, demonstrated a partial ability to work and that she did not show she was subsequently totally disabled during the period of summer school”
Establishes that prior work performance negates claim for total disability during subsequent period
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoris B. Walker, a school teacher, injured her back in March 1977. She had a preexisting back condition from prior surgery of which the employer was a…
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PER CURIAM.
The carrier in this worker’s compensation case appeals the Judge of Industrial Claim’s Order in its award of temporary total benefits and in its award of permanent partial disability benefits.
The appellee-claimant injured her back while working as a school teacher in March of 1977. The Judge awarded her temporary total disability benefits from that date until May 27, 1977, when she returned to work until school ended for the summer. He ordered further temporary total payments from June 16, 1977 to August 26, 1977, the period of the summer holiday during which appellee was unemployed. Appellee stated she was exhausted after the three weeks of desk work and felt unable to work during the summer term.
We agree with the appellant that appellee’s return to work in May, 1977, demonstrated a partial ability to work and that she did not show she was subsequently totally disabled during the period of summer school. See Teleprompter of Florida, Inc. v. Springer, IRC Order No. 2-3439 (1978).
The Judge also found that the appellee had sustained a 30% permanent par tial anatomical disability, 20% of which was attributable to a preexisting back condition of which the employer was aware and 10% of which was attributable to the accident in March of 1977. The appellant argues the Judge erred in finding it responsible for benefits based on the 30% rating, rather than on the 10% disability allocable to the accident, solely because of the Judge’s statement that it was responsible for the merged disability because “the employer had knowledge of [the claimant’s] . prior surgery and disability. . . . ” We agree with the appellee that, although an employer’s knowledge of a prior disability is no longer relevant to a determination that a claimant will be compensated for disability due to a prior injury and disability due to the injury at issue, that finding alone does not merit reversal of a case. See Section 21, Chapter 74-197, Laws of Florida and Media General Hospital v. Printing Pressmen and Assistants’ Union, IRC Case No. 2-3468 (1978).
Here, there was competent substantial evidence that appellee’s prior condition was asymptomatic before the accident to the extent that it never affected her work, and there was no evidence that the prior disability manifested itself independently of the disability caused solely by the accident in 1977. Apportionment was thus not proper in this case. See Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission, 196 So. 2d 748, 752-753 (Fla.1967).
Finally, we agree that the order should be modified to the extent that it appears to order appellant to pay for the unclaimed bill of Dr. Burbacher for his September 26, 1978, examination of the appellee.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERVIN, SHIVERS and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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Daytona Linen Serv. & Mission Ins. Co. v. Cora M. Davis, 454 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ed to the introduction of these bills on the basis that no claim had been made for them. That portion of the order sub judice ordering the employer/carrier to pay the emergency room hospital bills is reversed. Cf. Dade County School Board v. Walker, 379 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (modifying an order which appeared to award payment of an unclaimed medical bill). In all other respects, the order sub judice is affirmed. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. MILLS and WIGGINTON, JJ„ CONCUR. . E.g., Commercia…
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Escambia Cnty. Council ON Aging & Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Goldsmith, 465 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…s Court have consistently and uniformly applied the criteria set forth in Evans: Sarasota County v. Reichert, 413 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Caruso v. Crown Liquors, Inc., 379 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Dade County School Board v. Walker, 379 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Boca Raton Sprinkler v. Andrews, 416 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Barile Excavation & Pipeline Sewer Improvement v. Hough, 417 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Willard Kaufman Company v. Rawlings, 414 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Evans v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967)