ROBERT JAMES HUNSUCKER, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a marijuana possession conviction because officers executed a search warrant without knocking and announcing their authority, lacking sufficient justification under Florida law to dispense with this requirement.
A warrantless entry into a home without knocking and announcing authority violates the Fourth Amendment and Florida law when the officer's fear of evidence destruction is based on generalized statistics and lack of knowledge about the amount of contraband sought.
[1] Officers executing a search warrant must knock and announce their authority and purpose unless they have specific, articulable facts justifying a no-knock entry, not mere…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Even if there were articulable reasons to believe that the occupants were disposed to destroy contraband in such circumstances, the officer had no knowledge of the amount of contraband he was to search for and seize.”
Court explaining why the officer's fear of evidence destruction was uninformed and unjustified.
Officers executed a search warrant for drugs at appellant's home. The first officer to enter did not knock and announce his authority and purpose, cla…
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ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Judge.
An appeal from a judgment of guilt for possession of marijuana exceeding five grams. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the incriminating evidence found in appellant’s home when officers executed a search warrant for drugs. The first officer to enter explained that he did not knock and announce his authority and purpose because of the possibility that the evidence he sought would be destroyed by the occupants. The officer estimated that evidence had been destroyed in half the instances in which he complied with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1979), before entering. The officer also thought that persons standing in the yard might alert those inside, although they did not. The entry was unlawful and the motion to suppress should have been granted. Kistner v. State, 379 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla.1964); Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla.1972); Berryman v. State, 368 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Even if there were articulable reasons to believe that the occupants were disposed to destroy contraband in such circumstances, the officer had no knowledge of the amount of contraband he was to search for and seize. His fear that the contraband would be. destroyed in the time required to knock and announce was uninformed and therefore unjustified.
REVERSED.
LARRY G. SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Robinson, 565 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…oor, who disappeared inside the house, would destroy evidence or become violent. Although this situation may have concerned the deputies, the evidence on this factor did not compel the trial court to find an exigent circumstance. Hunsucker v. State, 379 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); see also Bouknight. II. Both the trial court and this court are required to use the exclusionary rule as the remedy for any violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987). This judicially created remedy was announced as…
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State v. Hume, 463 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…eral. Absent a specific basis for fearing either imminent peril to the undercover officer or a defendant’s ability to escape or destroy evidence, the failure to “knock and announce” based on general information cannot be excused. Hunsucker ¶. State, 379 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In opposition to the foregoing analysis, the state points to a line of cases dealing with “buy-busts” which collectively hold that the “knock and announce” statute does not apply where an undercover officer involved in an illic…
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Jacquelyn Harriet Bouknight and Nellie Mae Anderson v. State, 455 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…ere apparent to him at the time of his entry, and those facts must relate to the particular ease — not some generalized experience the officer may be aware of. See, e.g., Berryman v. State, 368 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla.4th DCA 1979); Hunsucker v. State, 379 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In the latter case, we held that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress, despite the searching officer’s esti [*440] mate that evidence had previously been destroyed in half of the instances in which he…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964)
- Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972)
- Berryman v. State, 368 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Kistner v. State, 379 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)