CLYDE W. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
MYRA MORGAN, APPELLEE
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The Florida Court of Appeal held that a circuit court lacks jurisdiction to use contempt power to enforce child support arrearages after the child support obligation has been abated due to changed circumstances. The court reasoned that contempt is an extraordinary remedy justified only by the public necessity of ensuring minor children receive support, and that necessity disappears once the obligation ends.
A circuit court lacks jurisdiction to use contempt power to enforce child support arrearages after the support obligation has been abated. The extraordinary remedy of contempt is justified only by the public necessity of ensuring minor children receive support; once that necessity disappears, contempt is no longer an appropriate remedy. The former obligor's remedy for recovering arrearages is limited to judgment enforceable by ordinary civil proceedings.
[1] A circuit court lacks jurisdiction to punish failure to pay child support arrearages through contempt when the obligation for current support has been abated because the…
[2] The extraordinary remedy of contempt is applicable to child support judgments to ensure the support of minor children, but its justification expires when the public neces…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The circuit court is empowered to utilize its contempt power to demand the payment of child support whenever the minor child continues to need support, whether it be for past or present support... When the public necessity is no longer present, the purpose and justification for the extraordinary remedy of contempt expires.”
Establishes the foundational principle that contempt power is justified only by the public necessity to ensure minor children's support
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1963, appellant was ordered to pay $25 per week in child support until the child reached age 21. In May 1979, when the 17-year-old son began residi…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant contends the circuit court is without jurisdiction to punish through contempt the failure to pay child support ar-rearages for a minor child for whom the husband’s obligation for current support has been abated. We agree.
In a final decree entered on October 28, 1963, appellant was ordered to pay $25.00 per week for child support until the child reached the age of 21. On May 23, 1979, the circuit court entered an order abating the child support obligation effective April 24, 1979, because the 17 year old son was now residing with appellant.
On the same day, the circuit court entered an order finding appellant in arrears of his support payments as of December 31, 1978. Appellant was held in contempt of court and sentenced to five months and 29 days in jail. The sentence was suspended upon condition that appellant pay $55.00 every two weeks towards the arrearage.
The circuit court is empowered to utilize its contempt power to demand the payment of child support whenever the minor child continues to need support, whether it be for past or present support. Patterson v. Patterson, 348 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The extraordinary remedy of contempt is applicable to divorce judgments for child support because of the public necessity for insuring the support of minor children. When the public necessity is no longer present, the purpose and justification for the extraordinary remedy of contempt expires.
By analogy, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to use its power of contempt to enforce payment of child support arrearag-es on accrued, unpaid installments after the child has reached majority. Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). In Wilkes, after the children had reached majority, the wife initiated contempt proceedings against her former husband for child support arrearages which had accrued when the children were still minors. This court held the extraordinary remedy of contempt could not be utilized to collect past due installments of child support under such circumstances because the purpose and justification for the use of contempt expired when the children reached majority.
The rationale in Wilkes, supra, applies to the present case. Here, the father’s obligation for child support was abated by the circuit court when the child began residing with the father. The order of abatement eliminated the public necessity for the extraordinary remedy of contempt since the father is now supporting the child directly.
Consequently, we hold the trial court was without jurisdiction to punish appellant by contempt for failure to pay child support arrearages for the minor child for whom appellant’s obligation for current support has been abated. In child support eases, the remedy of contempt should only be used when necessary to insure the support of minor children. Contempt is not an appropriate remedy to aid in the collection of money judgments. The wife’s remedy for recovery of the child support arrearages is now limited to a judgment enforceable by ordinary civil proceedings. Moreland v. Moreland, 358 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Accordingly, the order is reversed.
ERVIN, SHIVERS and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1990)…that even if contempt proceedings are found to be proper to enforce payment of a judgment for support arrearages, the remedy is unavailable once the child attains the age of majority. For this proposition Gibson relies on two cases, Smith v. Morgan, 379 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). See also Schwarz v. Waddell, 422 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gersten v. Gersten, 281 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). In both first district cases, the court held that th…
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Pyne v. Black, 650 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…2d 565 (Fla.1990). . Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1990); Ragan v. Thomas, 515 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Hinton v. Reynolds, 442 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Johnson v. Johnson, 382 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Smith v. Morgan, 379 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Patterson v. Patterson, 348 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). .Pottinger v. Pottinger, 133 Fla. 442, 182 So. 762 (1938); Puglia v. Puglia, 600 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Larger v. Diaz, 595 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Bin…
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Newman v. Newman, 459 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…s not now authorized. Compare Catches v. Catches, 409 So. 2d at 1200 (authorizing use of trial court’s contempt authority after child had reached majority where husband had been found in contempt while child was still a minor), with Smith v. Morgan, 379 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (no civil contempt power to collect arrearages after child has attained majority), and Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 437 (Fla.1971) (court lacked jurisdiction to punish father for…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Patterson v. Patterson, 348 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Bogle v. State, 245 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Moreland v. Moreland, 358 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)