MARTIN BARBER, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE W. HATCH AND JERRY WRIGHT, APPELLEES
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Lessor sought eviction against lessee and purported assignee of a long-term lease. The trial court found an assignment valid through equitable estoppel and granted specific performance, but the appellate court reversed because the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof for establishing estoppel.
The trial court erred by applying the wrong quantum of proof. Estoppel requires certainty with facts clearly and satisfactorily proved, not merely supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial applying the correct standard of proof.
[1] Estoppel requires facts that are clearly and satisfactorily proved, not taken by argument or inference.
[2] A trial court's finding of estoppel based on the greater weight of the evidence, rather than a higher standard of proof, constitutes error.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Before an estoppel can be raised there must be certainty and the facts necessary to constitute it cannot be taken by argument or inference, nor supplied by in-tendment. They must be clearly and satisfactorily proved.”
Establishes the legal standard for proving estoppel, which requires certainty and clear and satisfactory proof rather than a mere preponderance of the evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA lessor filed an eviction action against a lessee and a successor claiming to be an assignee of a 20-year lease. The lease prohibited assignment or s…
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[*537] COBB, Judge.
This case was commenced by the filing of an eviction action by the lessor of realty against the lessee and a successor to the lessee, alternately and confusingly referred to throughout the evidence as sub-lessee and an assignee of the lease. The lease was a long-term lease of twenty years. The defense of estoppel was raised, and the “assignee” counterclaimed for foreclosure of an equitable lien, which related to improvements he had made on the premises. The original lease contained a prohibition against assignment or sub-leasing without the written consent of the lessor. At trial there was testimony concerning a written assignment of the lease, but that document was never introduced in evidence. It has been represented to this Court at oral argument that this omission resulted from misplacement of the document at the time of trial. The evidence does not indicate that this document was signed or witnessed as required by Section 689.01, Fla.Stat. (1977). Indeed, it is not clear that it was ever physically delivered to the “assignee.” On the other hand, no objection was raised before the trial court to testimony as to the contents of this assignment.
The trial court apparently found an assignment of the lease on the basis of equitable estoppel applied against the lessor, and entered a judgment of specific performance for the “assignee” of the lease — relief which had not been requested.
The first point raised by the appellant is dispositive of this appeal: the trial court erred in finding estoppel based upon the greater weight of the evidence as opposed to the standard enunciated in the case of Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corporation, 99 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla.1957):
Before an estoppel can be raised there must be certainty and the facts necessary to constitute it cannot be taken by argument or inference, nor supplied by in-tendment. They .must be clearly and satisfactorily proved.
In the instant case, the trial court stated at the conclusion of the non-jury trial the following:
The Court finds that the greater weight of the evidence supports the defenses of the defendants and denies the petition of the complaint and of the plaintiff.
Although the final judgment is silent as to the quantum of evidence, there is no indication that the higher degree of proof required was substituted by the trial court during the interim between trial and judgment.
In the case of Hi-Acres Groves, Inc. v. Bassett, 338 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), the question of the appropriate remedy when the trial judge employs the wrong quantum of evidence is discussed. In that case, the majority opted for temporary relinquishment of jurisdiction to the trial court for thirty days with directions that the court reconsider the evidence utilizing the proper standard of proof. The dissent considered that the trial court should not be called upon to recall all the criteria and circumstances from a stale printed record.
We do not adopt, at this time, either the majority or dissenting view in Hi-Acres as an inflexible guideline. Based on the record of the instant case, we believe that a new trial is appropriate. Cf., Rossmoor Corp. v. Tri-County Concrete Products, Inc., 375 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
ORFINGER, J., concurs.
UPCHURCH, J., concurs specially with opinion.
UPCHURCH, Judge,
concurring specially-
While I concur in the result, I question the logic of a rule which imposes a higher standard of proof for estoppel, Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corporation, 99 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1957), than for fraud and deceit, Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla.1971), Blaeser Development Corporation v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Martin County, 375 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBRIDE, 517 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1987)…inference, nor supplied by intendment, but clearly and satisfactorily proved. This is a significantly higher degree of proof than by the greater weight of the evidence. Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corp., 99 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1957); Barber v. Hatch, 380 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). These standards, and the quantum of proof required, places the burden upon the trial court to ascertain that there is competent, substantial evidence adduced at the trial which would constitute clear and convincing proof of th…1 / 2
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Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…d 580 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Johnson v. Jaquith, 189 So. 2d 827 (Fla.4th DCA 1966); or (b) the lessor has waived the right to withhold consent by accepting benefits, Crossman v. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 273 F. 2d 720 (5th Cir. 1959); Barber v. Hatch, 380 So. 2d 536 (Fla.5th DCA 1980); Gould v. Ruzakowski, 345 So. 2d 842 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Leeds Shoes, Inc. v. Wally, 309 So. 2d 249 (Fla.4th DCA 1975); Tollius v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., 244 So. 2d 467 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). See Annot. 54 A.L.R.3d 679 (1973). .…
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Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 450 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…da Keys Boys Club, Inc., 358 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Harrell v. Branson, 344 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 675 (Fla.1977); Pender v. Hatcher, 303 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA ,1974); the concurring opinion in Barber v. Hatch, 380 So. 2d 536 at 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence standard) with Canal Authority v. Ocala Mfg. Ice & Packing Co., 332 So. 2d 321 (Fla.1976); McCrary v. Bobenhausen, 366 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Headley v. Pelham, 36…
Authorities Cited
- Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971)
- Jarrard v. Assocs. Disc. Corp., 99 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1957)
- Hi-Acres Groves, Inc. v. Bassett, 338 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Blaeser Dev. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Martin Cnty., 375 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Rossmoor Corp. v. Tri-County Concrete Prods., Inc., 375 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)