VICENTE RODRIGUEZ, A/K/A VINCENTE RODRIGUEZ, A/K/A VICENTE RODRIGUEZ, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Vicente Rodriguez appeals his conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm. The appellate court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case to correct the sentence, finding that the trial court improperly applied an ex post facto statute by retaining jurisdiction over parole release decisions for an offense committed before the statute became effective.
The trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3) because applying the statute to an offense committed before its effective date constitutes an ex post facto law prohibited by the Florida Constitution. The conviction is affirmed, but the case is remanded to delete the court's reservation of jurisdiction from the sentence.
[1] A statute that increases punishment or alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage, when applied to an offense committed before the statute's effective date, is a…
[2] The date of the offense, rather than the date of conviction, is the significant event for determining the ex post facto effect of a law.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[o]ne which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed, or which increases the' punishment, or, in short, which in relation to the offense or its consequences alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.”
Court's definition of an ex post facto law, establishing the standard for evaluating whether Section 947.16(3) violated constitutional protections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRodriguez was charged with robbery with a firearm on February 13, 1978. An amendment to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, allowing trial courts to …
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Vicente Rodriguez, a/k/a Vincente Rodriguez, a/k/a Vicente Rodriguez, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm. We affirm the conviction but remand for correction of the sentence.
The only point appellant raises which has merit is his contention that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for the first third of his sentence pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.).
The date of the offense with which appellant was charged was February 13, 1978. The effective date of the amendment to Section 947.16 allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction to review a parole release order during the first third of the sentence of a person convicted of any of the enumerated crimes, including robbery, was June 19, 1978. Appellant was convicted and sentenced on September 20, 1978.
We agree with appellant that Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978) is an ex post facto law as applied to him. An ex post facto law, which is prohibited by Article I, Section 10, Florida Constitution, is defined as “[o]ne which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed, or which increases the' punishment, or, in short, which in relation to the offense or its consequences alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 31, 101 So. 233, 235 (1924) (emphasis added). The challenged amendment to Section 947.16 clearly does alter appellant’s situation to his disadvantage.
A law is ex post facto when applied to an offense which occurred before the law became effective. State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So. 2d 150 (Fla.1977). “[T]he significant event as far as judging the ex post facto effect is the date of the offense rather than the conviction.” Greene v. State, 238 So. 2d 296, 301 (Fla.1970). Inasmuch as appellant’s offense was committed prior to the effective date of the statute in question, application of this law to him would be ex post facto in effect and therefore cannot apply to him.
Accordingly, appellant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed; however, the cause is remanded with directions to delete from the sentence the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction.
SCHEB and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1981)…effect enhanced his sentence. The district court agreed, finding that “by applying a statute which did not exist at the time of the offense, the [trial] judge in effect extended appellant’s jail time.” 383 So. 2d at 725. Accord, Rodriquez v. State, 380 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (same holding). We find that the most recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), controls the issue and mandates an affirmance. In Weaver, a prisoner had…
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Slaughter v. State, 493 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…s rationale in Stacey was explained as follows: Respondent’s trial took place in August 1981, well after we issued State v. Williams, [397 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1981) ] in April 1981, and the Second District Court of Appeal issued [State v.] Rodriguez [, 380 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) ] in March 1980. Thus,- both trial and appellate counsels had on-point controlling case law holding that retention of jurisdiction was unconstitutional.. Id. at 1351. Unlike Stacey, at the time of the sentencing hearing in the in…
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Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ause it imposed an additional requirement on eligibility for parole that was more onerous than the previous law, which did not grant judges such authority. E.g., Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509; Prince v. State, 398 So. 2d 976; Rodriguez v. State, 380 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Retrospective application of the provisions in section 947.1745(4) would permit the cir- [*936] euit judge to object to parole release even though that judge had previously declined to reserve jurisdiction for this purpose in ac…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Gale Distribs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1977)
- Greene v. State, 238 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1970)
- Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26 (Fla. 1924)