UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING CORPORATION, AND EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, APPELLANTS,
v.
ANDREW CARTIER, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1980-03-11
No. 79-1216
Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ.
380 So. 2d 1160 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to claimant's counsel in an equitable distribution proceeding because the relevant statute does not authorize such fees in that context.


Headnotes

[1] Attorney fees are not authorized in an equitable distribution proceeding under Section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes.

[2] An award of attorney's fees under Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes, is permissible only when a court reviews a claim, not in an original proceeding.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Following a work-related injury, an employee received workers' compensation benefits and sued the manufacturer of the equipment for defective design, …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BASKIN, Judge.

BASKIN, Judge.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court properly awarded attorney’s fees to claimant’s counsel in an equitable distribution proceeding. We hold that the trial court erred in making the fee award and reverse.

Appellee, Andrew Cartier, was awarded $25,350.86 in workmen’s compensation benefits from his employer’s insurer following a work-related injury.

Cartier then sued Universal Engineering Corporation, the manufacturer of the rock crusher, for defective design. The jury awarded Cartier $75,000 reduced by his 30% comparative negligence or $52,500 plus costs. Upon settlement after appeal was filed, Cartier received $53,250.

Although Cartier claimed the insurer was entitled to $242.80 on its subrogation lien, the insurer sought $10,000. ' The trial court awarded the insurer $2,500 in the equitable distribution proceeding on its subrogation lien and awarded, in addition, counsel fees of $2,780 based solely upon counsel’s affidavit. Because we find error in the award itself, we do not reach the question of the manner used to determine the amount of attorney’s fees, but note that appellee has confessed error on that point.

Both parties agree that Section 440.-39(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees in an equitable distribution proceeding.1

Attorney fees contemplated under this section are for the prosecution of the suit against the third party tort feasor, and by the clear language of the statute it does not appear that the legislature intended to provide fees for opposing any claim which might be made in connection wtih [sic] the “equitable settlement” provided for in the statute. There is no ambiguity in the statute upon which a claim for attorney fees for such service might be resolved in favor of the appel-lee.

Insurance Company of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So. 2d 447 (Fla.1956) at p. 450.

Appellee argues that Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1973), authorizes the award. He contends that a claimant should not be required to pay his own legal fees in attempting to retain past benefits paid, citing Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, 350 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1977) for the proposition.

Parrish, supra, involved successful opposition to the modification of an equitable distribution order. It dealt with Section 440.34, Florida Statutes, as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees on review of an equitable distribution award, and is therefore distinguishable from the case before this court.

Section 440.34(1), Florida Stathtes (1973), states:

If the employer or carrier shall file notice of controversy as provided in § 440.20, or shall decline to pay a claim on or before the twenty-first day after they have notice of same, or shall otherwise resist unsuccessfully the payment of compensation, and the injured person shall have employed an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there shall, in addition to the award for compensation be awarded reasonable attorney’s fee, to be approved by the division which may be paid direct to the attorney for the claimant in a lump sum. If any proceedings are had for review of any claim, award or compensation order before any court, the court may allow or increase the attorney’s fees, in its discretion, which fees shall be in addition to the compensation paid the claimant, and shall be paid as the cburt may direct.

Thus, only a judge of industrial claims may award an attorney’s fee in an original proceeding. A court may award a fee only where it reviews a claim. State ex rel. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Johnson, 118 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1959). In the case before this court, the trial court heard the case as an original proceeding and therefore lacks authority to award a fee.

We find the trial court committed error in awarding attorney’s fees to claimant’s counsel in an equitable distribution proceeding.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court awarding attorney’s fees.

. Section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973) states:

Upon suit being filed the employer or the insurance carrier, as the case may be, may file in the suit a notice of payment of compensation and medical benefits to the employee or his dependents, which said notice shall be recorded and the same shall constitute a lien upon any judgment recovered to the extent that the court may determine to be their pro rata share for compensation benefits paid or to be paid under the provisions of this law, based upon such equitable distribution of the amount recovered as the court may determine, less their pro rata share of all court costs expended by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the suit including reasonable attorney’s fees for plaintiffs attorney . . .

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Effie Culmer and Cameron Culmer, 402 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …Rainey, 86 So. 2d 447 (Fla.1956). Finally, on the question of the failure to award an attorney’s fee to the Culmers, Section 440.-39(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), does not authorize such an award. See Universal Engineering Corporation v. Cartier, 380 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In addition, even though the Department was awarded far less than it was seeking in equitable distribution, nonetheless, it was unquestionably the prevailing party by virtue of securing a $500 award. Accordingly, (a) we hereby r…
  • …rrell, 147 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); cert. denied 155 So. 2d 150 (Fla.1963). Edmondson’s contention that the trial court erred by denying his petition for attorney’s fees is also without merit. See Universal Engineering Corporation v. Cartier, 380 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Ed-mondson’s other contentions have been considered and have been determined to be without merit. Accordingly, the order appealed is AFFIRMED. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and ERVIN, Associate Judges, concur.…
  • Caravasios v. M.W. Spates Constr. Co., 441 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1983)
    …s and the fifty per cent award of past and future medical benefits, including the award for professional medical services and reimbursement for penalties and interest. The court affirmed the fee denial, citing Universal Engineering Corp. v. Cartier, 380 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), but reversed that portion of the trial court’s order awarding reimbursement for penalties and interest the carrier was required to pay because of its dilatory payment of claims. Appellate counsel was awarded a fee under the autho…

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw