ALARM SYSTEMS OF FLORIDA, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD R. SINGER ET AL., APPELLEES; EDWARD R. SINGER ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. ALARM SYSTEMS OF FLORIDA, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this insurance coverage dispute arising from a burglary, the court affirmed the trial judgment finding Alarm Systems liable for the loss of scheduled property but reversed the award of pre-judgment interest to the Singers (insureds) while affirming such interest for St. Paul Fire Insurance Co. The court also held the trial judge lacked authority to amend a final judgment on appeal by striking pre-judgment interest.
The trial court lacked authority to modify a final judgment while it was on appeal. Pre-judgment interest should be awarded to St. Paul Fire Insurance Co. because its claim was liquidated when it paid the damages for scheduled items. Pre-judgment interest should not be awarded to the Singers because their claim for damages was unliquidated until the trier of fact determined the amount.
[1] A trial court lacks authority to amend a final judgment that is currently on appeal.
[2] Pre-judgment interest is recoverable on a liquidated claim from the date of payment.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find that the trial judge was without authority to disturb the final judgment, which was then on appeal, by the motion to amend to strike the pre-judgment interest.”
Establishes that trial courts cannot modify final judgments after appeal is filed.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA burglary resulted in loss of scheduled and non-scheduled personal property, including jewelry. St. Paul Fire Insurance Co. paid damages for the loss…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Liquidated Claims cases and more on FLexlaw
BARKDULL, Judge.
Following the prior opinion in this cause, reported in Singer v.
I. A. Durbin, Inc., 348 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), this matter recurred in the trial court for a trial of the issues as made by the pleadings. The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of St. Paul Fire Insurance Co. on the amount it had paid on the loss occasioned by the burglary of scheduled items of personal property, and liquidated the amount claimed by the Singers to have been the loss of non-scheduled property, to wit: certain jewelry; and thereupon entered a final judgment for said amounts and incorporated pre-judgment interest from the date of the burglary for Singer and from date of payment by St. Paul Fire Insurance Co. Alarm Systems filed a notice of appeal and thereafter filed a motion to amend the judgment by striking the pre-judgment interest. The trial judge granted the motion to amend, struck the pre-judgment interest, and the plaintiffs appeal this order which appeal was consolidated with the earlier appeal from the judgment in chief. We affirm the final judgment as rendered by the trial judge as to the amount of the loss and the responsibility of the defendant for such loss, there being ample evidence to support such recovery under the issues as made by the pleadings.
We find that the trial judge \vas without authority to disturb the final judgment, which was then on appeal, by the motion to amend to strike the pre-judgment interest. Liberman v. Rhyne, 248 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); State v. Seay, 355 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); General Portland Land Development Company v. Stevens, 356 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
However, concerning the appellant’s point addressed to the pre-judgment interest (preserved in the original appellate proceedings), we find that the trial court was correct in awarding the pre-judgment interest to St. Paul Fire Insurance Co., because its claim was liquidated in amount when it paid the damages for the loss of the scheduled items; this was a fixed amount as of the time it was paid and interest should be allowed from the date of the payment.
As to the interest awarded to the Singers, we reverse. Their claim for damages for the loss was not fixed until a determination was made by the trier of fact as to amount and, therefore, it was unliquidated and no pre-judgment interest should have been awarded. Vacation Prizes, Inc. v. City National Bank of Miami Beach, 227 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); McCoy v. Rudd, 367 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
The final judgment, as originally entered on June 11, 1979, be and the same is hereby affirmed, except that portion which awarded pre-judgment interest to the Singers and, in that respect, it is hereby modified by striking said interest award.
Affirmed, as modified.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bergen Brunswig Corp. & Health Application Sys., Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 415 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…interest may be awarded when damages are a fixed sum or an amount readily ascertainable by simple calculation and not dependent on the resolution of conflicting evidence, inferences, and interpretations. See Alarm Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Singer, 380 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Town of Longboat Key v. Carl E. Widell & Son, supra; also see Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 214 F.Supp. 647 (M.D.Tenn.1963). Indeed, this court has recited such, in dicta, as the applicable rule. See McCoy v. Rudd, 36…
-
Honeywell, Inc. v. Trend Coin Co., 449 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…t price or market value, citing Sullivan v. McMillan, 37 Fla. 134, 19 So. 340 (1896). Here, however, the exact loss cannot be ascertained because the quantity of precious metal lost is in dispute. See [*879] Alarm Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Singer, 380 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Honeywell’s other arguments are without merit. See Fitzgerald v. Young, 105 Idaho 539, 670 P. 2d 1324 (Ct.App.1983) (comparative negligence not a defense to intentional tort); Melendres v. Soales, 105 Mich.App. 73, 306 N.W. 2d 39…
-
Warren v. OLD Dominion Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…mount of the damages cannot be computed except on conflicting evidence, inferences, and interpretations.” Town of Longboat Key v. Carl E. Widell and Son, 362 So. 2d 719, 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See also Alarm Systems of Fla., [*1378] Inc. v. Singer, 380 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Bryan & Sons Corp. v. Klefstad, 265 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). The underlying premise of this rule is that a person who is liable for damages cannot be in default for nonpayment of an unknown sum — Le., a sum that cannot be…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haskell Liberman and Leatrice Liberman v. Rhyne, 248 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Vacation Prizes, Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank OF Miami Beach, 227 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Scott v. State, 355 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Gen. Portland Land Dev. Co. & Greater Fla. Inv. Co. v. Stevens, 356 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- McCOY v. Rudd, 367 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Singer v. I.A. Durbin, Inc., 348 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)