THEODORE CLEVELAND CHAVERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Theodore Chavers was convicted of burglary but appealed on two grounds: improper prosecutorial comments about his failure to explain possession of stolen goods, and prejudicial cross-examination of a key defense witness regarding unrelated acts of sexual misconduct. The appellate court found the first argument meritless but reversed due to the improper impeachment of the defense witness whose testimony was central to Chavers' defense.
The court held that the prosecutor's question and officer's answer regarding unexplained possession of stolen goods did not constitute improper comment on the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and were proper to permit inference of guilt. However, the trial court erred in allowing cross-examination regarding the witness' unrelated acts of sexual misconduct, as such evidence is improper to impeach credibility except through prior convictions. Because the defense witness' testimony went to the heart of appellant's defense, the error was not harmless.
[1] A prosecutor's question and arresting officer's answer regarding the explanation for possession of recently stolen goods are permissible when the purpose is to allow the…
[2] Inquiries into the general moral character of a witness are improper, although general reputation for truth and veracity may be shown.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Such inquiries are proper when the purpose is to permit the jury to consider the inference of guilt drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of recently stolen goods.”
Establishes that questioning about unexplained possession is permissible and does not violate the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChavers was convicted of burglary of a structure. At trial, the prosecution questioned the arresting officer about whether the defendant or co-defenda…
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COBB, Judge.
Appellant, convicted of burglary of a structure, contends the trial court erred: (1) in denying a motion for mistrial after allegedly improper prosecutorial comments; and (2) in allowing prejudicial cross-examination of a key defense witness concerning unrelated specific acts of sexual misconduct.
Appellant contends that the following prosecutor question and arresting officer answer amounted to an improper comment upon the failure of the defendant to make a statement or explanation, in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966):
Q. Did they give any explanation for the possession of those coats?
A. Stanley Scott, a Co-defendant, gave me a statement later at the Police Department.
We find appellant’s argument to be without merit. The foregoing question and answer did not constitute “comment” on the constitutional right to remain silent. Such inquiries are proper-when the purpose is to permit the jury to consider the inference of guilt drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853, 90 S.Ct. 112, 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969); Whiteside v. State, 366 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Cridland v. State, 338 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
However, the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to ask defendant’s key witness the following questions over objection during cross-examination, and erred in allowing the prosecutor to refer to the testimony during closing argument:
Q. Okay. Did you admit in the Tom Fulford trial that you were a hooker?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. Now, you said you were a witness for the state, now, tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what he paid you $100.00 for. A. He paid me $100.00 to go to bed with him.
Although the general reputation of a witness for truth and veracity may be shown, it is improper to allow inquiries relative to the general moral character of a witness. Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965). In this case, the balance of the defense witness’ testimony exonerated the appellant and placed the entire blame on a third party. Evidence of unrelated particular acts of misconduct (except for the fact of a prior conviction) may not be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. See Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla.1976); Butler v. State, 94 Fla. 163, 113 So. 699 (1927); Baker v. State, 51 Fla. 1, 40 So. 673 (1906); Andrews v. State, supra; Urga v. State, 155 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), cert. denied, 162 So. 2d 904 (Fla.1964). In Fulton v. State, the Supreme Court held that allowing the state, over objection, to cross-examine a defense witness as to a pending charge of second degree murder against the witness was improper and, as the witness’ testimony went to the heart of the defendant’s claim of self-defense, the error could not be held harmless.
This court in McArthur v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1957), in reversing the defendant’s conviction stated: “[If the witness] had been sufficiently discredited . in the minds of the jurors, the ultimate result of the case could have been entirely different. We do not say that it would or should have been different; we merely hold that if the correct rule of evidence had been applied, it could have been.” Id. at 568 (emphasis added). Fulton v. State, supra at 285.
The defense witness’ testimony in the present case went to the heart of appellant’s defense; therefore, the error in allowing the improper evidence was not harmless.
Accordingly, we reverse on the second point and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur.
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Russ v. City OF Jacksonville, 734 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…nts that the impeachment evidence relating to Officer Baker was impermissible general character evidence. The evidence sought to be introduced to impeach Officer Baker clearly does not relate to his general moral character, compare Chavers v. State, 380 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA), but rather to his prior actions in making DUI arrests in circumstances virtually identical to the facts of the instant case which directly relate to his credibility as a witness in the instant ease. Because we are remanding fo…
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Kinnon v. State, 439 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ate to the inference of guilty knowledge which may be drawn, as the jury was instructed without [*960] objection below,1 from her unexplained possession of the recently stolen dresses. Such a comment is a perfectly permissible one. Chavers v. State, 380 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1118 (Fla.1980); Cridland v. State, 338 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Kinnon argues, however, that the “No explanation,” and the “is there any other explanation^]” statements which immediately preceded…
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Hobbs v. State, 403 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…no evidence that any pending investigation of the witness went to the heart of appellant’s defense or arose out of the same criminal episode giving rise to the charges against appellant. Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1976); Chavers v. State, 380 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1118 (Fla.1980). We find the cases cited by appellant inapplicable to the facts of this case as the witness had not been acting as an undercover officer in the defendant’s home, Sarmiento v. State, 371 S…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968)
- Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976)
- McARTHUR v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1957)
- Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Diamante Urga v. State, 155 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Young v. Florida, 396 U.S. 853 (U.S. 1969)
- Caffey v. Missouri, 396 U.S. 853 (U.S. 1969)
- Butler v. State, 94 Fla. 163 (Fla. 1927)
- Baker v. State, 51 Fla. 1 (Fla. 1906)