REGINALD S. ORR, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-03-12
No. 78-805/T4-89
SHARP, J., concurs., DAUKSCH, C. J., dissenting with opinion.
380 So. 2d 1185 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Reginald Orr was convicted of grand theft and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after charges were tried together despite his motion to sever. The Florida appellate court reversed the grand theft conviction, holding that evidence of prior convictions, which was necessary only for the firearm charge, was improperly prejudicial to the separate grand theft count.


Holding

Severance was required. While the burglary and grand theft charges arose from the same transaction and could be properly joined, evidence of prior convictions was necessary only to prove the firearm possession charge and was highly prejudicial to the grand theft charge, requiring reversal of the grand theft conviction and remand for new trial.


Headnotes

[1] Severance of offenses is required when the joinder of offenses prejudices the defendant and prevents a fair determination of guilt or innocence.

[2] Evidence of a defendant's prior convictions is inadmissible in a trial for a separate offense if it has no relevance to proving an element of that offense.

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Key Quotes

“Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, the trial courts of this state should insist that where several indictments or informations are filed against the same defendant constituting separate offenses growing out of the same transaction or occurrence, such indictments or informations should be consolidated and disposed of in one trial.”

Establishes the general rule favoring consolidation of charges from the same transaction, from Eagle v. State.

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Facts & Procedural History

Orr was discovered in Winter Park carrying a shotgun and duffel bag, claiming he found them in a trash can. Four hours later, police received a burgla…

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Opinion of the Court
UPCHURCH, Judge.

UPCHURCH, Judge.

Appellant was charged, by amended information, in three counts with Count I, Burglary of a Dwelling; Count II, Grand Theft, and Count III, Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon. A Motion for Severance of Offenses was filed alleging that Counts I and II were improperly joined with Count III; that motion was denied. The court entered a Directed Verdict of acquittal as to Count I. Appellant was found guilty of Count II, Grand Theft; and Count III, Possession of a Firearm by a convicted felon.

A single point is raised by this appeal: was a severance of Count III from Counts I and II required to promote a fair determination of Appellant’s guilt or innocence? Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.152(a)(2).

Appellant was discovered in Winter Park carrying a shotgun and a duffel bag. He told the investigating officer that he had found the shotgun, the bag, and another gun in a trash can. Some four hours later the police received a report of a burglary in the same area as the trash can. The owner identified the articles found in Appellant’s possession, including the shotgun, as taken from his residence.

In Eagle v. State, 249 So. 2d 460, 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), the court stated, “Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, the trial courts of this state should insist that where several indictments or informations are filed against the same defendant constituting separate offenses growing out of the same transaction or occurrence, such indictments or informations should be consolidated and disposed of in one trial.” The court emphasized that the charges grew out of the same transaction or occurrence, the same witnesses testified, and essentially the same evidence was addressed.

In the case before us, the element that defendant was a convicted felon is necessary to prove Count III. That element is not necessary to prove Count II. In a normal trial, evidence revealing other crimes is admissible if it casts light upon the character of the act under investigation by showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or material bearing on some essen-tia] aspect of the offense being tried. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959). In the case before us, Appellant had been previously convicted of Auto Theft and Grand Larceny. The only purpose in introducing the prior convictions was as a required element of Count III. This information had no relevance whatever as to the proof required in Count II.

The trial judge, in an innovative attempt to solve the Appellant’s dilemma, suggested that if Appellant did not think the jury would do what was right after being properly charged, he could plead guilty to Count III before starting and then the court would keep out the evidence of the prior conviction. While this may be innovative and expeditious justice would not have been served by this unique suggestion.

As to Counts I and II, the prior convictions had no probative value and were inadmissible. We cannot agree that Appellant was not harmed by the jury’s consideration of his prior convictions.

We AFFIRM as to Count III, and REVERSE as to Count II, and REMAND for new trial.

SHARP, J., concurs.

DAUKSCH, C. J., dissenting with opinion.

Dissent
DAUKSCH, Chief Judge,

DAUKSCH, Chief Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The decision to sever or not is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla.1972). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this case because the facts needed to prove the burglary and grand theft were quite well intertwined with the fact this previously convicted felon possessed the very same firearm he stole in the burglary.

The trial judge instructed the jury they were to consider each count separately and we should presume they did. Thus the only element of essential difference between the burglary and theft charges on the one hand and the possession charge on the other hand is the proof the accused was a convicted felon. I know it hurts to have been convicted of a felony and have a jury know about it, but as those in the trade say: “If you can’t do the time then don’t do the crime.”


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1982)
    …McDONALD, Justice. The state petitions for review of Vazquez v. State, 405 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), on the basis of conflict with Dedmon v. State, 400 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Orr v. State, 380 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction1 and approve in part and quash in part the instant district court opinion. [*1090] A three-count indictment charged Vazquez with first-degree murder, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, an…
    1 / 2
  • Thames v. State, 454 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …ez, supra, at the time of appellant’s trial. We note, however, that there did exist at that time a split of authority as to whether a defendant was entitled to severance of a count charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Orr v. State, 380 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The weight of authority throughout the country held that severance was required. See, Vazquez v. State, 405 So. 2d 177, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), aff'd, State v. Vazquez, supra. In light of this split of authority and the obvious…
  • Sosa v. State, 639 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …uld have been granted. The offenses in the instant case should have been separated for trial where one charge required proof of a previous felony conviction and one did not. See id.; Maycock v. State, 398 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Orr v. State, 380 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Even if consolidation of charges is the most practical and efficient method of processing a case, practicality and efficiency should not outweigh a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d at 1091; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.…

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