SOLOMON POLLACK
v.
FLORENCE POLLACK

Fla. | 1947-07-01
THOMAS, O. J., CHAPMAN, J. and WILLIAMS, Associate Justice, concurring.
159 Fla. 224 Florida Supreme Court (1947) Caution
Also reported at: 31 So. 2d 253
Cited by 85 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court upheld a divorce decree's allocation of the marital home to the wife and children, rejecting the husband's attempt to partition the property after the divorce. The court held that while divorce generally converts an estate by the entireties into a joint or common tenancy, a partition suit is premature when the home has been charged with the husband's support obligations for his family.


Holding

The court held that the homestead is not subject to partition while it remains charged with the husband's obligation to support his wife and minor children as ordered by the divorce decree. Although divorce generally converts an estate by the entireties into joint or common tenancy, a partition suit is premature when the home has been allocated to provide shelter for the dependent children.


Key Quotes

“If we were confronted with the divorce and no more, there might be substance to his contention, but here, the chancellor awarded the home to the wife as a place of residence for her and the minor children so long as she elected to use it for that purpose. The final decree of divorce, in other words, charged the home with the obligation of the husband to support his wife and minor children.”

Establishes that the decree's allocation of the home for residence purposes combined with support obligations distinguishes this case from a simple divorce conversion of tenancy.

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Facts & Procedural History

Solomon and Florence Pollack owned a home as tenants by the entireties in Miami. After securing a divorce, Florence retained custody of the two minor …

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, J.:

TERRELL, J.:

Solomon Pollack and Florence Pollack owned a home as an estate by the entireties at 925 N. W. 52nd Street, Miami, Florida. Florence Pollack secured a divorce from Solomon Pollack, who lived in the home up to the time the suit for divorce was instituted, and then removed from it. Florence Pollack with the two minor children are still living in the home. .

The final decree of divorce granted Florence Pollack, the mother, the custody of the two minor children, with the right of visitation on the part of Solomon Pollack, the father; re*225quired the father to pay the mother fifteen dollars per week for their maintenance; it required him to pay all amounts due on that certain mortgage against the home, including interest, taxes and insurance; and gave the mother the use, occupancy and control of the home so long as she elected to occupy it with the minor children. Should she vacate it at any time, then the final decree provided that the parties hereto might agree on terms of rental or sale of the home. Both parties were prohibited from disposing of the furnishings without the written consent of the other.

In November, 1946, after the decree of divorce, Solomon Pollack instituted this cause by bill in equity praying for partition of the homestead, on the theory that although owned as an estate by the entireties prior to the divorce, and not subject to partition, subsequent to that event it became an estate of joint tenancy that might be' partitioned. , A motion to dismiss the bill was granted and this appeal was prosecuted.

The point for determination may be stated as follows: Is the homestead owned by the husband and wife as an estate by the entireties, subject to partition after a decree of divorce, despite the fact that it was allotted to the wife and minor children as a place of residence by the decree for divorce ? •

Appellant contends that this question should be answered in the affirmative, relying on Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. (2) 727, and that line of cases holding in part that absolute divorce destroys an estate by the entireties, and converts the husband and wife into joint tenants or tenants in common as to the estate.

If we were confronted with the divorce and no more, there might be substance to his contention, but here, the chancellor awarded the home to the wife as a place of residence for her and the minor children so long as she elected to use it for that purpose. The final decree of divorce, in other words, charged the home with the obligation of the husband to support his wife and minor children. The chancellor was authorized to do this and so long as it is thus charged, a suit for partition is premature.

Appellant fails to take account of the well settled principle *226that the law imposes on civilized man the duty to provide food, shelter and raiment for his own. It was one of the conditions upon which Adam was bounced out of the garden, and it has been the law ever since. Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction to protect infants. Fisher v. Guidy, 106 Fla. 94, 142 So. 818. They are wards of the Court and when the Chancellor is concerned with their bread and butter, he does no,t take his cue from Elijah and the ravens, he draws it from the earnings of the father. He correctly applied the rule in this case, so his judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, O. J., CHAPMAN, J. and WILLIAMS, Associate Justice, concurring.


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Citator

Cited By (30 total)

  • Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1953)
    …relief in the premises; and, second, because of the well-recognized principle that, independent of statute, a court of chancery has inherent jurisdiction to control and protect infants and their property. Fisher v. Guidy, supra; Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So. 2d 253. So long, then, as the minor child is within the jurisdiction of the equity court, such court may exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify its decree as to the custody of the child, even though jurisdiction was not expressly ret…
  • Lowe v. Broward Cnty., 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …nt....” The Florida Supreme Court has pointed to “the well settled principle that the law imposes on civilized man the duty to provide food, shelter and raiment for his own.” McRae v. McRae, 52 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla.1951) (quoting Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So. 2d 253, 254 (1947)). This court has referenced the “strong public policy which exists in this state in favor of the natural family unit.” In re Guardianship of DA. McW., 429 So. 2d 699, 703-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), approved, 460 So. 2d 368 (F…
  • Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1950)
    …which the Constitution provided homestead exemption, that is, he is seeking to defeat the support of his two children claimed to be his dependents, and the courts generally do not permit such conduct on his part. See the case of Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So. 2d 253, holding that in the decree of divorce the court could properly charge the home owned by husband and wife as an estate by entirety with the obligation of the husband to support his wife and minor children. In the Anderson case under…

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