MARGARET M. DENNIS, A WIDOW, MELVIN A. FISHER, ESTELLE W. SLATER, ALVIN DE-LONES, FRED SLAGEL, AND CHARLES WALKER, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE CITY OF KEY WEST, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND THE KEY WEST PORT AND TRANSIT AUTHORITY, A BOARD ESTABLISHED BY THE CITY OF KEY WEST, FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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Residents living aboard houseboats moored off Key West challenged city ordinances prohibiting live-aboard vessels except in designated areas. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment upholding the ordinances, finding the restrictions on where houseboats could be moored constituted an unreasonable exercise of police power with no discernible relationship to public health, welfare, or safety.
The ordinance was quashed in part as an unreasonable exercise of police power. Sections 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the ordinance, which restricted where houseboats could be moored, were declared invalid because they had no discernible relationship to public health, welfare, or safety. However, Sections 4 and 6, requiring marine sanitation devices, were severable and retained validity as they had separate and legitimate purposes.
[1] A municipality's police powers may be extended into adjacent tidal waters by special act of the legislature for specific purposes, including zoning and sanitation.
[2] An ordinance prohibiting living aboard vessels within city limits, except in designated areas, may be an unreasonable exercise of police power if it lacks a discernible r…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no discernible relationship between this regulation and the health, welfare, or safety of the general populace. Therefore, the provisions of this, statute which are unreasonable must be quashed.”
The court's core holding that the mooring location restrictions lack any rational basis and therefore violate constitutional limits on police power.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSince 1957, Margaret Dennis and others lived aboard houseboats moored to pilings in tidal waters off Key West, supplied with utilities by the City Ele…
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EZELL, Associate Judge.
Margaret M. Dennis and several others,1 who all lived aboard vessels moored the Key West shoreline, appeal the final declaratory judgment wherein the trial court held a series of ordinances to be valid and determined that, pursuant to these ordinances, the Key West Port and Transit Authority2 could require the appellants herein to remove their houseboats. Preliminarily we note that jurisdiction to review decisions concerning the validity of ordinances is properly vested in this court, Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So. 2d 407 (Fla.1958), and we reverse.
Since 1957, Margaret Dennis has lived aboard her houseboat off the coast of Key West. The boat, as are those of the other appellants who have become Mrs. Dennis’ neighbors, are moored to pilings driven into the sea bottom and tied up to a bulkhead which was built in the tidal waters to protect the beaches from erosion due to wave action. The boats of Mrs. Dennis and her neighbors are supplied with electricity by the City Electric Company and with water by the Florida Aqueduct Authority. It is these boats which the Key West Port and Transit Authority is attempting to have removed.
Until 1970, the territorial and jurisdictional limits of the City of Key West were formed by the physical boundaries of the island itself. Those waters and submerged lands encircling the key were considered the territory of the State of Florida. In that year, however, the Florida legislature passed a special act [“authorizing the City of Key West] to exercise its police powers and jurisdiction extending three hundred (300) feet into the tidal waters adjacent to its corporate limits . . .” Ch. 70-762, § 2, Laws of Fla. These powers were extended only for purposes of the prevention of crime, the abatement of nuisances, the regulation of zoning and the enforcement of sanitation laws and regulations. Ch. 70-762, § 2, Laws of Fla. Thus, in 1970, the City of Key West acquired the right to exercise its police powers over those tidal waters where Dennis and her neighbors had tied up their boats.
The City then passed an ordinance creating the Key West Transit Authority and vested it with the “full power and authority to operate, control and manage any and all transportation and port systems and facilities acquired by the City”. Key West, Florida, Ordinance 72-23 (June 5, 1972). A second ordinance, passed the following year, gave the Authority the power to control all watercraft within the jurisdiction of the City. Key West, Florida, Ordinance 73 — 19 (June 18, 1972). Two particular sections of this ordinance were of special consequence in the trial court. The first of these provisions, Ord. 73-19, § 8-9d, made it a violation to moor or dock any watercraft without a permit; the second made it “unlawful for any person or persons to sleep or live aboard watercraft docked or moored within the jurisdiction . . . except watercraft equipped with marine sanitation devices that meet State and Federal waste facility requirements . . .” (Emphasis supplied). Ord. 73-19, § 8-12. Under the auspices of this ordinance, the Authority served Mrs. Dennis and her neighbors with notices to remove their vessels.
Mrs. Dennis and the others challenged these efforts by an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Although the previously discussed ordinances were very much in contention in the trial court and were, in fact, briefed for the benefit of this court, the parties have conceded that, if the Port and Transit Authority does have the ability to order the removal of the houseboats, it must flow from Ordinance 75-8 and the ability of the Authority to enforce such a regulation. Key West, Florida, Ordinance 75-8 (May 5, 1975) provides in pertinent part:
“Section 1. No house car, camp car, vehicle or vessel or part of vehicle or vessel used for a residence, live aboard facility, live aboard vessel, or for human habitation by whatever name known . shall be kept on public or private property within the jurisdictional limits of the City or within Three Hundred (300) feet of the corporate limits of the City while being used as a residence, live aboard facility, live aboard vessel or for human habitation except if kept within a licensed trailer park or other area which has been designated by the City .
“Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any private or public utility, person or corporation to furnish water, electricity or other services to any house car, camp car, camper or vessel which is being used in violation of this Ordinance.
“Section 3. It shall be unlawful and under no circumstances shall any vehicle or vessel described in Section 1 of this Ordinance be used a living or sleeping quarters within the jurisdictional limits of the City of Key West or within Three Hundred (300) feet of the corporate limits, except as provided herein.
“Section 4. All vessels used for live aboard or for human habitation shall be equipped with an approved marine sanitation device as provided herein. .
“Section 5. This Ordinance shall not apply to any vessel which is kept within or tied up to private property and does not constitute a navigational hazard and has an approved Marine Sanitation Device as provided herein.
“Section 6. Any vessel which is connected to an approved sewer system shall be exempt from the provisions contained in Section 4 herein.
“Section 7. The following areas are designated as live aboard areas as provided hereinabove:
Key West Yacht Club
Berths at the City-owned docks located
at Garrison Bight.
“Section 8. Should any person, firm or corporation, their agents, servants or employees, violate the terms and provisions of this Ordinance, such person, firm or corporation shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof by a Court of competent jurisdiction, shall be fined in any sum not less than One Hundred Dollars nor more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars.
“Section 9. Should any section, paragraph, clause or provision of this Ordinance be declared unconstitutional and void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall in no wise affect the validity of the remaining parts save the part held unconstitutional and void and is inseparable from and indispensable to the operation of the remaining part.”
We are not unmindful of the presumptions in favor of ordinances passed under the police powers of a jurisdiction; nor do we disparage the principle that the burden of overcoming this presumption falls heavily on the challenge, State v. Sawyer, 346 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), and the authority cited therein. Moreover, courts will not substitute their judgment as to the reasonableness of a particular rule or regulation where the reasonableness is “fairly debatable”. See Lester v. City of St. Petersburg, 183 So. 2d 589 (Fla.2d DCA 1966). However, where there has been an obvious abuse of police power and where the ordinance clearly appears to have no foundation in reason or necessity, the courts will provide a remedy. City of Clearwater v. College Properties, Inc., 239 So. 2d 515 (Fla.2d DCA 1970).
In this case, the ordinance makes it illegal to live aboard any vessel unless such vessel is moored or docked within the Key West Yacht Club or Garrison Bight, the public dock. There is no discernible relationship between this regulation and the health, welfare, or safety of the general populace. Therefore, the provisions of this, statute which are unreasonable must be quashed. Because Sections 4 and 6 of the ordinance, which mandate that all vessels used for human habitation be equipped with an approved marine sanitation device, are distinct and severable from the remainder of the ordinance and because these two sections have separate and valid purposes, they retain their viability under the principles of Dade County v. Keyes, 141 So. 2d 819 (Fla.3d DCA 1962) and in the spirit of the savings clause of the ordinance.
In light of our foregoing disposition of the issue concerning the validity of the ordinance, we need not reach the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in directing verdicts against two of the plaintiffs who failed to appear for trial. The effect of any such verdict is mooted by our quashal of the ordinance.
Therefore, the ordinance is quashed in part, the judgment is reversed, and the constitutional stay writ previously entered is hereby dissolved.
. There were two separate but consolidated lawsuits below with several plaintiffs in each case. The plaintiffs who sought relief in Circuit Court Case No. 77-234-CA-17 are not parties to this appeal.
. When the Key West Port and Transit Authority was first created by Ordinance 72-23, it was known as the Key West Transit Authority. Its title was subsequently changed by Ordinance 74-24.
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City OF Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…ordinance. Most vehicles do not contain basic amenities or sanitation facilities. Unquestionably, municipalities have the right to exercise the police power to prevent people from residing in such “structures.” See e.g., Dennis v. City of Key West, 381 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for rev. dismissed, 389 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.1980). Thus, I would limit the ordinance’s application to parked vehicles. Furthermore, I would construe the ordinance to prohibit people, whether awake or asleep, from using their veh…
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Paragon Grp., Inc. v. Hoeksema, 475 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…volve interpretation of language contained in an ordinance or statute. See, e.g., City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So. 2d 578 (Fla.1984); Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of North Miami, 286 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1973); Dennis v. City of Key West, 381 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for review dismissed, 389 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.1980). In contrast, the trial court’s function here was to determine if ordinance 82-14 properly reflected the action taken by the county commission. In Cordrey v. Hotter, 283 So. 2d 139…
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Dozier v. City OF Miami, 639 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…ese vessels represent a visual obstacle on these waterways and a visual intrusion which interferes with the tranquility otherwise enjoyed by adjacent residential property. . Dozier erroneously argues that our decision in Dennis v. City of Key West, 381 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. dismissed, 389 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.1980) compels a reversal here. Dennis, however, is distinguishable. In Dennis, this court quashed a portion of a municipal ordinance which required live-aboard vessels to dock only at the Key West…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Armstrong v. City OF Tampa, 106 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1958)
- Dade Cnty. v. Keyes, 141 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Lester v. City OF ST. Petersburg, 183 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- City OF Clearwater v. Coll. Props., Inc., 239 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- State v. Sawyer, 346 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)