STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWRENCE ALLEN SAVARINO, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the dismissal of a drug possession charge, arguing the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held that the state's traverse was sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss by establishing facts supporting constructive possession, though it clarified that the state bears the burden at trial to prove knowledge and control through circumstantial evidence that refutes all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.
The state's traverse was sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss. The trial court erred in granting the motion. However, at trial, the state bears the burden of proving constructive possession through evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the controlled substance and ability to reduce it to his control, and any circumstantial evidence must refute all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.
[1] A pretrial motion to dismiss an information requires the state's traverse to be sufficient to place a material issue of fact in dispute or to demonstrate that uncontrover…
[2] In cases where a defendant's motion to dismiss is based on allegations of non-exclusive possession of a vehicle, the state's traverse must present additional facts suffic…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the sole question before us is whether the state's traverse was sufficient to place a material issue of fact into dispute or to demonstrate that the uncontroverted facts do establish a prima facie case of guilt”
Establishes the legal standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss at the pretrial stage
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was arrested while driving a vehicle he did not own. A controlled substance (dilaudid) was found on the floorboard of the passenger's si…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from an order of the trial court which granted the defendant’s’ motion to dismiss an information charging him with possession of dilaudid (a controlled substance) in violation of Section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). Because this appeal comes from a pretrial dismissal pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) and not from a jury verdict, the sole question before us is whether the state’s traverse was sufficient to place a material issue of fact into' dispute or to demonstrate that the uncontroverted facts do establish a prima facie case of guilt. Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We hold that the state’s traverse was sufficient and we therefore reverse.
In the defendant’s motion to dismiss it was alleged that the defendant was arrested while driving a motor vehicle which was owned by an individual other than the defendant. It was further alleged that the controlled substance was not in defendant’s physical'possession but rather was found on the floorboard of the passenger’s side of the vehicle. The defendant submits that these facts do not show a prima facie case of guilt. In its traverse, the state admitted the facts alleged by the defendant but added the additional facts that the defendant had failed certain field sobriety tests, had a breathalyzer reading of .00, and had to enter the car on the passenger’s side because the driver’s door was inoperable.
We hold that this was sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss by the defendant. We stress, however, that we are only holding that the motion to dismiss should have been denied. • The state conceded here that the vehicle was not in the exclusive possession of the defendant. At trial the state has the burden of proving the defendant’s constructive possession of the controlled substance. In such a case, this must be done by proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and his ability to reduce it to his control. . Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Griffin v. State, 276 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Medlin v. State, 279 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). As we view the facts of the case thus far alleged, the state will attempt to prove its case through circumstantial evidence. Such circumstantial evidence produced by the state must refute all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. Taylor v. State, 319 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Whether the state can meet this burden is a question which must be decided at the conclusion of the state’s presentation of the evidence. It may well be that the state will not meet this burden, and a directed verdict in favor of the defendant would then be proper. At this juncture, however, the granting of the motion to dismiss was error. The order granting the motion to dismiss is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with what we have said.
BOARDMAN', A. C. J., and DANAHY, J., and ULMER, RAY E., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
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State v. Ferris Michele Paleveda, 745 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…ment is not a proper consideration on a motion to dismiss. See State v. St. Jean, 658 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); State v. Duran, 550 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); S.T.N. v. State, 474 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); see also State v. Savarino, 381 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Cummings v. State, 378 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The undisputed facts alleged in Paleveda’s motion to dismiss show that, at the time of her arrest, Paleveda was driving and otherwise in the exclusive possession and control…
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State v. Alford, 395 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ther the State’s traverse was sufficient to place a material issue of fact into dispute or to demonstrate that the uncontroverted facts do establish a prima facie case of guilt. Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State v. Savarino, 381 So. 2d 734 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Under this rationale, it must be determined in the case now before us whether the facts established a prima facie case of constructive possession, to wit, that the defendant knew of the presence of over twenty grams of a controlle…
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State v. Cramer, 383 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…hich added the fact that a gun found next to the cocaine had been brandished by appellant shortly before police arrived on the scene. We find these facts sufficient to set out a prima facie case to withstand a motion to dismiss. State v. Savarino, 381 So. 2d 734 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Whether the State can prove constructive possession at trial by refuting all reasonable hypotheses of innocence to this circumstantial evidence must be decided at the close of evidence. On motion to dismiss, the State need show on…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Griffin v. State, 276 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Deadwyler, 319 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Odessa D. Taylor v. State, 319 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Medlin v. State, 279 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)