JESSE CASON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Jesse Cason was convicted of violating Florida Statute § 784.06 and appealed, raising issues about the sufficiency of evidence and the trial court's jury instructions regarding penalties. The Florida Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient and the trial court properly instructed the jury on penalties, including the court's authority to suspend sentence or grant probation.
The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The Court also held that the trial court properly instructed the jury by informing them of the maximum penalty, the court's power to suspend sentence or place the defendant on probation, and that sentencing is exclusively the court's province. The jury should confine its deliberations to the evidence of guilt or innocence.
“The power of the court to suspend the imposition of sentence and the power to place on probation are part of the penalty fixed by law for those convicted of crime because they modify the language of the statutes fixing penalties which would otherwise be imposed.”
Establishes that suspension of sentence and probation authority are integral components of the statutory penalty that must be included in jury instructions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCason was convicted of violating Section 784.06, Fla. Stat., 1941. The case centered on the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury verdict and th…
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The defendant was convicted of violation of Section 784.06, Fla. Stat., 1941, and he appeals.
Two questions are argued here. The first raises the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We find the evidence sufficient. Alford v. State, 132 Fla. 624, 181 So. 839.
The second attacks the charge of the court as follows:
“ ‘In the event of a conviction in this case, the maximum penalty would be five years in the State prison or a fine of $1000. The Court is also empowered under the law to suspend imposition of sentence or to place the defendant on probation, if it should appear to the Court from consideration of all the circumstances that such treatment would be to the best interest of society and of the defendant.
“ ‘Under the law of this State, if you convict the defendant, you may in your verdict recommend him to the mercy of the Court or to executive clemency. Such a recommendation in a case like this does not necessarily bind the Court or the Governor, but it is advisory and would be persuasive.
“ ‘It is the Court’s duty and sole province to award the sentence and to fix the punishment or penalty prescribed by law, if the defendant be convicted. You must, therefore, confine your deliberations to the evidence presented at the trial in arranging at your judgment as to whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of the crime with which he is charged.’ ”
The statute, Section 819.10, Fla. Stat. 1941, (1945 Amend-ment) requires that the court must include in its charge to the jury the penalty fixed by law for the offense for which the accused is then on trial.
The power of the court to suspend the imposition of sentence and the power to place on probation are part of the penalty fixed by law for those convicted of crime because they modify the language of the statutes fixing penalties which would otherwise be imposed.
A period of probation in one case may be just as appropriate a penalty as the imposition of the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law would be in another.
*296The Trial court very properly covered this question in his charge and was careful to advise the jury that it was the sole province of the court to award the sentence and the jury should confine its deliberation to the evidence of guilt.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., BUFORD and BARNS, JJ., concur.
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Holmes v. State, 181 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…tituted error. The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically held that notwithstanding the language of § 918.10 (1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., it is not mandatory on the trial court to give instructions as to the penalty. See: Cason v. State, 159 Fla. 294, 31 So. 2d 274; Simmons v. State, 160 Fla. 626, 36 So. 2d 207. Particularly is this so when no such instruction was requested by the defendant. See: White v. State, [*587] Fla.App.1960, 122 So. 2d 340; Peel v. State, Fla.App.1963, 154 So. 2d 910. Therefore, the c…
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Phillips v. State, 92 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1957)…not see that the charge was harmful but on the other hand, while not altogether clear, if the charge had any effect whatever it was to the advantage of appellant and harmless. McKee v. State, 159 Fla. 794, 33 So. 2d 50; Cason v. State, 159 Fla. 294, 31 So. 2d 274. The statute, Section 918.10(1), Florida statutes, F.S.A., directs the court to charge on the penalty as he does on the law. The charge complained of dealt with the question of pardons and paroles in a rather general way and there is nothing in the…
Authorities Cited
- Auzie Alford v. State, 132 Fla. 624 (Fla. 1938)