STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD RILEY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a police officer's indictment for official misconduct, holding that the specific statutory subsection prohibiting knowing falsification of official records is not unconstitutionally vague, despite this Court's prior invalidation of a broader, related subsection in State v. De Leo.
Section 839.25(1)(b) is not unconstitutionally vague. The statute specifically defines the prohibited conduct (knowing falsification of official documents) with sufficient clarity that persons of common intelligence can understand what actions violate it, and the limitations in the statute reduce the danger of arbitrary application to a constitutionally acceptable degree.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its prohibited conduct is defined with sufficient specificity to provide fair warning of what actions constitute a violation.
[2] The presence of a "corrupt intent" element in a statute does not automatically render it void for vagueness.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The conduct proscribed by section 839.-25(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), is defined so that those with common intelligence and understanding have sufficient warning of what actions would constitute a violation.”
Establishes the legal standard for vagueness and applies it to find subsection (b) sufficiently clear
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichard Riley, a police officer, was indicted for official misconduct under Florida Statute § 839.25(1)(b) for knowingly falsifying police reports wit…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Corrupt Intent cases and more on FLexlaw
ADKINS, Justice.
This cause is before us on direct appeal from an order of the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court directly passing on the constitutionality of a state statute. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Pla.Const. Appellee, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was .indicted for official misconduct in violation of section 839.25(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977). Specifically, the state charged that defendant, a police officer, knowingly falsified certain police reports with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or to cause unlawful harm to others. Citing this Court’s decision in State v. De Leo, 356 So. 2d 306 (Fla.1978), the trial court dismissed the indictment on the basis that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. In De Leo we held that section 839.25(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), was unconstitutionally vague and susceptible to arbitrary application. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; U.S.Const. amend. XIV. The state argues that subsections (b) and (c) are severable and De Leo does not apply. We agree.
The decision in De Leo was based upon the open-ended nature of subsection (c) which proscribed conduct “keyed into the violation of any statute, rule or regulation, pertaining to the office of the accused, whether they contain criminal penalties themselves or not, and no matter how minor or trivial.” 356 So. 2d at 308. The subsection violated by defendant in this case is not couched in such-open-ended language but specifically defines the prohibited conduct:
(b) Knowingly falsifying, or causing another to falsify, any official record or official document;
§ 839.25(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1977). '
The Court in De Leo noted that the additional element of “corrupt intent” did not vitiate the potential for arbitrary application generated by the “catch-all” nature of the subsection. The fact that the “corruption” element did not cure the statute in De Leo does not mean that its presence necessarily renders a statute void. See Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1979). The prohibition in section 839.25(1), Florida Statutes (1977), is directed to public servants who act with corrupt intent. Subsec tion (2) defines “corrupt as “done with knowledge that act is wrongful and with improper motives.” As in De Leo this definition neither adds nor detracts to help determine the parameters of the instant subsection. Unlike De Leo, subsection (b) operates to narrow the offense of official misconduct by requiring a knowing falsification of official documents.
The conduct proscribed by section 839.-25(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), is defined so that those with common intelligence and understanding have sufficient warning of what actions would constitute a violation. Brunelle v. State, 360 So. 2d 70 (Fla.1978); Leeman v. State, 357 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1978); State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla.1977). The elements imposed by subsection (b) also limit the danger of arbitrary application to a constitutionally acceptable degree. State v. De Leo.
The order of the trial court dismissing the indictment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and OVERTON, SUNDBERG, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J.,
dissents for reasons stated in State v. De Leo, 356 So. 2d 306 (Fla.1978).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Harnum v. State, 384 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…t-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla.1979). Appellant’s attack on the constitutionality of the statute under which he was prosecuted (§ 839.25(l)(b), Fla.Stat.) was recently adjudicated adversely to his position in State v. Riley, 381 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.1980). Appellant also claims error in sentencing. He was charged with and convicted of two offenses (official misconduct and tampering with physical evidence) arising out of the same acts. He was given a single, general sentence of three years…
-
State v. Short, 483 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…der is a public servant. Short’s other vagueness objections concern the lack of definition of the terms “official document” and “official record.” These objections were addressed and answered adversely to him by our supreme court in State v. Riley, 381 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.1980). In Riley, the state charged that the defendant, a police officer, knowingly falsified certain police reports in violation of section 839.25(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977). The supreme court, in upholding the constitutionality of subsecti…
-
Derward Owens v. State, 593 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…unconstitutionally vague and does not therefore describe an act that can be criminally proscribed by statute. Subsection (l)(b) of the statute, prohibiting falsification of official records or documents, is, however, constitutional. State v. Riley, 381 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.1980). Despite the attempts of the state to persuade us otherwise, it is clear that the grand jury charged Owens under both subsections of the statute. The fact that the charge was made in the alternative does not avail the state, since when it…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1977)
- Leeman v. State, 357 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1978)
- Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1979)
- State v. DeLEO, 356 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1978)
- Brunelle v. State, 360 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1978)