GEORGETTE QUIGLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
LAVENTHOL & HOWARTH, A FLORIDA PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEE
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Georgette Quigley sued her accounting firm employer for breach of an employment contract after the firm withdrew the job offer before she began work. The Florida appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that because the contract lacked a specified duration and never went into effect, it was terminable at will and no breach occurred.
The court affirmed summary judgment, holding that because the employment contract had no provision specifying its duration and because the contract never went into effect (no start date had been agreed upon), the employer's withdrawal of the offer before work commenced did not constitute a breach of contract.
[1] An employment contract without a specified duration is terminable at will by either party.
[2] An employer's withdrawal of an employment offer before the employee begins work and before a start date is finalized does not constitute a breach of contract.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The contract at issue here was, as appellee urged in its motion for summary judgment, terminable at will because there was no provision for the duration of employment. Where there is no such provision, either party may terminate at any time.”
Establishes the legal principle that employment contracts without specified duration are terminable at will under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceQuigley was offered employment by Laventhol & Howarth accounting firm on September 8, 1978, at a salary of $17,500 payable biweekly, with employment t…
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MILLS, Chief Judge.
Appellant Georgette Quigley, plaintiff below, urges on appeal that the entry of a summary judgment by the trial court was error. We affirm.
Appellant was offered employment by appellee accounting firm at a salary of $17,-500 payable biweekly, such employment to begin in September upon a mutual determination of an acceptable date by the parties. The employment was offered on 8 Septem ber 1978 and accepted on 16 September 1978. Subsequently, the accounting firm decided to close its office and Quigley never performed any duties.
She filed a complaint for breach of employment contract, asking for damages. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, which was denied, and then filed an answer. Subsequently, it filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that since the contract did not provide any specific period of duration of employment it was terminable at will. An affidavit of John W. Che-noweth, manager of the firm’s Jacksonville office, asserted that on 27 September before any decision was made as to what date Quigley was to begin working and before she did begin working, he informed her that the services would not be needed. The affidavit asserted, “I made it clear to her on September 27, 1978, that the offer of employment was withdrawn.” A second affidavit, by a partner of the firm, stated that on 23 October 1978 he addressed and mailed a letter to the plaintiff which informed her of the decision to close the Jacksonville office. The motion for summary judgment was granted and a motion for rehearing was denied.
The contract at issue here was, as appellee urged in its motion for summary judgment, terminable at will because there was no provision for the duration of employment. Where there is no such provision, either party may terminate at any time. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Willett, 43 Fla. 311, 31 So. 246 (1901).
In Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47, 156 So. 240 (1934), the duration of the employment was unspecified, the salary was set at $200 per month, the former employee quit one job to take the new one, and the employment contract went into effect. Some months after the contract had taken effect and the employee had “stood by” ready to begin the work he had been hired to do, the employer repudiated the contract and hired someone else. In that case the court ruled that there was a breach of contract and the employee was due compensation for the time the contract was in effect.
Applying that rule to the facts of this case, we find that there was no breach of contract and Quigley was due no compensation because the contract never went into effect. Contrary to the assertion in appellant’s brief, there was no agreed upon starting date, only an agreement to set a starting date in the future.
Accordingly, the final summary judgment entered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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B. Freeman Irby, M.D. v. Mem'l Healthcare Grp., Inc., 901 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…nt, the salary of the Plaintiff or the price evaluation of Plaintiffs practice, to name a few. Thus the letter is merely an agreement to make an agreement which is not enforceable as a contract under Florida case law. Quigley v. Laventhol & Howarth, 382 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). So long as any essential matters remain open for further negotiations, there is no binding contract. Midtown [Realty, Inc.] v. Hussain, 712 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). AFFIRMED. KAHN and HAWKES, JJ., concur.…
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Terence B. Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., P.A., 490 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…mean, as Crawford contends, that the duration of employment is to be construed to be one year. See Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 914 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), cert. denied, 188 So. 2d 317 (Fla.1966); see also Quigley v. Laventhol & Howarth, 382 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (even though offer was made for employment at salary of $17,500 payable biweekly, court held contract was terminable at will on the ground that there was no provision for duration of employment). Crawford introduced no evidence f…
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Maines v. Davis, 491 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…f $750 per month was insufficient to hold anyone accountable. The trial court correctly referred to the pertinent rules, to wit: an agreement that does not provide a definite term of employment is terminable at will, Quigley v. Laventhol & Howarth, 382 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); and no action may be maintained for a breach of a contract which does not provide a definite term of employment. Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.1983). However, we find error in the…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Waldemar Knudsen v. Green, 116 Fla. 47 (Fla. 1934)
- Savannah v. Willett, 43 Fla. 311 (Fla. 1901)