MURRAY GLACKMAN
v.
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. | 1947-07-25
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, BUFORD, CHAPMAN, and ADAMS, JJ., BARNS and PARKS, Associate Justices, concur.
159 Fla. 376 Florida Supreme Court (1947) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 31 So. 2d 393
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Glackman challenged an ordinance regulating liquor business locations in Miami Beach, seeking a declaratory judgment as to his rights. The trial court dismissed his petition, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition stated sufficient facts under the Declaratory Judgment Act to allow a court of equity to adjudicate the controversy.


Holding

The petition alleged sufficient facts to authorize a court of equity to adjudicate the rights and status of the petitioner under the ordinance. The petition properly invoked the Declaratory Judgment Act and presented a genuine controversy suitable for declaratory judgment relief.


Key Quotes

“In our judgment petitioner brought himself within the rule announced in the cited cases so the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is quashed with directions to reinstate the bill and proceed accordingly.”

The court's holding that the petition stated sufficient facts under the Declaratory Judgment Act to proceed.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Murray Glackman was a licensed liquor operator in Miami Beach who sought to relocate his business within two hundred feet of his former location. The …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

*377PER CURIAM:

Murray Glackman filed his petition in the Circuit Court, alleging that ordinance 491, as amended by ordinance 694 and other ordinances of the City of Miami Beach, is unconstitutional, arbitrary and discriminatory as applied to him and his class and denies them the equal protection of the law. He prayed for a declaratory judgment adjudicating the validity of said ordinance and his rights thereunder.

A motion by the City to dismiss the petition was granted on the theory that it prayed for relief under an ordinance which petitioner contended to be void and unenforceable and was therefore inconsistent in its content. This appeal is by certiorari from the order of dismissal under Rule 34 of the Rules of this Court.

The point for determination is whether or not the petition alleged facts sufficient to authorize a court of equity to adjudicate the rights and status of petitioner in relation to the ordinance drawn in question.

Petitioner relies on Chapter 87, Florida Statutes, 1941, sometimes known as the Declaratory Judgment Act, to support his contention. In Ready v. Safeway Rock Co. 157 Fla. 27, 24 So. (2nd) 808, we attempted to chart a course to aid the bar in applying this act. See also Caldwell v. North, 157 Fla. 52, 24 So. (2nd) 806.

Plaintiff represents that he was a licensed liquor operator within the city, and desires to open a place of business within two hundred feet of his former location and claims the right to so do which the city denied.

It appears that there is a controversy between the plaintiff and the city as to whether or not the ordinances would allow or prohibit the change of location to that desired by plaintiff, also the question of the validity of the relator’s ordinances.

In our judgment petitioner brought himself within the rule announced in the cited cases so the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is quashed with directions to reinstate the bill and proceed accordingly.

It is observed, however, that in fairness to the Chancellor below that the petitioner’s bill fails to plead the pertinent provisions of the ordinance in such- a way as clearly to pre*378sent his complaint to the Chancellor. It would have been better to have copied into the petition the pertinent sections from the fifteen pages of ordinances attached; and on appeal to this Court it was useless to bring the original petition and the amended bill where only the amended bill was involved in the appeal.

It is so ordered.

THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, BUFORD, CHAPMAN, and ADAMS, JJ., BARNS and PARKS, Associate Justices, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • City OF Miami v. Oise Keton, 115 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959)
    …iate method for testing the validity of the Miami City Traffic Ordinance and the authority of the Miami Municipal courts to assume jurisdiction over traffic cases. Brown v. Foley, 1947, 158 Fla. 734, 29 So. 2d 870, and Glackman v. Miami Beach, 1947, 159 Fla. 376, 31 So. 2d 393. See also Rule 3.6, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of a common interest in the underlying principles involved, appellees constitute a class eligible to bring such a suit. Each person who is arrested and convicted and pays a…
  • …7, 92 So. 2d 180; the determination of grantee’s title to land on which grantor’s structure allegedly encroaches, May v. Holley, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 636; interpretation of rights under a city zoning, ordinance, Glackman v. City of Miami Beach, 1947, 159 Fla. 376, 31 So. 2d 393; authority of city officers under city charter, Alsop v. Pierce, 1944, 155 Fla. 185, 19 So. 2d 799; authority of church to enter into contract under its charter, Florida National Bank of Jacksonville v. Rector, Wardens and Vestry of S…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw