WILLIE JAMES BARNETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Barnett pleaded nolo contendere to obtaining a controlled substance by fraud after his initial trial ended in mistrial following his disruptive outburst in front of the jury. On appeal, Barnett challenged the mistrial as violating double jeopardy, but the court affirmed, holding that the mistrial was properly declared due to manifest necessity.
The court affirmed that the motion to dismiss was properly denied and the mistrial was properly declared. A second trial does not violate double jeopardy when the initial trial is discontinued under circumstances manifesting manifest necessity, particularly when the defendant's own misconduct prevents fair adjudication of the case.
[1] A retrial is not barred by double jeopardy when the initial trial is terminated by a mistrial declared due to the defendant's own misconduct that renders a fair trial imp…
[2] A mistrial declared due to the defendant's prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay remarks, which the state cannot rebut, is justified by manifest necessity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the double jeopardy protection does not preclude a second trial when the initial trial is discontinued under circumstances manifesting a necessity for so doing, and when the failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice”
Establishes the legal standard that manifest necessity can justify retrial without violating double jeopardy
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarnett's initial trial was terminated by mistrial at the state's request following Barnett's outburst in the jury's presence regarding exculpatory st…
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McCORD, Judge.
Barnett pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, reserving his right to appeal and to urge that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss, which was based upon Barnett’s assertion that a retrial would violate double jeopardy. We affirm.
Barnett’s initial trial was terminated, at the state’s request, by a mistrial following an outburst made by Barnett in the presence of the jury. Barnett’s outburst related to exculpatory matters allegedly told to a witness by a third party. In his order granting the mistrial, the trial court found that the remarks were no prejudicial to the state’s case that a fair trial would be impossible and a curative instruction would be ineffective. In his motion to dismiss, Barnett contended that there was no manifest necessity to justify the granting of the mistrial over his objection.
In our view, the motion to dismiss was properly denied. Barnett’s remarks were improper and prejudicial. The remarks attributed to the third party, to the effect that Barnett had not committed the offense, were clearly inadmissible hearsay, Baker v. State, 336 So. 2d 364, 367 at fn. 2 (Fla.1976), which the state could not, within the rules of evidence or procedure, rebut. Although the defendant has a valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, such right is subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgment; thus, the double jeopardy protection does not preclude a second trial when the initial trial is discontinued under circumstances manifesting a necessity for so doing, and when the failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949).
As recognized in State ex reí. Dato v. Himes, 134 Fla. 675,184 So. 244, 247 (1938), one circumstance for entering a mistrial with the right preserved for a second trial is “where the prisoner by his own misconduct places it out of the power of the jury to investigate his case correctly, thereby obtaining an unfair advantage of the state . . Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court properly exercised his discretion in determining that there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.
BOOTH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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QUIÑONES v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…udice, for the trial judge is in a peculiarly good position to observe the jurors, the witnesses and the attorneys in order to evaluate the extent of the prejudice.” Clark v. State, 756 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). See also Barnett v. State, 382 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).…
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Salter v. State, 795 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…t necessity where defendant violated an order in limine and testified that he had passed a lie detector test). See generally Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Clark v. State, 756 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Barnett v. State, 382 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). [*169] The defendant relies on State ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis, 55 So. 2d 118 (Fla.1951), and State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 23 So. 2d 484 (1945), but those cases are not on point. In both of those cases the trial…
Authorities Cited
- Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (U.S. 1949)
- Baker v. State, 336 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1976)
- State v. Himes, 134 Fla. 675 (Fla. 1938)