RAYMOND A. BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-04-09
No. 80-46
CROSS and COBB, JJ., concur.
382 So. 2d 422 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

Raymond Brooks appealed his discharge from the Brevard County School Board, but simultaneously filed an administrative appeal with the Department of Education. The court dismissed Brooks's appeal as premature, holding that he must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.


Holding

The court lacks jurisdiction to retain the appeal because administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial review is appropriate. The appeal is premature because the administrative action is not yet complete, and the employee may not appeal to the court until the administrative appeal to the Department is concluded.


Headnotes

[1] A party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an agency action.

[2] An appeal is premature when administrative review procedures are still available and have not been completed.

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Key Quotes

“Where administrative review procedures are available, a party must exhaust these remedies before judicial review is appropriate.”

Establishes the foundational principle that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before court jurisdiction attaches.

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Facts & Procedural History

Brooks was discharged from employment by the School Board of Brevard County. Simultaneously, his teaching certificate was revoked by the Department of…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Judge.

ORFINGER, Judge.

Appellant appeals his discharge from employment by Appellee. The appeal is filed pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1978). At the same time he filed an appeal with the Department of Education under the provisions of Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes (1978), and the Department has agreed to review the decision of the appel-lee. This latter information comes to us in a motion filed by appellant requesting us to stay the appeal in this court and to relinquish jurisdiction to the Department of Education.

The appellee responds by a motion to dismiss the appeal alleging, among other things, that in separate and distinct proceedings the appellant’s teaching certificate was revoked by the Department of Education and that such revocation is the subject of a current appeal before the District Court of Appeal, First District, and that the appellant is not entitled to another appeal before the Department of Education or before this court. Notwithstanding this response, it appears that the instant appeal is from action of the appellee in discharging the appellant, and does not directly arise out of the action of the Department in revoking appellant’s teaching certificate, although there certainly may be some connection between these events.

Nevertheless, in view of the administrative appeal which appellant has requested and which the Department of Education has agreed to hear, it does not appear that we have jurisdiction to retain the appeal in this court. Where administrative review procedures are available, a party must exhaust these remedies before judicial review is appropriate. General Electric Credit Corporation of Georgia v. Metropolitan Dade County, 346 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Until such time as administrative remedies have been exhausted, appellant may not seek relief in the courts from the asserted action of the school board. School Board of Flagler County v. Hauser, 293 So. 2d 681 (Fla.1974).

It appears that this appeal is premature because administrative action is not complete. The aggrieved employee may not appeal to this court until the administrative appeal to the Department is concluded. School Board of Pinellas County v. Noble, 372 So. 2d 1111 (Fla.1979); Phillips v. Santa Fe Community College, 342 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

The motion to stay the proceedings is denied and the motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

CROSS and COBB, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Migliore v. The City OF Lauderhill, 415 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
    …rine of exhaustion of administrative remedies comes into play. Appellants, having failed to avail themselves of the appropriate administrative remedy, cannot now obtain reinstatement or recover back pay. See Brooks v. School Board of Brevard County, 382 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Because our conclusions are dispositive of this appeal, we do not address appellants’ additional points. We affirm the final judgment denying appellants’ alternative petitions for mandamus or injunctive relief. WALDEN, J., and…
  • …ovided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the court will act. 1 Fla.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 147 (1977). See also De Carlo v. Tower of West Miami, 49 So. 2d 596 (Fla.1950); Brooks v. School Board of Brevard County, 382 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Hennessy v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 101 So. 2d 176 (Fla.2d DCA 1958). In the instant case, the City relies upon Skaggs-Albertson’s P., Inc. v. Michels Belle. Bl. P., Inc., 332 So. 2d 113 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). This case involved a…
  • Orange Cnty. v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 397 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
    …ject matter jurisdiction. State, etc., v. Oyster Bay Estates, Inc., 384 So. 2d 891, 895, n. 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). See also Halifax Area Council v. City of Daytona Beach, 385 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Brooks v. School Board of Brevard County, 382 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). This is because appellants may seek relief through a section 120.-56 proceeding: “Any person substantially affected by a rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that the rule is…

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