FRANKLIN R. BOWLER
v.
SALLY ZOOK BOWLER
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In this divorce appeal, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a wife could receive compensation for loss of dower rights when those rights are statutorily extinguished by divorce. The court held that dower rights cannot serve as a basis for property awards in divorce decrees, though it affirmed the award of alimony, child support, and attorney's fees.
The court held that dower rights in Florida are controlled by statute and do not vest until the husband's death; furthermore, dower rights are extinguished by divorce. Therefore, allowance for dower rights is not authorized in divorce decrees, and the provision making the wife beneficiary of the life insurance policy must be struck.
“Dower rights in this State are controlled by statute and do not become vested until the death of the husband, leaving the wife surviving him.”
Establishes that dower rights are statutory and inchoate, not vesting until husband's death
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFranklin and Sally Bowler married in January 1940 and separated in March 1946. One child, Sallie Rockefeller Bowler, age five, was born of the marriag…
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The parties married in January, 1940, and separated shortly before the bringing of this suit by the wife, in March, 1946. One child, Sallie Rockefeller Bowler, five years of age, was born of the marriage. The record of the trial consists of more than 1,100 pages, and we can see no useful purpose to be served in attempting to write in detail the marital troubles of the parties reflected in the record. Suffice to say that upon a careful examination of the record we find no error in the decree requiring the setting aside in toto of the decree of the lower court. In that decree divorce was granted to the wife, alimony and support money for the child and attorneys fees for the wife were decreed. Costs were taxed against the defendant. The defendant appealed, challenging the decree in toto and specifically that part of it reading:
“There are no special equities which entitle the wife to a decree awarding her a specific interest in the property of the husband. Yet, it does not appear that his misconduct should deprive her of valuable dower rights. Accordingly, the Court deems it equitable that she should be made the *448beneficiary of the life insurance policy, but not permit either party to utilize any cash surrender or loan value of the policy. It seems appropriate that she should be made beneficiary, and, on maturity of the policy, monthly payments be made to her as long as she might live — which she would use for her benefit and the benefit of the child as their needs may require — with the further provision that if the wife should predecease the husband or die before the minimum number of payments were made, then the policy proceeds should become a part of the estate of the husband, or if he preferred, go direct to the child.”
The special equities referred to are apparently of the character of those referred to by this court in Collins v. Collins, 153 Fla. 10, 13 So. (2) 445; Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629, 21 So. (2) 145.
Although the case, as determined by the Chancellor, did not authorize a decretal order for any interest in the property of the husband, yet it is attempted to make an allowance for her for the deprivation of dower rights.
Dower rights in this State are controlled by statute and do not become vested until the death of the husband, leaving the wife surviving him. Bennett v. Bennett, 157 Fla. 627, 26 So. (2) 650. It is also settled that dower rights, being inchoate, are also extinguished by divorce decreed at the instance of either party. North v. Ringling, 149 Fla. 739, 7 So. (2) 476. Such being the law, allowance for dower rights is not authorized. No other harmful errors appear.
We think that counsel for the wife are entitled to an additional fee of $500.00 for their services in her behalf before the court.
Affirmed as modified.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Fort v. Anne Burton Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1956)…The wife did release any claim for dower, but it is doubtful that this could be considered a relinquishment of a property right, where made in a separation agreement entered into in contemplation of divorce. Cf. Bowler v. Bowler, 1947, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So. 2d 751. In any event, the matter is primarily one to be decided by the Chancellor, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion; and since it does not appear that he has as yet evaluated the evidence “with due regard to the changed circumstances and the…
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In re Est. of Samuel Donner v. Anton, 364 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…d engrafting an equitable lien on a widow’s legitimate right to dower under our law. Such a lien is simply not authorized under Florida law. Dower is a right of the wife granted to her by law and vests on the death of the husband. Bowler v. Bowler, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So. 2d 751 (1947). The inchoate right of dower is purely a prerogative of the legislature which may modify or abolish it at will. It is a personal right which may be exercised only by the widow. In Re Estate of Pearson, 192 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DC…
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Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973)…d” for that marriage. See also 52 Am.Jur.2d, Marriage, § 5. Dower is not a vested right.3 We have said that because of its defeasible nature dower is not to be given consideration in divorce or dissolution of marriage proceedings. Bowler v. Bowler, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So. 2d 751 (1947). Dower is, as stated, statutory in nature. Fla.Stat. § 731.34, F.S.A. It is an expectancy, not a present estate (thus “inchoate”).4 This Court, in Neal v. McMullian, 98 Fla. 549, 124 So. 29-30 (1929), plainly held: “During th…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629 (Fla. 1945)
- Collins v. Collins, 153 Fla. 10 (Fla. 1943)
- Curtis v. Curtis, 157 Fla. 627 (Fla. 1946)