PRINCE KENNEDY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM TYSON AND LATHERN BROUGHTON AND MORRISON ASSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a workers' compensation case, the court reversed and remanded the lower court's denial of benefits for a permanent partial impairment that exceeded the anatomical schedule rating. The trial judge misinterpreted controlling precedent regarding when scheduled injury awards can exceed the statutory schedule based on evidence of greater functional disability.
A trial court may award benefits exceeding the statutory schedule for a scheduled injury when expert medical testimony is supplemented by other evidence demonstrating greater permanent partial loss or loss of use of the member. The trial court's order was reversed and remanded because it misinterpreted controlling precedent and lacked sufficient specificity regarding what evidence and legal standards it applied in arriving at its conclusion.
[1] A judge is free to consider evidence beyond expert medical testimony when determining permanent partial loss or loss of use of a scheduled member in a workers' compensati…
[2] A workers' compensation order must contain sufficient specificity to allow appellate review of the judge's findings and conclusions.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when dealing with a scheduled injury, expert medical testimony is nonconclusive and the judge is free to consider other evidence in arriving at a permanent partial loss or loss of use of the member”
Establishes the legal standard that trial judges are not bound by medical impairment ratings for scheduled injuries and may award greater benefits based on other evidence of functional disability.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePrince Kennedy, Jr. sustained a compensable left knee injury on November 7, 1974. He reached maximum medical improvement on March 8, 1978. In December…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Scheduled Injury cases and more on FLexlaw
SHAW, Judge.
Appellant fell and sustained a compensable injury to his left knee on November 7, 1974. On March 8, 1978 he reached maximum improvement and in December of 1978 he was examined by Dr. Batson who opined a 25% permanent partial impairment of the left lower extremity. Appellant’s claim for benefits in excess of the anatomical rating was denied.
The order denying the claim contains findings that appellant’s injury “functionally” exceeds the assigned 25% rating; that appellant’s disability is 35% based solely upon loss of wage-earning capacity and that disability is 50% of the left leg after “considering all factors.” The judge then makes the statement that:
[Tjhis Court feels compelled to limit its award to the schedule set forth in F.S. 440.15(3)(b) in spite of the clear language of F.S. 440.15(3)(s) and the holding of the Supreme Court in Magic City Bottle & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 116 So. 2d 240 (Fla.1959). The Industrial Relations Commission has repeatedly held that the Magic City case cannot be used to circumvent the holding in Mims and Thomas Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson, 340 So. 2d 920 (Fla.1976), see H.B.H. Services Corp. v. Powell, IRC Order 2-3388 (1978). The holding in Magic City is clear. The Deputy Commissioner ruled that in spite of the doctor’s testimony to a five percent impairment rating, the Claimant had lost in excess of Vs of the normal use of his left leg.
In my opinion, the case is irreconcilable with the opinion of the Court in Mims. . A careful reading of both the Magic City and Mims cases leads one to the conclusion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how the cases can be reconciled. One can only conclude that the eases are irreconcilable and that the Industrial Relations Commission has opted for the de facto overruling of the Magic City case by Mims.
Appellees concede, and we agree, that the judge misinterpreted Magic City. This perhaps led him to the conclusion that Magic City and Mims are irreconcilable and he is compelled thereby to limit disability to 25% of the leg. In light of this misapprehension we are unable to tell whether he applied the correct law in denying the claim. It is not at all clear in our minds that he was aware that when dealing with a scheduled injury, expert medical testimony is nonconclusive and the judge is free to consider other evidence in arriving at a permanent partial loss or loss of use of the member. On the other hand, he may have concluded that after considering all pertinent evidence the disability to the scheduled member does not exceed 25%.
The order lacks the degree of specificity necessary to enable us to determine how he arrived at his conclusion and we find it necessary to reverse and remand with directions that the judge reconsider his order in light of this opinion.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., and BOOTH JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Westberry v. Copeland Sausage Co., 389 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…all issues ripe for adjudication. This court remanded for clarification an order which failed to specify whether the claimant was partially or totally disabled. Sambo’s Restaurant v. Horn, 381 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). And in Kennedy v. Tyson, 382 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), where the order did not clearly reveal the deputy commissioner’s application of the correct law, this court determined that the order “lacks the degree of specificity necessary to enable us to determine how he arrived at his con…
-
Univ. OF Fla. & Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Green, 395 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Fla.W.C. R.P. 14; § 440.25(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1977). The duty of the deputy commissioner in this regard is fully explained in Vargas v. Americana of Bal Harbour, 345 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.1977), and in Kennedy v. Tyson, 382 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), wherein Judge Shaw stated: The order lacks the degree of specificity necessary to enable us to determine how he arrived at his conclusions and we find it necessary to reverse and remand with directions that the judge reconsider…
-
Broadfoot v. Albert Hugo Ass'n, Inc., 478 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…gal basis for the deputy’s conclusion, we reverse and remand for further findings. Mobley v. Fulford Van & Storage, 390 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Westberry v. Copeland Sausage Company, 389 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); and Kennedy v. Tyson, 382 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Claimant was employed as an interior decorator. In the month preceding his heart attack he was required to rearrange furniture on the showroom floor, and continually move heavy pieces of furniture, because the employees who usu…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Kimbro, 116 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1959)
- Mims & Thomas Mfg. Co. & Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ferguson, 340 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1976)