STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the trial court's dismissal of battery charges against Johnson, arguing that a law enforcement officer need not be lawfully performing duties at the moment of battery for the statute to apply. The court reverses, holding that a person cannot justify committing battery against a law enforcement officer merely because the arrest itself may have been unlawful.
The court held that a person is not justified in committing a battery against a law enforcement officer even if the arrest is technically unlawful. The use of force in resisting an arrest by a person reasonably known to be a law enforcement officer is unlawful notwithstanding the technical illegality of the arrest.
[1] A suspect's use of force against a law enforcement officer is unlawful, notwithstanding the technical illegality of the officer's actions or the stop.
[2] The illegality of an initial stop does not negate the statutory elements of resisting an officer with violence or battery of a law enforcement officer.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“just as the appellant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Sections 843.01 and 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1977), neither is he justified in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977).”
Establishes the core holding that battery against an officer cannot be justified by the technical illegality of the arrest
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert Johnson was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer under Florida Statute Section 784.07. Johnson filed a motion to dismiss arguing t…
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HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
The State of Florida appeals from an order granting Robert Johnson’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).
Johnson was charged by information with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1978). He filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) on the ground that there exist no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
Johnson contends that the lower court properly granted the motion to dismiss, as Officer Brubaker was not “engaged in the lawful performance of his duties,” an essential requirement of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes. He bases this contention on the fact that Brubaker did not have a misdemeanor warrant to arrest him 1 and that none of the provisions of Section 901.15, Florida Statutes, which would make the arrest lawful, were applicable. We do not agree.
In Meeks v. State, 369 So. 2d 109 (Fla.lst DCA 1979), the First District Court of Appeal ' addressed this issue. In that case, Meeks contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that the officers were not in the lawful performance of their duties at the time of offense. The batteries occurred while the officers were executing an allegedly illegal misdemeanor warrant. The appellate court held:
[J]ust as the appellant is not justified in using force to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Sections 843.01 and 776.-051(1), Florida Statutes (1977), neither is he justified in committing a battery to resist an unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977).
Id. at 110. In Meeks the court cites Lowrey v. State, 356 So. 2d 1325 (Fla.4th DCA 1978), which dealt with resisting an unlawful arrest under Section 843.01, Florida Statutes.2
In Lowrey, the court stated that Sections 776.051 and 843.01 must be read together. The court held that the use of force in resisting an arrest by a person reasonably known to be a law enforcement officer is unlawful “notwithstanding the technical illegality of the arrest.” Id. at 1326.
We agree with the holdings in Meeks and Lowrey. The trial court committed error in granting Johnson’s motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court dismissing the information and remand with directions to reinstate the in formation and for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur. . Johnson was charged with a violation of § 562.12(1), Fla.Stat., a second-degree misdemeanor. . Section 843.01 refers to the officer as being “in the lawful execution of any legal duty.”
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Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2006)…e.g., Espinosa, 686 So. 2d at 1347 and n. 4 (declining to revisit well-settled” law in applying section 776.051 to crime of resisting an officer with violence); see also Delaney v. State, 489 So. 2d 891, 892-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); State v. Johnson, 382 So. 2d 866, 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Because the issue is not before us, we decline to address the effect of section 776.051 on the [*1270] “lawful execution” element in arrest situations. . The First District stated in dicta that "[t]he comparison between a d…
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Clauson Conway Taylor v. State, 740 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…the state is not required to prove that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty if the defendant has committed a battery on the officer in the course of resisting an arrest. See Meeks v. State, 369 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); State v. Johnson, 382 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In either case, if the officer reasonably believed that the arrest was lawful, the defendant is not justified in using force. As previously explained, however, this principle applies only if the defendant is charged with resistin…
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Johnson v. State, 395 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…ence, and motion to suppress statements made by petitioner. [*595] We grant the writ and quash the order and opinion of the circuit court. Petitioner has previously been before this court on a charge arising from this episode. See State v. Johnson, 382 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The facts in this case are that on June 10, 1979, shortly after 2:00 a. m., Sergeant Bru-baker of the St. Petersburg Police Department was on routine patrol when he observed activity on the porch of petitioner’s duplex. The offi…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lowery v. State, 356 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Meeks v. State, 369 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)