ERWIN KOLTAY, APPELLANT,
v.
INDEX-TEL, INC., APPELLEE
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Erwin Koltay, the defendant below, appealed a trial court judgment finding him indebted to Index-Tel, Inc. in an accounting action. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, noting that the trial judge properly exercised his role as fact-finder and fact-determiner, and preserved appellant's right to jury trial on his remaining counterclaim.
The trial court's judgment was affirmed because the trial judge acted within the proper scope of his duties as trier of fact and law. The appellate court declined to pass on the motion to set aside judgment but ordered that jurisdiction would revert to the trial court upon entry of the mandate to determine that motion.
[1] A trial court acts within the proper scope of its duties when acting as the trier of fact and law.
[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction over a case until a notice of appeal is filed, at which point appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the appellate court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial judge, in rendering his final judgment, was acting within the proper scope of his duties as the trier of fact and of law and we, therefore, affirm.”
Establishes the basis for affirmance: the trial judge's judgment was within proper judicial authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court rendered a final judgment against Koltay, the defendant, finding him indebted to Index-Tel, Inc. in an action for accounting. The tria…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, defendant below, appeals from a final judgment of the trial court finding him indebted to the appellee, plaintiff below, in an action for an accounting. The trial judge, in rendering his final judgment, was acting within the proper scope of his duties as the trier of fact and of law and we, therefore, affirm.
The final judgment recognized appellant’s right to jury trial on his remaining counterclaim and specifically refrained from addressing the merits of that counterclaim. We also note with interest that the trial court specifically advises the parties in the final judgment that had the plaintiff in this cause been the individuals against whom appellant has a separate pending cause of action in the court below, rather than the corporate entity which was actually plaintiff below, the judgment rendered may well have been different in scope and effect.
Finally, within one year after entry of the final judgment, but after filing his notice of appeal to this court, the appellant timely filed with the trial court a motion to set aside final judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), alleging misconduct of the plaintiff. The trial court entered an order on its own motion, correctly finding that it was without jurisdiction of the matter since the filing of the notice of appeal had lodged jurisdiction in this court. It then ordered the clerk of the lower court to supplement the record on appeal in this cause with the motion to set aside final judgment together with the supporting affidavit. That supplemented record was filed with this court on February 5, 1980. No further action was taken and oral argument on the issues raised by the notice of appeal was held by this court on April 1, 1980, without any mention being made of the motion to set aside judgment. A written motion to relinquish jurisdiction was filed with this court on April 1, 1980, requesting us to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for determination of the motion to set aside judgment. This court is not by this opinion passing on the validity or propriety of the motion to set aside judgment, and by this affirmance jurisdiction will again be vested in the trial court for that determination when the mandate from this court is entered.
AFFIRMED.
SCHEB, Acting C. J., and DANAHY and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.