HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
MYRNA R. BOSWORTH ET VIR., APPELLEES
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Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company appealed a trial court's award of $9,000 in attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff in a personal injury protection coverage dispute. The appellate court held that while the trial court has discretion to award fees consistent with expert testimony, it is not confined to that amount and must have the ability to award less based on its independent judgment.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $9,000 where expert testimony supported that amount as reasonable, and the court rejected Hartford's argument that the fee was punitive. However, the trial court was not confined to the amount witnesses deemed reasonable and could have awarded a lesser amount based on independent discretion.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases an attorney's fee award on a desire to punish a party for not settling a lawsuit.
[2] A trial court is not confined to the amount of a reasonable fee testified to by expert witnesses.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial judge is not confined to the amount which the witnesses, however well qualified, deem reasonable.”
Establishes that trial courts have independent discretion in setting attorneys' fees and are not bound by expert testimony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMyrna Bosworth was injured in an automobile collision and received payment for medical treatments under PIP coverage from Hartford's insurance policy.…
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UPCHURCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a portion of a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Brevard County awarding attorneys’ fees of $9,000.00.
The points assigned as error on appeal may be summarized in the single question:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining $9,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the services of plaintiff’s attorneys?
Appellee, Myrna R. Bosworth, after injury in an automobile collision, was paid for medical treatments under the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage of an automobile policy carried by appellant Hartford. Based upon an independent medical examination of appellee, appellant Hartford refused further payments. Appellee then filed suit to recover $4,746.15 in outstanding medical bills. A verdict was returned for the full amount.
At a subsequent hearing, an application for attorneys’ fees under section 627.428, Florida Statutes (1977) was considered. The court heard the testimony of the two attorneys representing appellee and two who qualified as experts. No testimony as to the amount of a reasonable fee was offered by Hartford.
Hartford contends that the trial judge improperly awarded the fee based upon a desire to punish Hartford for not settling the suit. See Meeks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 460 F. 2d 776 (5th Cir.1972). The trial court apparently considered appellant’s argument and specifically found that this factor had not entered into its determination of the fee. We cannot conclude that this finding was incorrect because the fees awarded did not exceed the amount which the experts testified was reasonable.
Appellant also contends that the trial judge held they were limited to the “perimeters of the testimony” and therefore could not award less than the $9,000.00 figure. This contention is based on the following remarks of the trial judge:
THE COURT: I’m kind of locked in on the thing. I’m not particularly uncomfortable with it, but the award must be made within the perimeters of testimony and the law.
The trial judge is not confined to the amount which the witnesses, however well qualified, deem reasonable. See Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Gorgei Enterprises, Inc., 345 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). The remarks of the trial judge indicate that he may have believed he had no discretion to award a smaller amount absent other proof. Therefore, we conclude that this cause must be remanded for further consideration of the award. We do not hold that the court did not have discretion to award an amount which was consistent with the expert testimony [see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Florida Power & Light, 367 So. 2d 1104 (Fla.3d DCA 1979)], but hold only that he was not confined to that amount and could have awarded a lesser amount.
Remanded for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur.
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Cancel v. Cancel, 399 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)…t could have employed to account for the asset in its financial award without receiving such evidence. This failure to appreciate the 3 scope of the remedies available to it compels us to reverse. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Bosworth, 382 So. 2d 1345, 1346–47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (reversing and remanding for further consideration when the trial court appeared to have misapprehended the extent of its discretion when deciding the amount of an award based on the evidence presented). The Diffende…
Authorities Cited
- Meeks v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 460 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1972)
- Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Gorgei Enters., Inc., 345 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 367 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)