ACCREDITED SURETY AND CASUALTY COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A surety company posted a bail bond for Margaret Arenas on a robbery charge. When Arenas was subsequently arrested on the same robbery charge, she was released on her own recognizance rather than under the original surety bond. The trial court ordered forfeiture of the surety bond when Arenas failed to appear, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a surety is discharged when the accused is rearrested on the same charge because the surety loses exclusive custody of the accused.
The surety is discharged when the accused is rearrested on the same charge. The rearrest removes the accused from the surety's exclusive custody and breaches the surety contract, extinguishing the surety's obligation to ensure the accused's appearance.
[1] A surety on a bail bond is discharged when the accused is subsequently arrested again on the same charge.
[2] Rearrest of an accused on the same charge removes the accused from the surety's control, thereby releasing the surety from its obligation to ensure the accused's appearan…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule is predicated on the theory that the release of an accused on bond commits him to the exclusive custody of the surety. Rearrest on the same charge removes the accused from the surety's control, thereby releasing the surety from its obligation to ensure the accused's appearance.”
Establishes the custody theory underlying the surety discharge rule
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMargaret Arenas was arrested on June 7, 1978 for robbery and released on a surety bond posted by appellant company, with appearance set for August 29,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Bail Bond Forfeiture cases and more on FLexlaw
OTT, Judge.
The question before us is whether a surety on a bail bond is discharged when the accused is subsequently arrested again on the same charge. In this action the trial court concluded that the surety was not discharged and ordered the forfeiture of the bond. We hold that the trial court erred and reverse.
On June 7, 1978 Margaret Arenas was arrested on a charge of robbery. Bail was set and the accused was released from custody upon the posting of a surety bond by the appellant. The bond secured the appearance of the accused before the court on August 29. On July 6, 1978 the accused was arrested on two counts of robbery, one of which was the same as that for which she had been previously arrested and for which appellant had posted bond. The ac-' cused was released on her own recognizance on both charges and appearance was again set for August 29, 1978. She failed to appear and an order of forfeiture of the original surety bond was entered against the appellant.
A bail bond is a three party contract between the state, the accused and the surety. The surety guarantees the state that the accused will appear at subsequent proceedings. The rule in this and several other states is that the surety is discharged if the accused is rearrested on the same charge or for the same offense. Ex parte Cribbs, 109 Fla. 286, 146 So. 912 (1933); Cash et al. v. State, 73 So. 2d 903 (Fla.1954); Commonwealth v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 366 Mass. 611, 321 N.E. 2d 811 (1975); State v. Gonzalez, 69 N.J.Super. 283, 174 A. 2d 209 (1961); Commonwealth v. Skaggs, 152 Ky. 268, 153 S.W. 422 (1913).
The rule is predicated on the theory that the release of an accused on bond commits him to the exclusive custody of the surety. Rearrest on the same charge removes the accused from the surety’s control, thereby releasing the surety from its obligation to ensure the accused’s appearance. The return of the accused to the state’s custody constitutes a breach of the surety contract, and the court cannot create a new obligation on the part of the surety by attempting to “continue bail” under the previously posted bond.
The rationale of the custody theory is that the person having the accused in custody is in the best position to secure his appearance. The state’s discretion to either require the accused to post a new bond or to release him on his own recognizance is unquestioned. However, if the state elects to release on recognizance, then the state assumes the risk that the accused may not appear for subsequent proceedings.
It follows that when Arenas was arrested on the robbery charge for which the appellant had posted bond, the surety agreement was breached because appellant was deprived of the exclusive custody of the accused. Appellant’s obligation was thereupon extinguished. The subsequent release of Arenas on her own recognizance constituted a new contract to appear between only her and the state. Appellant was not a party to that new contract and therefore was not liable for Arenas’ failure to appear. Accordingly, the final judgment of the circuit court ordering the forfeiture of appellant’s $10,502 surety bond is reversed.
SCHEB, Acting C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Wiley v. State, 451 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…308 (Fla.1956). The bond is simply a three-party contract made by the state, the accused, and the surety, with the surety guaranteeing to the state that the accused will appear at subsequent proceedings. Accredited Assurance & Casualty Co. v. State, 383 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Ordinarily, a bail bond is cancelled when it no longer appears necessary to look to the surety to guarantee the appearance of the accused at subsequent court proceedings on the particular charges covered by the bond. For example,…
-
Dudley v. State, 511 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…step further. An obligation to produce a defendant is a contractual obligation under which the surety guarantees the State that the defendant will appear at subsequent proceedings. Accredited Sur. & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Hillsborough County, 383 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The liability of a surety may not be extended beyond the terms of his contract. State ex. rel. Dade County v. All Florida Sur. Co., 59 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1952); Midland Ins. Co. v. State, 354 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). There is…
-
Pinellas Cnty. v. Robertson, 490 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…279 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). A bail bond is a three-party contract between the state, the accused, and the surety, whereby the surety guarantees appearance of the accused. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Hillsborough County, 383 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The early case of Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 21 L.Ed. 287 (1873), announced three conditions under which bail could be exonerated: an act of God, an act of the obligee, or an act of the law. However, the United St…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cash v. State, 73 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1954)
- Ex Parte. Woodrow Cribbs, 109 Fla. 286 (Fla. 1933)