ANDREW JOHN HENRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-05-14
No. 78-291/T4-58
COBB and UPCHURCH, JJ., concur.
383 So. 2d 320 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Andrew Henry appeals an order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing him on probation for sexual battery of a twelve-year-old girl. The court affirms, holding that hearsay testimony regarding the victim's immediate post-incident complaint and her later identification of the appellant was properly admitted under established Florida law.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's admission of both statements. The mother's testimony regarding the child's immediate complaint of the sexual battery was admissible as a historic exception for crime victims' prompt complaints. The father's testimony regarding the daughter's out-of-court identification was admissible as an extra-judicial identification made in the accused's presence, where the victim was present at trial and subject to cross-examination.


Headnotes

[1] A victim's report of a sexual crime made shortly after the event is admissible in evidence.

[2] Testimony of a victim's extrajudicial identification of an accused is admissible when the victim is present at trial and subject to cross-examination.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The female outraged should seek the first opportunity to complain, and the fact that she does complain goes to the jury as evidence.”

Establishes the longstanding rule that a crime victim's prompt complaint is admissible evidence in Florida courts.

Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

A twelve-year-old girl reported being sexually battered on October 3, 1976. Two months later, she identified the appellant when they passed on the str…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
MILLER, ROBERT P., Associate Judge.

MILLER, ROBERT P., Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Orange County withholding adjudication of guilt and placing defendant on probation for the crime of sexual battery.

The victim, a twelve-year-old girl, reported that she was sexually battered on October 3, 1976. Two months later, she saw appellant walking down the street and identified him as her assailant.

Over objection, the mother and father of the victim were permitted to testify to certain of her statements. The mother was allowed to testify that when the daughter arrived home after the incident in a disheveled, frightened condition, she told her “that a boy had pulled her off her bicycle and had taken her clothes down.” The father was allowed to testify to his daughter’s identification of the appellant when they happened to pass him on the street two months after the incident.

The victim was present and testified at the trial to both the attack and her subsequent identification of appellant.

The parties in their briefs restrict their argument to whether or not such testimony would fall into either the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule or the rules relating to the admissibility of prior consistent statements to rebut impeachment evidence implying recent fabrication. However, since the testimony in each instance is clearly admissible for other reasons it is not necessary for this court to determine its admissibility as a prior consistent statement or as a res gestae statement.

The testimony of the mother was in effect the child’s reporting of a sex crime immediately after the event. Such a report has long been recognized as admissible in evidence by the courts of this state. Our Supreme Court in Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889), in a rape case, stated:

The female outraged should seek the first opportunity to complain, and the fact that she does complain goes to the jury as evidence. ...

The court in that case went on to hold, however, that the detailed circumstances of the offense were not admissible under such rule. For recent decisions see Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288, 294 (Fla.1953); Gray v. State, 184 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Thomas v. State, 220 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1977). As additional authority for and explanation of the admissibility of such statement, see 3 Underhill’s Criminal Evidence § 758 (5th Ed. 1957); also 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 313 (13th Ed. 1972).

The testimony of the father which appellant contends was hearsay was her identification of appellant in his presence. Such testimony of a person who witnesses an extra-judicial identification of the accused by a victim is admissible when the victim is present, testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination by the accused. State v. Freber, 366 So. 2d 426 (Fla.1978). See also 5 West’s Florida Practice § 801.1 (1977) and cases cited therein. Although not controlling of this case, it should be noted that this rule has been codified into the new evidence code. See § 90.801(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1979).

Appellant having failed to demonstrate error, the order of the trial court placing the appellant on probation is affirmed.

COBB and UPCHURCH, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw