STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,

v.

DANIEL EDWARD COOMES, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981)
  …utes. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972). Appellants initially argue that the RICO Act is vague and overbroad, and must therefore be held unconstitutional. We disposed of a similar argument in the case of Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1980), and held the statute constitutional. Moorehead is controlling on this point. Appellants secondly argue that the act is facially unconstitutional because it imposes strict liability without requiring criminal intent or knowledge, and bec…
• Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1981)
  …ative terms of that provision — “enterprise,” “pattern,” and “racketeering activity” — are statutorily defined, and they have already been upheld in the face of vagueness challenges. State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980). The term “participate” is not itself vague. “[Wjhere a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980). The statute…
• Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981)
  …ismiss, alleging that the RICO Act is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Both motions were denied. Some of appellants’ arguments against the statute have been rejected in State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.1980), and Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980). In this appeal, appellants contend that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them because the definition of the term “enterprise,”1 which specifically includes illicit as well as licit enterprises, conflicts with the expression…

Authorities Cited

• State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1980)