DONALD LEE MOOREHEAD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Moorehead was convicted under Florida's RICO statute for being employed by an enterprise conducting racketeering activity. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute against challenges that it was unconstitutionally vague and over-broad, holding that the statutory language sufficiently clarified what constitutes a 'pattern of racketeering activity' by requiring interrelated incidents that are not isolated.
The Florida RICO statute is neither vague nor over-broad under the Florida Constitution. The statutory definition of 'pattern of racketeering activity,' which explicitly requires interrelated incidents that are not isolated, is sufficiently clear for men of ordinary intelligence to understand when repeated criminal conduct becomes a pattern.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its definition of a pattern of racketeering activity requires interrelated incidents that are not isolated.
[2] A court will not consider a constitutional challenge to a statute if the issue was not raised in the lower court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents”
Definition from section 943.461(4) that Moorehead challenged as vague
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonald Lee Moorehead was charged with five auto thefts committed within a two-month period. Before entering a nolo contendere plea, Moorehead challeng…
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BOYD, Justice.
Donald Lee Moorehead was convicted of being employed by or associated with an enterprise and conducting or participating in that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of section 943.462, Florida Statutes (1977). Before entering the plea of nolo contendere upon which the conviction was based, the appellant challenged, on vagueness and over-breadth grounds, the constitutionality of the statute, which the trial court passed on in denying his motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. The appellant reserved the right to appeal the court’s rulings on the facial validity of the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). §§ 943.-46-.464, Fla.Stat. (1977). Only these legal issues are before us, the factual questions pertaining to appellant’s conduct having been foreclosed by his nolo plea. We hold that the statute is neither vague nor over-broad under the Florida Constitution.
Appellant argues that the definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” found in section 943.461(4), Florida Statutes (1977), is unconstitutionally vague. That section provides:
“Pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents .
Specifically appellant argues that men of ordinary intelligence cannot ascertain when repeated criminal conduct becomes interrelated.
The definition was derived from the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970), which does not explicitly require that the incidents be related and not isolated. The federal courts have upheld the federal statute against claims of constitutional vagueness by implying a requirement that the incidents not be isolated. United States v. Hawes, 529 F. 2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F. 2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Parness, 503 F. 2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) cert. denied 419 U.S. 1105, 95 S.Ct. 775, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1975). The Florida legislature incorporated the federal case law by explicitly defining “pattern of racketeering activity” to include interrelated incidents that are not isolated. This inclusion clarifies the definition and prevents it from being unconstitutionally vague.
Appellant presents the same argument with respect to section 943.462(1), Florida Statutes (1977). Since this point was not raised in the court below, we refrain from commenting on it. McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla.1978); Silver v. State, 188 So. 2d 300 (Fla.1966).
Next appellant argues that the entire RICO act is unconstitutionally over-broad. He argues that the legislature im-permissibly included a host of misdemeanors which are not related to organized criminal activity. See Note, Racketeers and Non-Racketeers Alike Should Fear Florida’s RICO Act, 6 F.S.U.L.Rev. 483 (1978). Whatever merits there are to this argument, they do not apply to this case. Appellant was charged with five auto thefts within a two month period. This is not the type of minor criminal activity upon which appellant bases his argument.
We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
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Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981)…utes. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972). Appellants initially argue that the RICO Act is vague and overbroad, and must therefore be held unconstitutional. We disposed of a similar argument in the case of Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1980), and held the statute constitutional. Moorehead is controlling on this point. Appellants secondly argue that the act is facially unconstitutional because it imposes strict liability without requiring criminal intent or knowledge, and bec…
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Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1981)…ative terms of that provision — “enterprise,” “pattern,” and “racketeering activity” — are statutorily defined, and they have already been upheld in the face of vagueness challenges. State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980). The term “participate” is not itself vague. “[Wjhere a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980). The statute…
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Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981)…ismiss, alleging that the RICO Act is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. Both motions were denied. Some of appellants’ arguments against the statute have been rejected in State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.1980), and Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980). In this appeal, appellants contend that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them because the definition of the term “enterprise,”1 which specifically includes illicit as well as licit enterprises, conflicts with the expression…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McNAMARA v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)
- United States v. Enrico Campanale and Donald Matthews, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975)
- United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974)
- United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976)
- Hurt v. Britton, 419 U.S. 1105 (U.S. 1975)
- Adolph Coors Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 419 U.S. 1105 (U.S. 1975)
- Silver v. State, 188 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1966)