WILLIAM G. INMON, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Inmon was charged with involuntary sexual battery as a first-degree felony. The State notified him that it would seek life imprisonment under Florida's Habitual Offender Statute based on his prior conviction for the same offense. Inmon argued he should receive ten peremptory challenges (available for life felonies) rather than six, but the appellate court affirmed that the number of peremptory challenges is determined by the charge in the information, not by potential sentencing enhancements.
A defendant is entitled to peremptory challenges based on the offense charged in the information, not on potential sentencing enhancements. Inmon, charged with a first-degree felony, was entitled to six peremptory challenges regardless of the State's notice that it would seek life imprisonment under the Habitual Offender Statute.
[1] A defendant charged with a first-degree felony is entitled to six peremptory challenges, regardless of whether the State intends to seek enhanced sentencing under the Hab…
[2] Notice of intent to seek enhanced sentencing under the Habitual Offender Statute, served prior to trial, does not alter the number of peremptory challenges available to t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the instant case, appellant was charged with a first-degree felony which entitled him to only six peremptory challenges. If the State had elected to wait until immediately prior to sentencing to notify appellant that he would be sentenced under the Habitual Offender Statute, appellant certainly would have been limited to the six peremptory challenges allowed under the original information.”
Establishes that the number of peremptory challenges is determined by the offense charged in the information, not by potential sentencing enhancements or the timing of notice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceInmon was charged by information with involuntary sexual battery by threatening force. Prior to trial, the State served notice that his case was refer…
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HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant William G. Inmon, Jr. was charged by information with involuntary sexual battery by threatening force against the victim. Prior to trial, the State served notice on appellant that his case had been referred to the Career Criminal Prosecution Program and that if the case proceeded to sentencing the State would “request that the defendant be sentenced pursuant to the Florida Habitual Offender Statute.” Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1979).1 This notice was based on appellant’s prior conviction for the same offense.
At trial, appellant exercised six peremptory challenges and attempted a seventh challenge which was objected to' by the State on the ground that the charge was not a life felony. Appellant argues that under the Habitual Offender Statute he could be sentenced to life imprisonment and, therefore, should have ten peremptory challenges. The court upheld the State’s objection and appellant was restricted to six peremptory challenges.
Appellant argues, inter alia,, that where an offense charged is a first-degree felony and the State has announced that it will seek life imprisonment under the Habitual Offender Statute, appellant is entitled to ten peremptory challenges. We are unable to agree with appellant’s argument and affirm the judgment and sentence entered against him.
Section 775.084(3)(b) provides:
(b) Written notice shall be served on the defendant and his attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence so as to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant. (Emphasis ours)
We interpret this provision to mean that the State shall serve notice on the defendant either before he enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or, in the event he enters a plea of not guilty and submits to trial, prior to the imposition of sentence. In the instant case, appellant was charged with a first-degree felony which entitled him to only six peremptory challenges. If the State had elected to wait until immediately prior to sentencing to notify appellant that he would be sentenced under the Habitual Offender Statute, appellant certainly would have been limited to the six peremptory challenges allowed under the original information. The fact that the State chose to notify appellant. prior to trial has no effect on this issue.
Appellant raises several other issues which we find to be without merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgment and sentence entered against appellant.
AFFIRMED.
BOARDMAN and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur. . Notice was pursuant to Section 775.084(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
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Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993)…SHAW, Justice. We have for review Ashley v. State, 590 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), in which the court certified conflict with Inmon v. State, 383 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.2d DCA), review denied, 389 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1980). We have jurisdiction. Art V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We quash the decision in Ashley. Based on an incident that took place October 29, 1989, Ashley was charged with battery on a correctional…
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COX v. State, 764 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…considered and rejected by the second, third, and fourth district courts of appeal. See Whitaker v. State, — So. 2d —, 1999 WL 510773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)[24 Fla. L. Weekly D1692]; Smellie v. State, 720 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Inmon v. State, 383 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 389 So. 2d 1111 (Fla.1980). In each of the cited cases, the defendant maintained that because he was charged with a first degree felony which became punishable by life imprisonment by virtue of the state’s decision to s…
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Smellie v. State, 720 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…habitual felony offender, the offense with which he was charged — robbery with a weapon, a first degree felony — became punishable by life imprisonment and, therefore, that he was entitled to ten peremptory challenges. We agree with Inmon v. State, 383 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 389 So. 2d 1111 (Fla.1980), which held that the State’s filing of its notice of intent to seek an habitual offender sentence enhancement prior to trial does not serve to increase the number of peremptory challenges a de…
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