DENNIS W. FELLOWS AND DENISE M. FELLOWS, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT FRIEND, DENNIS W. FELLOWS, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITIZENS FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF ST. LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND BANK BUILDING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, APPELLEES
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Plaintiff Fellows appealed a summary judgment after being struck by a truck that ran a red light while he was attempting to exit defendants' driveway onto a highway. The court affirmed, holding that even if the driveway was negligently designed, the truck running the red light was the clear proximate cause of the accident, breaking any causal chain between defendants' alleged negligence and plaintiff's injuries.
The court held that summary judgment was properly granted because the truck running the red light was the clear proximate cause of the accident, not any negligence in the driveway's design. Regardless of plaintiff's status on the property, no negligence by defendants was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
[1] A defendant's negligence is not the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries if the injuries would have occurred regardless of the defendant's alleged wrongdoing.
[2] The proximate cause of an accident must be a natural, direct, and continuous sequence between the negligent act and the injury, such that the injury would not have occurr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Proximate cause means that the alleged wrong of the defendant caused the damage plaintiff claims.”
Establishes the definition of proximate cause that must be satisfied for negligence liability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Fellows had car trouble on Highway U.S. 1 and entered a driveway on Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Association's property, which was under …
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BERANEK, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. The facts are that the plaintiff was proceeding on Highway U.S. 1 when he had car trouble. He left the highway and entered a driveway on the property of Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Association. This driveway area was under construction by the second defendant, Bank Building Corporation of America. Plaintiff was not a customer of the Bank and was using the driveway solely for his own purpose. It is alleged that the driveway was a one-way drive but that it was not properly marked on the pavement with arrows. In any event, plaintiff turned around in the driveway due to his car trouble. This placed him in the position of attempting to cross U.S. 1 from east to west. Plaintiff’s car was struck by a truck which had run a red light. Serious injuries occurred and plaintiff sued defendants, Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association and the corporation doing construction work on the premises. Plaintiff’s allegations were that the driveway had been negligently designed and that the defendants had failed to provide warning signs or other traffic control devices at the entry of the highway.
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Final summary judgment in favor of defendants was entered and the order granting the motion does not recite the ground therefor. Our review of the record indicates that the clear proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident was the truck on the highway which ran the light. The record conclusively shows that negligent design of the driveway, if any, was not the legal cause of the eventual accident which occurred on the far side of this four-lane, divided highway. Proximate cause means that the alleged wrong of the defendant caused the damage plaintiff claims. Rosen v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc., 265 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). There must be such a natural, direct and continuous sequence between the negligent act and the injury that it can reasonably be said that but for the act the injury would not have occurred. Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So. 2d 746 (Fla.1967). Here, even the safest of driveways would not have saved plaintiff from being struck by the truck which ran the light.
Much of the argument before the trial court and on brief before this court relates to the status of the plaintiff while on the defendant’s property. Defendants contend plaintiff was a trespasser and plaintiff contends he was either a business invitee or at least an uninvited licensee. We need not consider this issue because no matter what his status, there is no indication that any negligence of these defendants was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. A similar situation was presented in Pope v. Cruise Boat Co., Inc., 380 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), where the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment based on an absence of proximate cause where the plaintiff entered a highway from an obstructed shoulder area. We believe this case is governed by the same principle as applied in the Pope decision and the summary judgment is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
ANSTEAD, J., and SIMONS, STUART M., Associate Judge, concur.
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D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001)…tehead’s death would not have occurred “but for” the negligent acts or omissions of the hospital and the doctor, those acts and omissions must be deemed the cause of the injury. See Fellows v. Citizens Savings & Loan Association of St. Lucie County, 383 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Bryant v. Jax Liquors, 352 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Stated differently, any conduct on Whitehead’s part before he entered the hospital which contributed to his cardiac and pulmonary arrest and subsequent death was not a p…
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Cassel v. Price, 396 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…CA 1974). There must be such a natural, direct and continuous sequence between the negligent act and the injury that it can reasonably be said that but for the act the injury would not have occurred. Fellows v. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 383 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). We think it was just as likely as not, under the circumstances of this case, that a child’s decision to climb the tree would have been the same had the pieces of broken brick or block been clearly visible. In any event, liabilit…1 / 2
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Borenstein v. Raskin, 401 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…inuous sequence between the negligent act and the injury that it can reasonably be said that but for the act, the injury would not have occurred. Cassel v. Price, 396 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Fellows v. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 383 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). There is no evidence that any delay on the part of Mrs. Borenstein in seeing a vascular surgeon between April 5 and July 11, 1975 was a proximate cause of her damages. Where reasonable persons can come to but one possible concl…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1967)
- Linda Gale Pope et vir. v. Cruise Boat Co., Inc., 380 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Cousins Assocs., Inc. v. Cousins, 380 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Michaeline K. Rosen v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 265 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)