CHARLES MONROE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The trial court erred by refusing to give a requested jury instruction on defense of others, entitling the defendant to have the jury consider his theory of defense.
[1] A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a recognized defense if there is evidence, however tenuous, to support that theory of defense.
[2] The jury, and not the judge, is the sole arbiter of the facts and the credibility of witnesses when determining whether a defense is applicable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUndercover officers attempted to arrest appellant's brother; appellant attempted to aid his brother, claiming he did not know the men were police offi…
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RYDER, Judge.
Charles Monroe appeals from his convictions of battery of a law enforcement officer and obstructing or opposing an officer without violence. The appellant raises three points on appeal; we find two of the appellant’s points to be without merit but agree with the appellant’s third point in which he contends that the trial court erred by not giving a requested jury instruction on defense of others.
On June 26, 1978, two undercover police officers attempted to arrest the appellant’s brother. The appellant, who claimed he did not know the two men chasing his brother were police officers, attempted to aid his brother. Although there was substantial evidence which tended to prove that the appellant probably knew that the men were in fact police officers, the appellant testified on his own behalf that he did not know that the men were police officers. As this was the appellant’s theory of defense, and since there was evidence to support that theory, however tenuous it might have been, the appellant was entitled to the requested jury instruction on defense of others.
In the case sub judice we are constrained to hold the trial Court in error in refusing to give the jury the requested instruction . . However, disdainfully the trial Judge may have felt about the merits of such defense from a factual standpoint, however even we may feel about it, is beside the point. It was for the jury and the jury alone to pass upon it as a recognized defense to a criminal charge. And if there was “evidence introduced in support thereof” . . . , the defendant was “entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to his theory of defense.”
Koontz v. State, 204 So. 2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Accord, Laythe v. State, 330 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
The trial judge erred by refusing to give the requested jury instruction on the defense of others. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Ladner v. Plaza del Prado Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 423 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…elective enforcement is the law of the case and is not open to redetermination by the trial court. We will first address the second point on appeal. The case was before this court previously, Ladner v. Plaza Del Prado Condominium Association, Inc., 384 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), to review an order granting the Condominium Association’s motion for preliminary injunction which required appellants to correct the nonconforming condition of their terrace railing. This court reversed the preliminary injunction…1 / 2
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Taylor v. State, 410 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…of how weak or improbable his testimony may have been with respect to the circumstances leading up to the battery. Taylor v. State, 301 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). In Monroe v. State, 384 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980), the court held that when a defendant testified that he did not know the alleged victim of the battery was a police officer he was entitled to a requested instruction on the defense of others. In Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926…
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Polite v. State, 933 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Langston v. State, 789 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Jackson v. State, 463 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), review denied, 482 So. 2d 345 (Fla.1986); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 3.6(f), (g); see also Monroe v. State, 384 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). However, the availability of such a defense, which was implicitly rejected by the jury in this case, does not render knowledge an element of the offense itself which must be established by the state. Cf. State v. Espinosa, 686 So…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Merlin Evans v. State, 204 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Johnson v. State, 204 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Anderson v. State, 330 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Laythe v. State, 330 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)