GRACE SANICOLA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Grace Sanicola was charged with welfare fraud under Florida Statute 409.325(1)(b) for failing to disclose her husband's employment to maintain state assistance eligibility. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of her motion to dismiss, holding that the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The statute does not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine because, when read in its entirety within chapter 409, it clearly requires disclosure of changes that affect eligibility for financial assistance. The statute does not unconstitutionally delegate power to HRS because the relevant eligibility standards are established elsewhere in chapter 409, and it is impossible for the legislature to anticipate every factual situation requiring disclosure.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it provides persons of common intelligence adequate warning of proscribed conduct.
[2] A statute prohibiting failure to disclose changes in circumstances to obtain or continue to receive benefits is constitutional when interpreted to require disclosure of c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating vagueness challenges to statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSanicola was charged with welfare fraud for allegedly failing to disclose a change in circumstances (her husband's employment) in order to obtain or c…
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ADKINS, Justice.
By direct appeal we have before us the constitutionality of section 409.325(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Appellant, hereinafter defendant, was charged with welfare fraud. Specifically, the state alleged she had failed to disclose her husband’s employment in order to obtain state assistance in violation of section 409.325(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)
[One who fjails to disclose a change in circumstances in order to obtain or con tinue to receive under any such program aid or benefits to which he is not entitled or in an amount larger than that to which he is entitled, or who knowingly aids or abets another person in the commission of any such act is guilty of a crime and shall be punished as provided in subsection (5).
Defendant moved to dismiss the information on the basis that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and an unlawful delegation of power by the legislature to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Art. II, § 3, Fla.Const. Without comment, the trial court entered its order denying the motion to dismiss. Defendant later entered a plea of nolo con-tendere and specifically reserved the right to appeal the constitutional question. We affirm.
A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct. Roth v. U. S., 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1979). There should be sufficient clarity so that guesswork is not required to discern the prohibition. Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934). Defendant maintains that the phrase “change in circumstances” is vague because there is no indication as to the type of change required to trigger the statute. Defendant suggests that it would be helpful to know whether the change refers to alterations in financial status as opposed to other types of changes. Also, since there is no limitation that the change be material, it is possible to incur criminal liability for insignificant incidents. See State v. DeLeo, 356 So. 2d 306 (Fla.1978).
The state counters with the argument that when read in its entirety, chapter 409 makes it clear that the type of “changes in circumstances” which must be disclosed are those which affect eligibility for financial assistance. See, e. g., Riggins v. State, 369 So. 2d 948 (Fla.1979); § 409.185, Fla.Stat. (1977). We agree.
The statute prohibits non-disclosure of “a change in circumstances in order to obtain or continue to receive . benefits to which he is not entitled.” § 409.325(1)(b), Fla.Stat. (1977) (E.S.). Clearly the disclosure must be pertinent to the person’s eligibility to receive or continue to receive assistance; otherwise the disclosure would have no effect and the prohibition would be meaningless.
The defendant next contends that the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of authority in violation of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. By leaving the determination of what constitutes a “change in circumstances” to HRS, the legislature allegedly failed to set forth meaningful guidelines and standards. Dickinson v. State ex rel. Bryant, 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla.1969). As noted in the preceding paragraph, however, the statute must be construed to require disclosure of changes which relate to eligibility. The standards for eligibility are found elsewhere in chapter 409 and are not under attack here. It would be impossible for the legislature to anticipate each factual situation giving rise to a change necessitating disclosure. State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1977).
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, SUNDBERG, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982)…d 178 (Fla.1974). A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct. Sanicola v. State, 384 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1980). Trushin maintains that the term “anything of value” is vague because there is no delineation of that term and therefore its application is purely subjective. The state disagrees, arguing that the challenged words are clear on their face.…
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Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1994)…DCA 1992). A penal statute “will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” Sanicola v. State, 384 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla.1980) (citations omitted). The legislature’s failure to define “public housing facility” does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. “If a statute or rule uses a word without defining it, then its common or ordinary meaning appli…
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State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1997)…o withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must be specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct. Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1983) , (citing Sanicola v. State, 384 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1980)). We do not agree with the district court’s analysis that section 877.18, Florida Statutes (1993), fails this test. Perhaps it would have been better legislative drafting if the legislature had not chosen the shorthand method of referrin…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (U.S. 1957)
- Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670 (Fla. 1934)
- State v. DYE, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977)
- Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1979)
- Dickinson v. The State of Fla. ex rel. Claude B. Bryant, 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969)
- State v. DeLEO, 356 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1978)
- Ingram v. State, 369 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1979)