WILTON LEE, JO PAT MASONRY, INC., AND GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
MARILYN G. DUNNIGAN, JAMES T. DUNNIGAN, AND ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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In this negligence case involving a multi-vehicle collision, the appellants sought contribution from the appellees based on comparative negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the appellees, but the appellate court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the appellees were joint tortfeasors and whether they were negligent in maintaining control of their vehicle.
Summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed. A reasonable fact-finder could infer from the evidence that Dunnigan should have maintained greater distance or driven slower due to wet road conditions, establishing potential negligence. Additionally, because the collisions were separated by 20 to 30 seconds, a factual question existed as to whether Lee and Dunnigan were joint tortfeasors.
[1] A driver who is unable to stop their vehicle before colliding with another vehicle in their lane of traffic is presumed to be negligent.
[2] To avoid liability based on the sudden emergency doctrine, a driver must demonstrate that an unexpected or extraordinary event was the sole cause of the accident.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A driver who is not able to stop his vehicle before it runs into another vehicle in his lane of traffic is presumed to be negligent.”
Establishes the legal standard for negligence in rear-end collision cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilton Lee made a left turn in a pickup truck and collided with a southbound station wagon driven by Rebecca Kirkham. Marilyn Dunnigan, driving a Merc…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Appellants filed a third-party complaint against appellees seeking contribution on the ground that appellees were comparatively negligent in an automobile accident. Appellants challenge the trial court’s award of summary final judgment to appellees, contending there was a genuine issue of material fact. We agree and reverse.
While driving a pickup truck north on a highway in Clearwater, Florida, appellant Wilton Lee made a left turn, colliding with a southbound station wagon driven by Rebecca Kirkham. Appellee Marilyn Dunni-gan was driving her Mercury automobile south just behind Kirkham’s station wagon and struck the station wagon following its collision with the pickup truck. When Kirkham brought action against Lee and the owner of the truck he was driving, they, in turn, asserted a third-party claim against Dunnigan seeking contribution on the ground that they and Dunnigan were joint tortfeasors. Subsequently, the court granted Dunnigan’s motion for summary judgment on the third-party claim.
A driver who is not able to stop his vehicle before it runs into another vehicle in his lane of traffic is presumed to be negligent. Sawyer v. Dawson, 215 So. 2d 764 (Fla.3d DCA 1968), cert. dismissed, 225 So. 2d 532 (Fla.1969). Here Dunnigan defended on the ground that she was faced with a sudden emergency and could not stop her Mercury in time to avoid hitting Kirkham’s station wagon. To avoid liability she must show that an unexpected or extraordinary event was the sole cause of the accident. Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619 (Fla.1959). Here, there were several affidavits and depositions before the court when it heard the motion for summary judgment. Both Dunnigan and a disinterested witness to the accident stated that the road was wet and slippery at the time of the accident. Another witness said that the collision of Dunnigan’s station wagon and Kirkham’s Mercury occurred some 20 to 30 seconds after Lee’s pickup truck struck the Mercury. A finder of fact could infer from these statements that Dunnigan should have maintained a greater distance between her Mercury and the station wagon or should have been driving at a slower speed because of the road conditions. From this the fact-finder could conclude that Dunnigan was negligent in not having her car under control when she collided with the Kirkham vehicle. See 114 So. 2d at 621.
Lee seeks contribution under Section 768.31(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), contending that he and Dunnigan were joint tortfeasors. If the collisions of Lee’s and Dunnigan’s vehicles with Kirkham’s station wagon were separated by a substantial period of time, however, they were not joint tortfeasors liable for contribution. See Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis.2d 578, 135 N.W. 2d 284 (1965). Because one witness testified that the collisions occurred 20 to 30 seconds apart, there existed a factual issue as to whether Lee and Dunnigan were joint tort-feasors. Thus, genuine issues of material fact existed which precluded summary judgment.1 Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1966).
Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
DANAHY and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur. . The introduction of the doctrine of comparative negligence in 1973 and the onerous burden of a movant for summary judgment in a negligence action require a trial judge to exercise caution in considering a motion for summary judgment in such an action. Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla.1977); U. S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 362 So. 2d 414 (Fla.2d DCA 1978).
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Gertrude Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…ny substantial or reasonable explanation for his failure to avoid the collision. [Emphasis supplied.] Id. at 657. See also Baughman v. Vann, 390 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Stewart v. Scribner, 390 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Lee v. Dunnigan, 384 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Cowart v. Barnes, 370 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1979). After analyzing the above cases we conclude that the facts in the instant ease warrant a directed verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue…
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Salazar v. Santos (Harry) & Co., Inc., 537 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…Regarding the first claim, witnesses established that had Kessler been following at a safe distance the second accident would not have occurred. This evidence was sufficient to present a jury question on the issue of negligence. See Lee v. Dunnigan, 384 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Rivenbark v. Johns, 205 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); § 316.0895 Fla.Stat. (1987). As to the issue of legal causation, the jury had before it evidence that either impact could have caused death and that the death was in fact c…
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Authorities Cited
- Wills v. Sears, 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977)
- Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1966)
- Bellere v. Einar Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1959)
- U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. & Phillip Hurlock, 362 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Sawyer v. Dawson, 215 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Sawyer v. Dawson, 225 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1969)