GRIFFIN BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
RUTH JONES, APPELLEE
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Griffin Builders Supply appeals summary judgment granted in favor of Jones on a construction contract dispute. The court reversed, finding that a release document signed by Griffin's supervisor was ambiguous regarding whether it constituted a full release of all claims or allowed for future payment demands, creating a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
The court held that the release was ambiguous and thus created a genuine issue of material fact regarding its proper interpretation, precluding summary judgment. The language 'final payment in full' implied a general release, while 'or any amount due or to become due' implied further payments might be anticipated, making the contract's meaning a question for a fact-finder.
[1] A party cannot avoid the effect of a release by asserting they did not read it before signing.
[2] An ambiguous contract creates genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That in addition to the above listed amounts, if any, there is now due said contractor the final payment in full on said improvements in the sum of $7,506.25; or any amount due or to become due thereunder; that payment to said contractor of said sums shall constitute a full release by said contractor of any and all claims arising out of said contract.”
The language of the release document that appellant relies upon, showing the ambiguous phrasing that prevents summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGriffin Builders Supply and Jones entered into an oral contract for construction at cost plus $3,817.62 profit. After substantial completion, Griffin'…
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[*266] RYDER, Judge.
Griffin Builders Supply, Inc. appeals the grant of summary judgment to appellee Jones, alleging that material issues of disputed facts remain regarding the effect of a release signed by appellant’s representative. We agree.
Appellant and appellee allegedly entered into an oral contract for appellant to build a house for appellee in return for costs plus an agreed profit of $3,817.62. After substantially completing construction, appellant’s supervisor executed a contractor’s affidavit to obtain the remainder of mortgage proceeds from Coast Federal Savings and Loan Association. The affidavit stated:
That in addition to the above listed amounts, if any, there is now due said contractor the final payment in full on said improvements in the sum of $7,506.25; or any amount due or to become due thereunder; that payment to said contractor of said sums shall constitute a full release by said contractor of any and all claims arising out of said contract.
Appellant accepted the $7,506.25. Bloomport, appellant’s supervisor, averred by affidavit that he gave Coast Federal, as appellee’s agent, the affidavit only to obtain the money and did not intend that the document release appellee from further payment under the contract. The alleged costs plus agreed profit exceeded payments by $3,757.33 after the final mortgage payment was made, and appellant sought that additional amount from appellee. We reject the contention of appellant’s supervisor, since a releasor cannot avoid the effect of a release by stating that he did not read it before signing. See Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 111 So. 525 (1927); 66 Am.Jur.2d Release § 15 (1973).
The affidavit provides for the final payment of the mortgage proceeds to appellant to be a full release of claims from the contract with appellee. Appellant urges that inclusion of the phrase “or any amount due or to become due thereunder” implies that later payments could be required. The release is ambiguous, since the language “or any amount due or to become due” implies that further payments may be anticipated, while the words “final payment in full” imply general release.
We have held that an ambiguous contract creates genuine issues of material fact as to the correct interpretation of the contract, thus precluding summary judgment. Tampa Electric Co. v. Florida Power Corp., 267 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). See Buckel Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 370 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). When the wording of an agreement is ambiguous and parties suggest different interpretations, the issue of proper interpretation becomes one of fact precluding grant of summary judgment. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. In-sink-erator, 252 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Commercial Trading Co. v. Zero Food Storage, Inc., 199 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
The release considered below was ambiguous and thus created genuine issues of material fact. The summary judgment is REVERSED, and the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
GRIMES, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Bacardi v. Bacardi, 386 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…the parties suggest different interpretations, the issue of the proper interpretation is an issue of fact requiring the submission of evidence extrinsic to the contract bearing upon the intent of the parties. Griffin Builders Supply, Inc. v. Jones, 384 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); MacKenzie v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). No such evidence was heard by the general master or trial court in the present case. Instead, the order appealed from was necessarily based upon a conclusio…
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Phillip and Delores Floyd v. Homes Beautiful Constr. Co., 710 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…judgment. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Steve Hull Chevrolet, Inc., 513 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Gulfstream Bank, N.A. v. Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., 438 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and Griffin Builders Supply, Inc. v. Jones, 384 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). It is not apparent from the four comers of the release what “claims” the parties intended to release. For example, it is not apparent whether the modifying language “presently existing” bars a cause of action relating to a defect…
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S & T Anchorage, Inc. v. Lewis, 575 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…c. v. Zero Food Storage, Inc., 199 So. 2d 109, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied 204 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1967); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Steve Hull Chevrolet, Inc., 513 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Griffin Builders Supply, Inc. v. Jones, 384 So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). We find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Jonathan Lewis has individual rights, separate and distinct from his derivative rights as a member of the Association. Having determined that Anchorage reli…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30 (Fla. 1927)
- Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. In-Sink-Erator, 252 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Commercial Trading Co., Inc. v. Zero Food Storage, Inc., 199 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Buckel Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. OF Md. & Jones & Braido, Inc., 370 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Tampa Elec. Co. v. Fla. Power Corp., 267 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)