ELIJAH BOWLES, APPELLANT,
v.
VICKIE BOWLES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this family law appeal, a husband challenges a trial court's temporary order granting his wife exclusive possession of the marital home and primary custody of the children pending final dissolution. The Florida appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making these temporary arrangements.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the wife exclusive temporary possession of the marital home or in awarding her primary temporary custody of the children. The trial court was authorized to order the parties to live separately when circumstances warrant, and the record here supported such an order based on evidence of quarreling and fighting between the parties and the practical arrangement that the husband had another residence available.
[1] An order granting a party exclusive possession of the marital home pending final dissolution is an appealable non-final order.
[2] A trial court may require parties to live separately if public decency, the safety of the parties, or the welfare of the children requires it.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the matter is one vested very largely in his discretion, it is the settled law of this State that he may require the parties to live separately if public decency, the safety of the parties or the welfare of the children requires.”
Establishes the legal standard for granting exclusive possession of the marital home in domestic relations cases
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring divorce proceedings, the trial court initially issued a restraining order at the wife's request requiring the husband to vacate the marital hom…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Public Decency cases and more on FLexlaw
BERANEK, Judge.
This is an appeal by husband from a non-final order of the trial court giving wife custody of the children and exclusive possession of the marital home pending final dissolution. This is an appealable non-final order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii).
Initially, a restraining order was issued by the trial court on the request of the wife. It provided that the husband was to vacate the marital home and that he was restrained from taking any of the children from home or school. Husband then filed a motion to dissolve the restraining order and a motion for temporary custody of the children. After a hearing the trial court entered an order ratifying the previous order but allowing husband reasonable visitation with his children and allowing him to keep the two oldest children on week-ends.
Husband appeals the trial court’s order maintaining there was insufficient basis for temporarily granting exclusive possession of the marital home to the wife absent a showing that public decency, safety of the parties or welfare of the children is adversely affected. Husband also contends the trial court erred in not awarding the husband temporary custody of the children maintaining that the wife is unstable, has recently attempted suicide and cannot control the children.
The record before this court is meager, consisting of a transcript of hearing where only the husband and his nephew testified. The trial court determined that the husband had another house to live in and husband’s attorney agreed that wife could live in the marital home unmolested until the case was litigated to a conclusion.
Husband argues that the order was in error, relying upon Daniel v, Daniel, 236 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). There the court found it error under the facts of that case to temporarily exclude husband from the marital home absent evidence of quarreling or fighting or any adverse effect upon the children. In this case, however, there was testimony in the record indicating that husband and wife were quarreling and fighting. Furthermore, as stated above, the husband’s attorney seemed to agree the wife could live unmolested in the house on a temporary basis since the husband had another house in which to live. We cannot say the trial court erred. In Burnett v. Burnett, 158 Fla. 464, 28 So. 2d 878 (1947), it was suggested by counsel that the trial court believed it was without legal authority to order husband from the home. The Supreme Court commented:
If the chancellor was in fact of this view, he was in error. While the matter is one vested very largely in his discretion, it is the settled law of this State that he may require the parties to live separately if public decency, the safety of the parties or the welfare of the children requires.
Here, the trial court acted within his discretion.
With respect to husband’s petition for temporary custody of the children, we similarly find no abuse of discretion. Other than a mere reference by the husband and nephew to a suicide attempt by wife, there is no evidence that she cannot care for the children. On the contrary, the husband testified she does take care of the children, is a good mother, and that she loves them. The trial court’s exercise of discretion as to temporary child custody should thus not be disturbed.
AFFIRMED.
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ion v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Orders providing for temporary custody or temporary primary residential care are appropriate to enter while the case is pending before the entry of final judgment. See, e.g., Bowles v. Bowles, 384 So. 2d 299, 300-301 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (non-final order awarding wife temporary custody of the children pending final dissolution proper and should not be disturbed); Blass v. Blass, 316 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (where evidence as to which parent sh…
-
Migliore v. Migliore, 792 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…n filed here. Sume v. State, 773 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Husband challenges the temporary custody and attorneys fees awards. They are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and no abuse of discretion has been shown. Bowles v. Bowles, 384 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Robbie v. Robbie, 591 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Wiederhold v. Wiederhold, 655 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Both parties have appealed the child support award. The trial court chose not to apply the child support guide…
-
Gallivan v. Gallivan, 743 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…s, the trial court is required to determine matters of child custody in accordance with the best interests of the minor children. See § 61.13(2)(b)l., Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); Kuutti v. Kuutti, 645 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Bowles v. Bowles, 384 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Our review of the record and the June 4 order convinces us that the parties and the court clearly contemplated that some evidence bearing on the wife’s current ability to care for the children would be taken prior to the childre…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Daniel v. Daniel, 236 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Maude A. Burnett v. Burnett, 158 Fla. 464 (Fla. 1947)