STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL PUCKETT, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1980-05-16
No. 79-2026
BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur.
384 So. 2d 660 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1980) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

The State appealed the dismissal of burglary charges against a 17-year-old juvenile. The trial court dismissed the information for allegedly violating a 45-day filing deadline, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the 45-day deadline in Section 39.05(6) applies only to petitions alleging delinquency, not to informations filed against older juveniles.


Holding

The 45-day deadline in Section 39.05(6) applies only to petitions alleging delinquency and does not apply to informations. The Legislature, by amending Section 39.04(2)(e) to permit informations against older juveniles without simultaneously amending Section 39.05(6), did not intend the 45-day deadline to apply to informations.


Headnotes

[1] A statute that expressly applies to a "petition" does not apply to an "information" unless the statute is amended to include informations.

[2] The 45-day time limit for filing a petition alleging delinquency does not apply to the filing of an information against a juvenile.

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Key Quotes

“Section 39.05 is entitled 'Petition' and subsection 6, by its terms, applies only to a petition. We believe that had the legislature intended that Section 39.05(6) apply to the filing of an information, it would have so amended subsection (6).”

The court's rationale for why the 45-day deadline does not apply to informations filed against older juveniles, based on the plain language and structure of the statute.

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Facts & Procedural History

Michael Puckett, age 17, was taken into custody on August 2, 1979 for burglary of a dwelling and held in juvenile detention until August 23, 1979. An …

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Opinion of the Court
HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.

HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.

The State of Florida appeals from an order granting Michael Puckett’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.

On August 2, 1979, Puckett, a seventeen-year-old, was taken into custody for the burglary of a dwelling. He was held in detention at the juvenile facilities from August 2, 1979 until August 23, 1979, at which time he was released pursuant to an order of the court. On September 28, 1979, an information was filed charging Puckett with burglary of a dwelling. On October 17, 1979, Puckett filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice on the ground that the information was not timely filed. The motion was granted, and the State appealed.

Puckett’s motion to dismiss was based on Sections 39.04(2)(e) and 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (1979). Section 39.04(2)(e) allows the state attorney to file a petition for dependency, a petition for delinquency or, in certain cases, when the child is 16 or 17 years old, an information. Section 39.05(6) provides that a petition alleging delinquency will be dismissed with prejudice if not filed within 45 days from the date that the complaint was referred to the intake office of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Puckett contends that Section 39.05(6) existed prior to the amendment of Section 39.04(2)(e), permitting in-formations to be filed against 16 or 17 year-old juveniles. He submits that the use of the word “petition” alleging delinquency in Section 39.05(6) must, subsequent to the amendment in 1978, include informations. We disagree.

An examination of the history of Sections 39.04 and 39.05 reveals that both statutes were amended by Chapter 78 — 414, Laws of Florida. Section 39.04(2)(e)(4) was amended to allow the State’s attorney to file an information when in his judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be imposed on a 16 or 17 year-old juvenile. Section 39.05(6) was amended to allow the State 45 days, rather than the previous 30 days, from the date the complaint was referred to the intake office to file a petition alleging delinquency. This section provides that if the petition is not filed within 45 days it will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 39.05 is entitled “Petition” and subsection 6, by its terms, applies only to a petition. We believe that had the legislature intended that Section 39.05(6) apply to the filing of an information, it would have so amended subsection (6). Since Section 39.05(6) expressly states that it applies to a petition, it should not be read to apply to an information.

Accordingly, the order granting Puckett’s motion to dismiss with prejudice is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the information.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • D.C.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1984)
    …should not be able to look to the comforting assurances of juvenile procedures, including the 45-day filing requirement. The state relies on Parr v. State, 415 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla.1982) and State v. Puckett, 384 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The state also relies on I.H. v. State, 405 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1982), where it was held that for purposes of the juvenile filing time limit, an information setting forth adult charge…
    1 / 2
  • Parr v. State, 415 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
    …ry hearings which, by definition, means those cases pending before the juvenile court. Thus, a child who is subject to adult proceedings and sanctions cannot rely upon the special treatment established for juvenile proceedings. See State v. Puckett, 384 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The legislature, then, has reposed broad discretion in the state attorney to prosecute certain juveniles as adults and if a child meets the statutory criteria, he should be treated as an adult in all respects. This brings us to…
  • Bell v. State, 479 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …at the forty- [*309] five day period established by section 39.-05(6) and the ninety day juvenile speedy trial rule were inapplicable to a child against whom an information had been properly filed under section 39.04(2)(e)4. Accord State v. Puckett, 384 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (section 39.05(6) applies only to the filing of a petition for delinquency). We opt to follow the rationale of Parr. There is nothing in the statute or court rules that indicates the time limitations relating to juvenile proceedi…

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