F. P. CONCANNON AND HELENA H. CONCANNON, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM V. ST. JOHN, JR., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Canannons appealed a judgment finding that appellee St. John owned a disputed liquor license. The court reversed, holding that St. John never acquired ownership of the license because he paid no consideration to the Canannons (the true owners) and the agreement constituted only a lease, not a sale of the license.
St. John did not acquire ownership of the liquor license. A statutory transfer of a liquor license to the State Beverage Department does not transfer property rights absent the usual incidents of a true sale, including consideration. Here, the lack of consideration to the Canannons and the agreement's language establishing only a lease relationship preclude transfer of ownership.
[1] A liquor license transfer to satisfy state records is not a transfer of property rights absent the usual incidents of a true sale, including consideration.
[2] Ambiguous contract language drafted by one party is construed against that party.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A statutory transfer of a liquor license to satisfy the records of the State Beverage Department is not a transfer of property rights in the license to the purchaser of a business Wright v. Cade, 349 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), absent the usual incidents of a true sale, which includes consideration.”
Establishes that administrative license transfers do not convey ownership rights without consideration and the elements of a true sale.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Canannons owned a liquor license and transferred it to St. John's predecessor under a lease agreement that expressly stated the license belonged t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
ORFINGER, Judge.
This appeal questions the final judgment below finding the appellee to be the owner of the liquor license whose ownership is disputed.
It is clear from the record that appellants were the owners of the liquor license in question and transferred it to appellee’s predecessor under a lease of the premises and by virtue of lease terms which clearly stated that the license belonged to appellants. It is equally clear that when appellee purchased the business from the original lessee’s estate and entered into a new lease with appellant, he paid appellant nothing for the license. His only payments to appellant were the periodic rent payments called for under the lease. The only consideration paid by appellee was to the personal representative of the former owner of the business, who clearly did not own the liquor license and therefore could not sell it. Appellee bought the business and leased the premises, and secured a transfer of the license under an agreement to reassign it at the termination of the lease. Although there is an ambiguity in the agreement to reassign, the particular language in question was drafted by appellee’s attorney, so they are construed against appellee as the drafter thereof. American Agronomics Corporation v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
Appellant in answering the amended complaint clearly raised the issue of lack of consideration for the transfer of ownership of the liquor license. A statutory transfer of a liquor license to satisfy the records of the State Beverage Department is not a transfer of property rights in the license to the purchaser of a business Wright v. Cade, 349 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), absent the usual incidents of a true sale, which includes consideration. Because the evidence is clear that the transfer of the liquor license was not supported by consideration to appellant and because the proper interpretation of the agreement in the context supports only a lease, not a sale of the license, we must reverse the judgment.
The judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded for the entry of judgment for appellant.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
CROSS, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Coney v. First State Bank OF Miami, 405 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…as filed no brief on this appeal. For purposes of this opinion, we treat the Gonzalezes as the lessors. . A statutory transfer to satisfy the records of the Division is not, however, the same as a transfer of property rights. Concannon v. St. John, 384 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Wright v. Cade, 349 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). What Abbassi owns and what the Division treats him as owning are two different things. . Anomalously, the Division does recognize the lien of a lender at least to the extent o…
-
Santiago v. Allen, 449 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…was to revert back to the defendants. Such arrangements have been recognized by the courts and are not contrary to public policy. See Wright v. Cade, 349 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 716 (Fla.1978); Concannon v. St. John, 384 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Coney v. First State Bank of Miami, 405 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Although the' defendants are the “owners” of a rever-sionary interest in the liquor license, Gene Willner, sole stockholder and officer of Astral Liquors, In…
-
Montez Howard v. Metcalf, 487 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…cannot agree. The Division’s transfer of a liquor license, a function it is obligated to fulfill under section 561.32, Florida Statutes (1985), neither transfers property rights nor vests title in the purchaser of the license. Concannon v. St. John, 384 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Wright v. Cade, 349 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Such transfer serves only to maintain record continuity in the ownership and management of a liquor business in order that it may be regulated pursuant to Chapter 561. See Sant…
Authorities Cited
- Am. Agronomics Corp. v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Wright v. Cade, 349 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)