BAY CADILLAC, INC., AND LYNN UNDERWRITING COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
LUTHER RAY INGRAM, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's award of benefits for unauthorized medical services, temporary total disability, and future medical treatment, finding that the claimant failed to establish that Dr. Dunne's services were authorized beyond electromyographic studies or that he was totally disabled from work.
The court held that Dr. Dunne's authorization was limited to performing electromyographic studies only, not general medical treatment, so the carrier was not obligated to pay for his services or related pharmaceuticals and hospital bills. The court also held that Dr. Dunne never opined that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled, only that the claimant had limitations as an auto body repairman. Finally, the court held there was no showing that the 1977 accident resulted in residual injury requiring future medical treatment.
[1] A carrier's authorization for a doctor's services is limited to the specific purpose for which authorization was granted.
[2] A finding of temporary total disability is not supported by a doctor's opinion that merely places limitations on a claimant's ability to function in a specific occupation…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The judge's finding that the carrier specifically authorized treatment by Dr. Dunne is not supported by the record. Dr. Dunne's authorization was for the limited purpose of performing the electro-myographic studies.”
Establishes that Dr. Dunne's authorization was limited in scope to specific diagnostic studies, not general medical treatment.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA skilled mechanic suffered compensable accidents in 1976 and 1977. After the 1977 accident, he was treated for cervical strain by Dr. Vega, prescribe…
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PER CURIAM.
The claimant, a skilled mechanic, suffered compensable accidents in 1976 and 1977. As a result of the latter accident he was initially treated by Dr. Vega for cervical strain and, in light of continued complaints, referred to Dr. Gipson who prescribed the drug Fiorinal.
In November of 1977 the claimant returned to Dr. Vega who, on November 22, advised him to return to full-time employment. He was discharged on November 25, with the notation that he had suffered no permanent injury.
In March of 1978 he went to Dr. Wilson for an orthopedic evaluation. It was determined that electromyographic studies would be useful and he was given a list of several doctors who were authorized by the carrier to perform the studies. Included in this list was the name of Peter B. Dunne. The claimant, however, opted to have Dr. Arthur Pasach’s office do the studies and there was no further request for Dr. Dunne’s services. The judge’s finding that the carrier specifically authorized treatment by Dr. Dunne is not supported by the record. Dr. Dunne’s authorization was for the limited purpose of performing the electro-myographic studies. Based upon our conclusion that Dr. Dunne’s services were unauthorized, the order under review is reversed insofar as it directs the carrier to pay for Dr. Dunne’s services, pharmaceuticals prescribed by the doctor and the medical bills resulting from hospital confinement by the doctor. We find it necessary also to reverse the judge’s finding of temporary total disability commencing November 11, 1977. The order states: “It is Dr. Dunne’s opinion that Mr. Ingram is temporarily totally disabled and in need of medical treatment . .” Here again the record does not support the finding. We have reviewed Dr. Dunne’s testimony, and it is clear that he merely placed limitations upon claimant’s ability to function as an automobile body repairman. He never opined, as found by the judge, that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled. Claimant gave as his reasons for not returning to work his use of the drug Fiorinal and advice from his doctors. There is absolutely no showing that claimant’s use of medication was so incapacitating as to totally preclude employment. The order is reversed as to this point.
According to Doctors Gilberto E. Vega and Albert A. Wilson, the November 1, 1977 accident resulted in a cervical strain (a pulled muscle or tendon between the neck and shoulder blades). Dr. Vega testified that the claimant attained maximum medical improvement on November 25, 1977. There is no showing that there was any residual from the 1977 accident that would require future medical treatment. The lower back problems were not shown to have originated from, or been exacerbated by, the 1977 accident. The award for future medical treatment and the award of an attorney’s fee are accordingly reversed.
SHAW, J., and WOODIE A. LILES (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur. BOOTH, J., dissents with opinion.
BOOTH, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Crews v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 378 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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Reynolds v. Neisner Bros., Inc., 436 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…atutes, as it is supported by the evidence. The record does not contain testimony of any residual need for future medical treatment once claimant reached MMI with directions that she return to work with limitations. See Bay Cadillac, Inc. v. Ingram, 384 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Accordingly, we affirm on this point. Both appellant and appellee agree that Reynolds’ AWW was erroneously calculated by the deputy. The AWW amount stated in the order was apparently derived from her earnings as of the time of…
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Fcci Mut. Ins. Co. & Interlachen Country Club v. Schnupp, 697 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…thopedist in Jacksonville she had already begun seeing.8 Without [*1240] elaboration, this request asserted that she “was not receiving adequate care.” The request made no mention of surgery or any medical specialty. Cf Bay Cadillac, Inc. v. Ingram, 384 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)(holding physician authorized to perform electromyographic study was not authorized to render other treatment). This is not a case in which the claimant’s request for a physician amounts to a request for care of a type not previou…
Authorities Cited
- Emerson Crews v. Town OF BAY Harbor Islands & Metro. Dade Cnty. Self Ins. Fund, 378 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)